Succession in Saudi Arabia: The Prospects for Stability
Abdullah had acted as the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia since 1995 when his brother, King Fahd, was incapacitated by a stroke. Abdullah was formally crowned King upon Fahd’s death in 2009. Under Abdullah, Saudi Arabia gradually integrated into the global economy and played a more prominent role in regional and international affairs. Abdullah was also regarded by some as a cautious social reformer, being the first Saudi monarch to appoint women to government positions and allow women to vote in future municipal elections. Abdullah also invested heavily in education, implementing a scholarship programme to send Saudis to study abroad and developing the country’s tertiary educational institutions.
Despite these tentative liberalising steps, Abdullah’s government nonetheless retained tight control over the media and restricted religious freedom, political opposition, and women’s rights. Meanwhile, Abdullah’s foreign policy was increasingly focused on regional counter-terrorism efforts. In the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks, Abdullah led a crackdown on home-grown extremists in the Kingdom, launched media campaigns to educate the Saudi public on the dangers of extremism, and strengthened security partnerships with the US. Most recently, under Abdullah, Saudi Arabia assumed a lead role in the fight against the Islamic State (IS), a militant group currently operating in Iraq and Syria. In both domestic and foreign policy, Abdullah had to balance the need for reforms against a wide range of competing interest groups, most notably Saudi Arabia’s deeply conservative religious establishment, upon whose loyalty the House of Saud relies to legitimise its rule.
The New King: Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
Abdullah’s successor is Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, 79. Salman’s credentials suggest that his rule will represent a continuation of Abdullah’s, with little disruption to the Kingdom.
Having previously served for nearly five decades as the governor of the Saudi capital, Riyadh, Salman is familiar with the intricacies of dealing with Saudi Arabia’s various interest groups and constituencies. He also has foreign policy experience, having served as the Saudi Minister of Defence since 2011, developing relationships with foreign leaders and overseeing security co-operation with the US and Gulf partners in the face of growing Islamic militancy in the region. However, a substantial degree of uncertainty surrounds Salman’s state of health, as the new King reportedly suffers from dementia and Parkinson’s disease and is rarely seen in public. This suggests the King’s close advisors will play a more prominent role, including the new crown prince, 69-year-old Muqrin bin Abdulaziz.
A number of Salman’s appointments suggest that the House of Saud is preparing to hand power to its younger generations. Salman has promoted several younger members of the ruling family, including his son, Mohammed bin Salman, 34, who is the new defence minister. Abdullah’s nephew, Muhammad bin Nayef, 55, has been appointed as the new deputy crown prince. Nayef in particular has a reputation as a moderniser, and established good relations with Western leaders during his tenure as interior minister. The shift from one generation of Saudi leaders to the next may be accompanied by increasingly progressive reforms initiated from the top-down, although sweeping change is highly unlikely. One challenge facing Saudi Arabia’s ruling elite is how to manage the next succession should Salman’s health deteriorate significantly. This will require selecting an heir from amongst the many grandsons of Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, which is likely to be a more fraught process than Salman’s accession to the throne. Given Salman’s reportedly frail state, and Muqrin’s age, there is some concern that this may become a prospect much sooner than anticipated.
Regional and Domestic Challenges
Over the next year, the transfer of power from Abdullah to Salman will be smooth with few to no major foreign or domestic policy changes. Saudi Arabia’s policy of refusing to reduce oil production is likely to continue, for example, as the Petroleum Minister Ali Naimi has retained his post. However, the new regime faces a number of critical domestic and foreign issues that threaten stability.
Security concerns will become more prominent over the next year, given the worryingly high levels of sympathy inside Saudi Arabia for IS and the collapse of the Saudi-supported government in neighbouring Yemen. An estimated 3,000 Saudi citizens are currently fighting with IS and other Islamist militant groups in Syria and Iraq, for example, and the eventual return of these fighters will present a significant internal security threat to the Kingdom. The deteriorating security environment in neighbouring Yemen as well as the threat from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is likely to become a priority for Salman and his advisors, with closer cooperation between the US and Saudi Arabia likely.
Underlying these challenges is a longstanding rivalry with Iran currently being played out via proxies in the region’s various conflicts. Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy largely hinges on the question of how Salman will decide to manage the relationship with Iran, and whether this necessarily includes steps towards rapprochement. Although generally the House of Saud has avoided rebuilding diplomatic ties with Iran, the prospect of a permanent treaty between Iran and the West over the former’s nuclear programme may force Salman to change this stance.
Finally, Salman will face the challenge of balancing domestic pressures with the need to improve Saudi Arabia’s international image, particularly in light of recent alleged human rights abuses. The Kingdom’s human rights record has been challenged vociferously in recent months following the sentencing of a Saudi blogger to 1000 lashes and the public beheading of a woman accused of murder. The integration of Saudi Arabia into the international economy creates external pressure to address these allegations through a reformist agenda, whilst balancing this with the interests of a highly conservative Saudi society. Although Salman is considered a lesser advocate of reforms than Abdullah, the cautious rate of domestic social and political reform initiated by his predecessor is likely to continue.
The most likely outcome of Salman’s appointment is a continuation of Saudi Arabia’s current policies whilst avoiding any significant change that could undermine stability. However, with Saudi Arabia’s leadership heading towards a generational shift in the midst of various domestic and regional challenges, there is a substantial degree of uncertainty about what lies beyond Salman, and it is unlikely future transitions will be quite as smooth.