The ISIS insurgency: A defining moment for Iraq

In December 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), an Islamist militant organisation headed by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi national, took control of two Iraqi cities, Ramadi and Fallujah, and quickly proceeded to occupy various areas in the western province of Anbar. Over the past few weeks, ISIS has extended its control over Niniveh, Salaheddin and Diyala, three Sunni-majority provinces in northern Iraq. As of 25 June 2014, ISIS controls two of the three major border crossings between Iraq and Syria, and has control of the Iraqi side of the Turaibil crossing with Jordan. This article addresses some of the causes of the current crisis before discussing several potential scenarios for how the crisis may develop over the coming weeks and months.

While ISIS’s intention to create an Islamic caliphate encompassing Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Israel and Kuwait is well known, the speed and success of its recent advance has surprised many observers and led them to reassess ISIS’s perceived capabilities. Analysts have reported that ISIS is well-organised and very well-funded. Their manpower, ranging between 3,000 and 8,000 fighters, is however minimal in comparison to the Iraqi Army, which comprises an estimated 800,000 soldiers. ISIS’s rapid advance not only uncovered the fragility of the Iraqi Army despite the extensive military training it has received over the last few years from various international actors, but it also highlighted widespread grievances among many interest groups in Iraq who have long been marginalised by the government of Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki.

Far from indiscriminate targeting, ISIS’s modus operandi has been clear from the start: relying on the support of aggrieved groups in Sunni-majority cities and provinces, including former elements of the Ba’athist regime of the late Saddam Hussain, as well as Sunni militia and tribal groupings, to create a ‘Sunni corridor’ into Baghdad. This strategy builds on the deep divides that exist in Iraq between the Sunni and Shi’a populations. In many of the ISIS-held cities, the local Sunni population has suffered years of political and social discrimination at the hands of the Iraqi government. Thus it is understandable why some Iraqis in Mosul and other cities have reportedly welcomed ISIS as a liberator from the “occupying forces” of the Shi’a central government.

Nonetheless, this reaction should not be mistaken as an endorsement of ISIS’s regional agenda on the part of the Iraqi population. Rather, the situation is the result of two interrelated trends: on the one hand, ISIS is using Sunni grievances against the government to gain influence in Iraq; on the other hand, Sunni elements – including supporters of the former Ba’athist regime – welcome the destabilisation of the central Shi’a government by ISIS and see it as a possible opening for Sunni interests in a post Al Maliki state. This is not to overlook the significant fault lines that exist within both the Sunni and Shi’a camps themselves. For example, ISIS militants and Ba’athist elements differ on the type of government that they foresee for Iraq, with the former working to establish an Islamic caliphate and the latter looking for political representation along the lines of the pre-2003 national government. In view of these complex alliances and the competing agendas of the various interest groups, there are a range of possible scenarios for how the crisis will develop.

Although various observers have suggested the possibility of an ISIS advance on Baghdad, it is unlikely the group will make significant inroads into Basra and the oil facilities in southern Iraq over the coming weeks. ISIS has so far specifically targeted Sunni-majority areas where they can rely on the support of the local population against government forces. The southern areas of Iraq are Shi’a-majority and as such are likely to present a stronger resistance to ISIS incursions by actively supporting the Iraqi Army.

However, the possibility remains that ISIS will exploit the momentum from their initial advance and carry out a spectacular attack on Western targets. Potential targets include oil and gas facilities in the south and diplomatic offices in Baghdad. Given ISIS’s recent split from Al-Qaeda, an attack against a western interest would serve to showcase its capabilities and establish its reputation vis-à-vis other militant groups in the region, as well as serving to attract new recruits. However, any attack on Western facilities would be met with strong military action and could accelerate direct Western intervention. As such, we assess an imminent attack is unlikely. This could change in the event of either ISIS changing its tactics or if the group was to splinter organisationally and lose control over certain fringe elements.

In the short term, it is more probable that ISIS will target high profile Shi’a religious sites, such as Najaf or Karbala. While such an attack would serve as a show of force, it would likely trigger a strong response from Iran. ISIS has so far benefited from the reluctance of foreign powers to directly enter Iraq, and it is unlikely to change its tactics prematurely. Nevertheless, Shi’a religious sites remain high-intent targets and possible showcase attacks cannot be ruled out.

Looking further ahead, the ISIS advance has increased the prospect of a full-scale civil war in Iraq. As well as violent sectarian conflict between Shi’a and Sunni groups, we are likely to witness internal fighting between ISIS and Ba’athist elements.

Even if ISIS’s expansion is halted, Sunni and Shi’a tensions will continue and will be exacerbated by any military support from neighbouring countries and the international community. In the longer term, we may witness the federalisation of Iraq along sectarian lines, broadly corresponding to the Sunni, Shi’a and Kurdish-dominated areas of the country. The Kurdish Regional Government already enjoys de facto political autonomy and the successful defence by the Peshmerga, the Kurdish security forces, of the disputed areas is likely to increase its negotiating power with the Iraqi government. 

Although recent events in Iraq were initially described by some observers as an invasion by terrorist forces, the context is far more complex. ISIS has played upon deep-seated sectarian tensions and political inequalities that have affected Iraq for years. While counter-terrorism measures are part of the solution, a military response will not resolve the deeper social and political problems that exist within the country. An inclusive political solution is urgently needed, but only one that avoids oversimplifying the context and addresses the root causes of the current crisis. Without this, Iraq faces the worrying risk of descending into full scale bloody civil war.