The Islamic State in 2018

In 2017, we witnessed many rudimentary attacks involving low-level tactics in Europe. Does this mark a shift in Islamic State’s strategy, away from more sophisticated attacks?

Commentators on terrorism like to talk about ‘shifts’ and ‘step changes’, but it is probably more accurate to think in terms of the threat fluctuating over time. For example, in March 2016 the Metropolitan Police’s head of counter-terrorism, Mark Rowley, warned that Islamic State was planning “enormous and spectacular” attacks. This was based on the reasonable assumption that Islamic State was planning to return fighters to their country of origin to conduct well-organised and complex attacks there. However, this is not what happened, and jihadists have reverted to using simpler and often very effective tactics. 

The reasons for these fluctuations are complex and thus not easily explained by one single factor. Taking a slightly longer-term view makes it clear that jihadists retain a range of options including bombings and shootings, as well as stabbings and vehicle ramming attacks – there is also good evidence that they intend to use other tactics, such as train derailments. So, whilst general trends are interesting, it is important to understand that they are not reliable indicators of how the threat will develop next. 

How much of a threat do foreign fighters pose to Europe in 2018? 

As Islamic State’s territory in Iraq and Syria expanded, many commentators assumed this would automatically increase the threat of foreign fighters returning to their country of origin to conduct attacks there. Later, when Islamic State’s so-called caliphate collapsed, commentators advised that this also would result in a wave of returning foreign fighters with combat experience. This interpretation seems inconsistent and based on supposition. Detailed analysis of foreign fighter numbers suggests the threat is significantly lower. 

Again, it is impossible to predict with any certainty whether the threat from returning fighters will change significantly in 2018, but a few factors are worth noting. Firstly, recent attacks in Western Europe have mostly not been conducted by foreign fighters. The use of simpler tactics has enabled these attacks to be successful, whilst minimising the risk of detection. Secondly, Western countries’ security services maintain a high rate of success in intercepting plots, despite clusters of successful attacks, such as in the UK in early 2017. Thirdly, as already noted, the pool of potential returnees is quite small. Thus, although undoubtedly a potentially significant concern, it is probably not beyond the capabilities of national security services in Europe to largely contain this aspect of the wider threat. 

Will Al Qaeda make a comeback in 2018 in terms of a terrorist threat to Western countries? 

Quite possibly, yes. Contrary to some media commentary, Al Qaeda never lapsed into insignificance, although the focus was on the rapidly emerging threat from Islamic State from 2014 onwards. With the lapse of Islamic State’s territory in Iraq and Syria, concern has partially shifted back to Al Qaeda. As usual, information is incomplete and sometimes contradictory, so it is not entirely clear if and to what extent Al Qaeda has reorganised. However, it does seem that the group has maintained a viable presence in several key countries, as well as exploiting new opportunities elsewhere. 

It is also worth noting that Al Qaeda, and not Islamic State, has been the driving force in promoting self-starter jihadist attacks in Western countries. For example, Al Qaeda publications have led the way in promoting tactics such as vehicle ramming attacks, stabbings and homemade bombs, and viable new tactics such as train derailment attacks have featured recently. Arguably, Al Qaeda has maintained its longer-term relevance.