Security Gaps: The Resurgent Kidnapping Threat in Afghanistan

On 31 May, Taliban militants kidnapped over 200 locals after setting up roadblocks on a major highway in Aliabad district, in the northerly Kunduz Province. The attack, unprecedented in scale, has since been followed by a series of similar mass abductions on roadways across the country, carried out by both the Taliban and Islamic State.These incidents have starkly highlighted the limitations of local security capabilities and have raised questions about a recent decision by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to reduce the number of security checkpoints in favour of carrying out more offensive operations against insurgent forces.

The recent spike in kidnappings falls alongside the deterioration of the broader security environment in Afghanistan over the past two years. The ongoing withdrawal of NATO troops as part of the ending of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in late 2014 shifted primary responsibility for security onto the ANSF. Taking advantage of the declining NATO presence, the Taliban have launched increasingly aggressive offensives over the past two years, with reports indicating that ANSF casualties reached an all-time high during 2015. The shortcomings of the ANSF were most keenly highlighted in September 2015, when Taliban fighters seized control of the provincial capital of Kunduz for several days before being repelled by a US-supported ANSF counter-offensive. The ANSF continues to steadily lose ground in the face of the Taliban’s 2016 offensive: as at mid-June 2016, out of Afghanistan’s 398 districts, the Taliban reportedly controls 39 and contests another 43 in the southern, eastern and northern parts of the country. While a recent change to the US rules of engagement in Afghanistan has re-introduced limited US airstrikes in support of ANSF operations, this is not likely to be sufficient to reverse the Taliban’s gains.

Within this context, Afghan military commanders recently made the decision to scale back the number of road checkpoints that the ANSF operates. This move – backed by the ANSF’s NATO advisors – was strongly informed by the perceived vulnerability of the checkpoints to attack. While the Taliban has inferior numbers and armaments to the ANSF, the latter has tended towards stationing a significant proportion of its personnel in small outposts and road checkpoints while the militants remain able to move about with relative freedom. As a result, the Taliban is able to pick its battles where it can effectively amass its forces against vulnerable points – in this case, the static, isolated and lightly-manned checkpoints. Since the start of the Taliban’s 2016 offensive, a high number of these checkpoints have been completely overrun by Taliban forces.

Under pressure to minimise casualties, Afghan commanders hold that reducing the number of active checkpoints would both increase ANSF force survivability and free up more resources to launch more offensive operations against insurgent groups, rather than waiting for them to seize the initiative. However, whether the ANSF will be able to implement this new strategy remains uncertain. ANSF commanders have emphasised that their forces are now protected within larger and more easily defendable forward operating bases (FOBs) – a tactic highly favoured by the NATO contingents that came before. As a result, whereas checkpoints operated on a 24-hour basis, ANSF patrols on critical routes now return to the FOBs at the end of the day. However, critics of this strategy have pointed out that an over-reliance on the protection of the FOBs threatens to further restrict the ability of security forces to monitor and check insurgent movements outside of the FOBs’ immediate surrounds.

With the recent spate of kidnappings, this appears to have proven true. While the removal of checkpoints has arguably reduced the ANSF’s vulnerability to attack, it has simultaneously increased the vulnerability of the population in areas where insurgents have a presence. In districts under their control, the Taliban have an established practice of setting up their own roadblocks on highways and main roads in order to target suspected government sympathisers. With the scaling down of the ANSF checkpoints, the Taliban has been able to extend this practice into contested and even government-controlled districts. For instance, the mass kidnapping on 31 May took place on a major highway between Aliabad and Kunduz districts in an area reportedly heavily patrolled by government forces. While the majority of the victims in this instance were released – supposedly without any ransom payment – the mass kidnapping of civilians in government-controlled districts serves to highlight the inadequacy of government security measures and erodes the government’s popular legitimacy.

While such mass kidnappings are likely to become more commonplace in the coming months, traditional kidnappings for ransom are also likely to see an increase as both criminal gangs and insurgents alike become able to operate with greater freedom in major urban centres. Foreign nationals – particularly aid workers – face an extreme risk, as both militants and criminals continue to employ kidnappings of foreigners to raise revenues via ransom payments. Since the start of 2016, a number of veteran foreign aid workers have been kidnapped in government-controlled districts. For instance, Australian national Katherine Jane Wilson had been working in Afghanistan for 20 years before she was taken from her organisation’s offices on 29 April by unidentified gunmen in Jalalabad, eastern Afghanistan. Moreover, while areas such as Jalalabad are known areas of militant activity, in recent months a number of daylight kidnappings and attempted kidnappings of foreigners in the capital, Kabul, have shown that even urban areas with a pronounced security presence are not exempt from the threat.

The targeting of aid workers has been linked closely to the security measures that they have been forced to adopt since the ISAF withdrawal started. In previous years, when ISAF maintained a high-force strength, many aid organisations took advantage of the security provided by ISAF’s numerous bases and chose to operate out of them – even employing ISAF troops as security escorts for field trips. With the ending of ISAF’s combat mission and ongoing withdrawal of international forces, aid workers are now forced to make use of alternative arrangements. For instance, colleagues of Wilson have disclosed that the aid organisation that she worked for, like many others,made use of local clothing and drove local vehicles in order to remain inconspicuous rather than relying on costly private security details and armoured cars. While this approach has been effective in some parts of Afghanistan and has allowed aid workers access to regions where an overt security presence would inhibit their operations, once identified as foreigners there is little obstacle to potential kidnappers.

The deteriorating security environment also makes the prospect of rescue increasingly unlikely for foreign nationals. While Western special forces remain capable of carrying out high-risk hostage rescue operations, their ability to locate victims through local intelligence networks is likely to be constrained by the reduced ANSF presence. As long as they remain preoccupied with preventing the Taliban from seizing key districts, the ANSF are unlikely to dedicate resources to locating and retrieving kidnapping victims – particularly if they have been moved to Taliban strongholds. In the meantime, while the fear that the Taliban will seize control of major urban centres continues to drive the ANSF’s strategic decisions, the ability of insurgent groups to carry out successful kidnappings in so-called ‘secure’ areas presents an immediate threat – and one that is unlikely to recede over the coming months.