The Price of Victory in Iraq: Shi'a Militias and Sectarian Violence

The conflict in Iraq has steadily turned against the Islamic State (IS) militant group, highlighted by the loss of the group’s stronghold of Fallujah to an Iraqi army offensive in late June. However, to realise these defeats, the Iraqi government has relied on the involvement of Shi’a Muslim militias, over which the government has exercised limited control. These groups have been accused of various human rights abuses against Sunni civilians. As the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) steadily move to retake the IS-held city of Mosul, the involvement of these militias threatens to exacerbate already-pronounced sectarian tensions in ‘liberated’ areas. 

Shi’a militias – notably the Iran-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah – were integral in the offensive against Fallujah. However, this involvement has come with reportedly severe consequences. Following the clearing of IS from the city, Kata’ib Hezbollah allegedly seized some 900 civilian men from the village of Saqlawiyah, near Fallujah, and subjected up to 50 of them to extra-judicial killings. Similar incidents, including torture and forced disappearances, were reported during Shi’a militia operations in Tikrit in April 2015, as well as following operations in the eastern Diyala Governorate. Many of these incidents have been interpreted as revenge attacks by Shi’a militias against Sunni communities, who Shi’a militia members believe are complicit in IS’s occupation. 

In some areas, Shi’a militias have come to closely resemble IS, engaging in kidnapping for ransom and extortion rackets. For instance, on the primary road route between the Iranian border and Iraqi Kurdistan, long-haul truck drivers have reportedly been extorted by the Hashd Al Shaabi militia, which claims to have 100,000 fighters operating alongside the ISF. Other drivers report that Shi’a militia fighters have kidnapped their relatives, in one case demanding an IQD 10 million (USD 7,800) ransom. While Hashd Al Shaabi commanders have denied the accusations and blamed local criminals masquerading as militia members, the damaging impression that Shi’a militias are merely a replacement for IS is one that proliferates throughout Sunni communities. 

Kidnappings by Shi’a militias have also targeted foreign nationals. Most prominently, in January 2016, three US security contractors were abducted by a Shi’a militia from an apartment in the capital, Baghdad. While the three were released unharmed a month later, following intensive negotiations with the Iraqi government, the incident highlighted the lack of control that the government holds over these militias. 

These dynamics threaten to prolong Iraq’s instability even as IS’s strength begins to wane, as the same sectarian tensions which promoted the group’s formation continue to be exploited. Despite this, the Iraqi government is unlikely to make a concerted effort to rein in the Shi’a militias. In March, the Nineveh Provincial Council reportedly called for an exclusion of Hashd Al Shaabi from the impending Mosul operation out of fears that the militia’s involvement would spark greater sectarian violence. However, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi has refused the request, retorting that “nobody can stop Iraqis from participating in the liberation of their land”. However, in Mosul and Iraq’s Sunni areas, the cost of ‘liberation’ may be higher than Al Abadi expects to pay.