State of Play: Daesh Reconsiders its Approach

Several months ago it would have been unthinkable to hear an Islamic State (IS) representative claim that the group “does not fight for territory”. After all, it was the promise of a new caliphate (and associated oil revenues) which had proved key in attracting new members and sustaining IS’s influence. Nevertheless, on 21 May, the group’s spokesman, Abu Mohammed Al Adnani, emphasised precisely this, giving cause for consideration as to why IS would be willing to become State-less and what this might mean for the group’s development. 

Two years after seizing the city of Mosul in northern Iraq and declaring the founding of an Islamic caliphate, IS is steadily being hemmed by its many opponents. In Iraq, the group faces two advances: by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) in western Anbar province, and by the Kurdish Peshmerga to the east of Mosul. In Syria, regime forces are encroaching on the IS-controlled oil fields around Deir Ezzour while the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are closing in on the group’s supply lines to Turkey in the so-called Manbij pocket. In this context, Adnani’s statement appears designed to pre-empt criticism of the group’s loss of territory, such that these developments are not perceived too negatively by IS’s followers. 

Simultaneously, these pressures have coincided with a spike in suicide bombings against civilian targets in Iraq and Syria. Since the loss of the Iraqi city of Ramadi in January 2016, IS has dramatically stepped up this campaign, with over 200 killed in bomb attacks in Baghdad since the start of April. Attacks have also targeted many civilian areas which had previously seen little violence, such as the towns of Karbala and Basra in southern Iraq, as well as the government-held port of Latakia in western Syria. Like Adnani’s statement, these attacks are likely an attempt by IS to demonstrate a projection of strength in the face of territorial losses. 

While these attacks may signal a position of increasing territorial weakness, they should not be a cause for complacency. During the insurgency which followed from the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, asymmetric attacks in the form of mass-casualty car bombs were the hallmark of IS’s predecessor – the Al Qaeda-aligned Islamic State in Iraq. This expertise was retained and developed as the group grew in strength, and has since formed a core component of its military tactics. IS assaults on fortified positions typically begin with several suicide vehicle bomb attacks designed to soften up defences for the light infantry and mechanised units that follow. Intermittent attacks on civilian targets behind front line areas were also used to disrupt and preoccupy opposing forces. 

Further, the group’s capability to conduct terrorist attacks threatens to exacerbate the very social and political drivers that gave rise to its prominence in the first place. For instance, by targeting Shi’a communities in southern Iraq, IS has encouraged tensions between Sunni and Shi’a Iraqis and sectarian violence ensured. This dynamic has played out in the recent Fallujah operation, where human rights activists have accused Shi’a militias of carrying out violations – including torture and executions – against fleeing Sunni civilians who the militias believe to be IS collaborators. Consequently, while IS may be on the back-foot territorially, this does not correspond to a reduction in the threat it poses to the region’s stability in the short term. 

For now, these developments should be noted in the context of the ongoing battle with IS in Iraq and Syria. Any reversion to IS’s status as a terrorist organisation is unlikely to take place rapidly and the anti-IS campaign has still to overcome a range of obstacles before the group’s military strength becomes significantly eroded. For instance, the operations to retake Fallujah and Ramadi provide an indication of the difficulties that may be involved in liberating the larger urban centres of Raqqa and Mosul. Explosives and booby-traps littered the streets of Fallujah, stalling the ISF advance as explosive ordinance disposal teams were called in to dismantle them. IS also positioned itself amongst civilians to shield its fighters from US-led coalition airstrikes, limiting the degree to which advancing forces can rely on close-air support and artillery. In Mosul – a city many times larger than Fallujah – these conditions are likely to be encountered to a much greater degree. 

Nevertheless, at least in its current form, IS’s days may be numbered. According to Western security officials, defections from the group have grown into a steady stream in recent months – with many foreign IS fighters reportedly attempting to seek help from their home countries to leave IS-controlled territory. However, if IS shifts back to its terroristic roots, a territorial organisation in its death throes presents little prospect of relief for the region.