Terrorism and Territory: Why a Weaker Islamic State in Libya is still Tunisia's Problem
On 7 March, Islamic State (IS) militants attempted to seize control of several security posts in the Tunisian town of Ben Guerdane, near the Libyan border. The raid was the first cross border, insurgency-style attack by IS in Tunisia and was co-ordinated and well-resourced. This attempt to capture territory in Tunisia has since raised concerns over a possible IS insurgency within the country; however, interpreting this attack as evidence of IS’ growing strength in neighbouring Libya ignores the reality of the group’s limitations.
While the attack played on sensationalist fears of an expanding IS occupation in North Africa, driven in part by propaganda, the incident came off the back of major IS losses in a US airstrike on a key training camp in Sabratha, Libya. As such, the attack represented more of an opportunistic attempt by those displaced in the airstrike, most of whom were Tunisian nationals, to turn retreat into an unlikely advance, as opposed to territorial expansion. In this regard, IS’s territorial agenda in Libya faces more challenges than in Syria or Iraq. It has lost strongholds it once claimed in Derna and Benghazi, as well as in Sabratha, whilst the balance of its territory currently comprises a loose network of enclaves spread along the Libyan coast. With its positions under increasing pressure from military strikes and rival local militias, its capacity to extend territorial control is significantly restricted.
The attack represented more of an opportunistic attempt by those displaced in the airstrike, most of whom were Tunisian nationals, to turn retreat into an unlikely advance, as opposed to territorial expansion.
The Ben Guerdane attack should rather be viewed as a pertinent reminder of the latent threat posed by radicalised Tunisian foreign fighters currently residing abroad, including in Libya. Tunisia has struggled to confront a growing problem of radicalisation since the ousting of former President Ben Ali and the subsequent opening of the political space. Public sympathy for Salafist ideology has proliferated, and with it a susceptibility for the radicalisation of disenfranchised youths. This seedbed of sympathy, compounded by economic stagnation, has manifested in Tunisia providing the highest number of foreign fighters involved in conflict abroad. As of December 2015, Tunisians fighting in Syria and Iraq were estimated at around 6,000, consistently cited as the highest figure by country of origin. Across the border, in Libya, the most recent estimates put this figure at between 1,500 and 2,000. As such, it was not a growth in IS’ strength that spurred the Ben Guerdane attack but rather weakened structures in Libya that amounted to radicalised and trained Tunisian militants having nowhere to go but home.
The greater IS threat in Tunisia is therefore independent of the group’s expansionist rhetoric, but is determined by the potential for sophisticated attacks by returning foreign fighters on civilians, such as those witnessed at the Bardo Museum and Sousse in 2015, which together resulted in the deaths of over 60 people and effectively crippled Tunisia’s tourism sector. It is these kinds of attacks within Tunisia to which the country remains vulnerable, stemming from a growing home-grown threat.
Nevertheless, Libya’s geographic proximity, its proliferation of arms and a porous border have accelerated the evolution of the threat from IS in Tunisia. However, this does not change the fact that the roots of the threat are Tunisian rather than Libyan. A robust military approach may well scupper IS hopes of a Tunisian emirate but the government will need a more strategic approach to deal with the thousands of radicalised Tunisian fighters who are eventually likely to return.