The carrot or the stick? Solving El Salvador's gang problem

May 2015 will be remembered as El Salvador’s deadliest month since the country’s civil war in 1992, with over 622 homicides. The recent surge in violence comes as President Salvador Sánchez Cerén reverts to a mano dura (iron fist) approach to combating gang violence in the country, a tactic frequently used by past administrations. Having opposed the 2012-2014 truce between the country’s two largest ‘Mara’ gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18, Cerén opted to renew the government’s military offensive after coming to power in 2014. Although unprecedented levels of gang violence suggest that this strategy is failing, many hope that an anticipated increase in US funding will bolster the government’s war against the Maras. However, because Cerén’s approach fails to address the underlying causes of gang violence in the country, it is likely to be unsuccessful. 

In March 2012, peace seemed to be on the cards, as rival MS-13 and Barrio 18 leaders ordered approximately 10,500 Mara gang members in El Salvador to stop countrywide attacks. This move followed a government supported gang truce, brokered by religious and civil society representatives. The truce held for approximately 21 months, as the government suspended its mano dura approach to gang violence and instead pledged economic support for gang members who ceased their criminal activities; homicide rates fell by over 40 percent. However, by 2014, public opinion had turned sharply against the agreement. Critics argued that the Maras had taken advantage of the truce as well as the concessions offered by the previous government to bolster their extortion operations, estimated to affect 79 percent of small businesses at the time. The Maras in turn argued that they had been forced to increasingly rely on extortion due to the government’s failure to provide employment opportunities for gang members who had put down their weapons. 

Cerén came to power in June 2014 on a staunchly mano dura platform, rebuffing any attempts to renew the faltering gang truce. Although he initially outlined a more open and inclusive security strategy, known as ‘Plan El Salvador Seguro’, which included provisions for social development programmes, it quickly became clear that the government would once again revert to a military solution to gang violence despite its failure in the past. Cerén has continued the hard-line tradition of previous governments, deploying more than 7,000 soldiers and three special force battalions across the country to aid police and monitor border areas. Social and economic development programmes—a carrot offered by the previous administration to entice gang members to cease violent activity—have been supplanted by anti-gang military battalions—a notoriously brutal stick. 

In light of this shift, anticipated US funding increases for social and economic development in El Salvador are likely to be undermined by the current government’s mano dura approach. In January 2015, US Vice President Joe Biden outlined a USD 1 billion aid package for Central America, earmarking approximately 80 percent of the funding for social and economic development initiatives. However, this plan also includes significant funding for counter-narcotics programmes, which critics claim the El Salvadoran government will use to further militarise the country. Many compare this latest US package with previous strategies launched in Colombia, where between 2000 and 2006, the US spent USD 9 billion on the ‘Plan Colombia’ security and development initiative. While supporters of Plan Colombia highlight its contribution to stabilising a country on the brink of being a failed state, critics argue that it funded a violent and destructive counter-narcotics war whose principal goal was improving investment conditions in Colombia. Setbacks for drug traffickers and left-wing insurgencies in Colombia went hand-in-hand with large-scale displacements, an estimated 14,000 non-combatant deaths, extra-judicial killings, and a surge in paramilitary violence. It remains to be seen whether US funding for El Salvador will produce similar levels of violence. 

Reverting to the iron fist approach to combating gang violence in El Salvador, Cerén has militarised the country and escalated the government’s war against the Mara gangs. Extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and human rights abuses— all characteristics of El Salvador’s brutal anti-gang police squads and army— are expected to continue, and only encourage socially and economically marginalised youths to seek protection within gang structures. Increased US funding risks exacerbating this problem. As long as the El Salvadoran government fails to show any earnest commitment to addressing the underlying social and economic drivers behind gang recruitment, the Maras will continue to fight fire with fire, perpetuating violence in the country.