The Islamic State in Libya

On 8 February 2015, the Islamic State (IS) released a video recording of what has become a familiar scene over the past year: an English-speaking jihadi delivered a scripted, politically-charged statement, then presided over the brutal mass execution of a group of orange-clad prisoners. However, the backdrop to the latest release was some distance from the bomb-cratered streets of Raqqa or Mosul, or the Syrian Desert. Rather, the video depicted a rocky coastline near the city of Sirte in northern Libya – the most recently claimed territory of the Islamic State in Libya. The victims were stated to be 21 Coptic Christians from neighbouring Egypt. In the months prior to the video’s release, Islamist militant activity had intensified across Libya. A deadly attack on foreign nationals in Tripoli, and multiple assaults on oil facilities and pipelines in the interior all claimed by IS have fuelled fears that the group is establishing a foothold in North Africa. This latest video marks a substantial and worrying deterioration in the security environment in Libya, which has previously been dominated by a conflict between two competing political factions.

Of all the prospective regions in which IS could establish itself, Libya has long been a frontrunner. Persistent instability since the 2011 revolution gave way in mid-2014 to a renewed civil war between the pro-Islamist Libya Dawn alliance, based in Tripoli, and the Tobrukbased forces of General Khalifa Haftar. The attendant lack of political and economic development opened up vast ungoverned spaces across the country where competing armed factions have asserted themselves with increasing vigour. IS, infamous for its use of savagely violent propaganda videos following military successes in Syria and Iraq, is the latest group to flourish in Libya’s political vacuum. IS has successfully penetrated Libya by building alliances with domestic militant groups and by establishing recruitment networks that seek to capitalise on pockets of Islamist sentiment that have been present in the eastern parts of the country since the 1990s. In the last quarter of 2014, IS envoys sent from Syria to forge links with Libyan jihadists facilitated pledges of allegiance to IS from a number of domestic militant groups, including the Derna-based Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam, and substantial sections of Ansar Al-Sharia, which operates primarily out of Benghazi.

In December 2014, IS’s main recruiters in Turkey instructed their Libya-based associates to stop sending militants to Syria, and instead concentrate on domestic operations. Until then, IS had focused on consolidating its core territories in Iraq and Syria. From a military standpoint, the decision to divert recruits into North Africa thus gave the impression that the group was dividing its strength. It appeared that opening a second front in Libya would divert valuable resources away from IS’s military efforts in the Levant. However, IS’s objectives stem from a deeply-entrenched ideological framework and go beyond running an insurgency against the Iraqi and Syrian governments. IS’s central goal is to establish a territory ruled by Islamic law – a caliphate – the fulfilment of which was proclaimed by the group in Iraq and Syria in June 2014. However, IS’s ideology requires that the group pursues the constant expansion of this caliphate as a matter of necessity, with much of IS’s legitimacy closely tied to its ability to conquer new territory. Accordingly, the stalemate in Iraq and Syria has driven IS to seek out other opportunities for expansion, with Libya being the obvious choice. By expanding into North Africa, apart from the practical benefits derived from further territorial expansion and control, IS is able to maintain and strengthen its legitimacy as a jihadist movement through the fulfilment of its overriding goal.
The group now calling itself the Islamic State of Libya has the potential to grow substantially in the coming months. As at the end of February 2015, IS in Libya claims to control the coastal cities of Derna, Sirte, and Nawfaliyah in northern and eastern Libya. Correspondingly, the most pressing concern of European governments is that IS may be attempting to establish a conduit to mainland Europe across the Mediterranean. Intercepted communiqués between IS members have supported this assessment, hinting at the access that could be provided by a Libyan base of operations to the southern European “Crusader” states, particularly Italy. Given the growing influx of North African refugees that arrive annually on the Italian coast, the sense of alarm is not unwarranted. While European coastal security provisions and the heightened state of vigilance across much of the continent are likely to constrain efforts by IS to carry out attacks, an attempt on the mainland is not unforeseeable should IS fortify its presence in Libya.

However, the more probable short-term outcome is that IS’s expansion will further compromise not only the fragile security environment in Libya itself, but also threaten to destabilise the wider region. Many of Libya’s neighbours, such as Algeria, Niger and Mali, are already engaged in long-term counterterrorism operations against well-established militant networks, which are likely to be ramped up following the emergence of Islamic State in Libya. The greatest risk is that IS will develop and strengthen relationships with groups in neighbouring countries, as has already occurred in Tunisia, where IS militant training facilities are run in coordination with affiliates from Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia. Recent actions by regional states reflect this fear.

For example, since early-February, Algeria and Tunisia have substantially bolstered the presence of security forces along their borders with Libya, whilst simultaneously cracking down on domestic extremist groups. Egypt’s response has been especially pronounced, with the Egyptian air force carrying out strikes on IS targets near Derna and Sirte in the immediate aftermath of the release of the recent IS execution video. There are also unconfirmed reports of Egyptian Special Forces conducting operations on Libyan soil against extremist groups in Benghazi.

Despite these concerns, Islamic State in Libya’s ability to replicate the massive territorial gains made by IS in Iraq and Syria is dubitable. Particularly in northern Iraq, IS did not have to compete with the sheer multitude of militant groups found in Libya – both pro and anti-Islamist. Whilst IS potentially has an edge on recruitment over these groups, the current military balance does not favour rapid expansion.

For instance, forces loyal to the Tripoli-based government have already deployed to the outskirts of Sirte to counter IS’s advance. This stands in stark contrast to Iraq, where IS advanced on and captured Mosul virtually unopposed. Even in Derna, which IS claims to be its centre of power in Libya, it must compete with other jihadist groups, such as the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade. This plethora of rival groups is likely to constrain IS’s ability to hold territory in Libya.

Nevertheless, IS promotes a narrative that is quickly gathering traction across the troubled region. As in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, the group’s recruitment tactics in Libya and North Africa have capitalised on the lack of prospects for the local youth amidst economic and political stagnation. IS’s savvy use of social media facilitates this process. In marketing terms, the IS “brand”, enhanced by extensive mainstream media coverage of the group’s military successes, has an appeal and a geographical reach far exceeding that possessed by any other militant group. As such, IS recruitment in Libya is able to draw not only upon local jihadist networks, but also upon networks in adjacent states, and even further afield. The recent Corinthia Hotel attack in Tripoli demonstrated the success of these efforts, with Tunisian and Sudanese nationals among the attackers. Whilst a rapid expansion is unlikely, these factors will contribute towards the longevity of the group’s presence in Libya. Barring the unlikely scenario of a Western military intervention that includes ground forces, the Islamic State of Libya looks set to be a feature of the Libyan security landscape for some time to come.