The ‘Lone Wolf' Problem

On 15 December, Australia was shaken by a rare violent act when Man Haron Monis, an Iranian refugee and self-proclaimed sheikh, held 17 customers and staff hostage at the Lindt Chocolate Café in Martin Place, Sydney. After spending 15 hours attempting to negotiate with Monis, security forces stormed the building. Two hostages and Monis himself were killed in the assault while three others were injured. Even though Monis was not affiliated with any terrorist group, for many Australians his actions were the realisation of a threat which had been building for months.

The emergence of Islamic State (‘IS’) in Iraq and Syria as one of the most capable global jihadist groups has long concerned the Australian government. In recent speeches Tony Abbott, the Australian Prime Minister, highlighted the danger presented by Australian citizens travelling to the Middle East to fight for jihadist groups, such as IS, and returning home with the necessary training to carry out terrorist attacks. Since September, the Australian government has introduced tough new anti-terror legislation designed to combat this perceived threat. Amongst other measures, the new laws granted the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (‘ASIO’), the country’s internal intelligence agency, broader permissions to access and monitor computer networks, and also introduced sentences of up to 10 years for journalists and whistle-blowers who disclose information regarding ongoing intelligence operations. Travel restrictions have been imposed, criminalising travel to regions suffering from high levels of terrorism, and ASIO has been granted new powers to detain, without charge, suspected Islamist militants returning from overseas. Although these measures address the threat of attacks by organised terror cells that necessitate coordination and communication between members, they are of limited use when dealing with self-radicalised individuals such as Monis.

Monis was known to the Australian authorities but principally due to his criminal record, which included charges of sexual assault, writing hate mail to the families of Australian servicemen killed in Afghanistan, and being an accessory to the murder of his former wife. Monis was underestimated as a threat since he did not fit the typical image of a jihadi – trained overseas and with links to extremist groups - that Australia’s new terror legislation targets. Monis was a late convert to the radical interpretation of Sunni Islam promoted by IS: just weeks before the attack he announced on his website that he had converted from Shia to Sunni Islam and pledged his allegiance to the caliphate declared by IS. This late conversion and the disorganised nature of his attack supports the fact that he did not have any formal links with foreign jihadist groups.

This was also made apparent during the siege itself when Monis initially displayed a standard black Islamic banner, but reportedly later asked to be brought an IS flag instead. Monis’ operation, haphazardly planned and carried out, bears little resemblance to the highly coordinated and meticulously planned attacks which the Australian government has prepared itself for.

Although it came as a shock, the Sydney Siege can be seen as the latest in a string of so-called ‘lone wolf attacks’, conducted by individuals acting outside of established terrorist networks. In early December, an Emirati woman, reportedly inspired by terrorist ideology published online, stabbed and killed an American teacher in a shopping mall in Abu Dhabi. In November, a Danish man was shot and wounded, by supposed IS sympathisers, whilst driving from his workplace in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In October, two separate lone wolf attacks in Ottawa and Montreal killed two Canadian soldiers. Such attacks tend to be spontaneous and unpredictable, making it difficult for security services to counter them. Not all recent lone wolf attacks can be traced back to a specific group; however, they follow IS statements urging supporters and sympathisers to carry out spontaneous attacks on Westerners in retaliation for the US-led air strikes targeting its fighters. Furthermore, unlike other jihadi groups that dabble with social media, IS has developed a sophisticated PR machine which has captured an extensive following thanks to the group’s success on the battlefield. Consequently, IS has a strong platform to spread its radical ideology, allowing the organisation to influence impressionable individuals who may not be on terrorist watch lists. This creates an elusive threat that cannot be predicted by security forces and has not been effectively addressed by Australia’s new terror laws. Even though the Sydney Siege was not carried out by seasoned jihadists, Australia’s fears of an attack from home-grown IS militants were, nevertheless, indirectly realised. It is unreasonable to expect governments to detect and prevent all lone wolf attacks; however, given Monis’ profile, questions have been raised over whether his attack could have been stopped through other means. For example, stricter gun controls and better provision of mental health services for Monis once he became known to the authorities could have prevented him from carrying out his operation.