Safeguarding the Rio Olympics

Los Urabeños in Colombia, the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, Los Rastrojos in Venezuela, the Mara gangs in El Salvador, Primeiro Comando da Capital in Bolivia, and Rio de Janeiro’s Comando Vermelho and Amigos dos Amigos: all groups which continue to expand and dominate local drug-trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping operations in Latin America. Despite killing or capturing numerous high-level operatives, security forces have failed to fundamentally weaken these groups. Up until now, government strategies to combat organised crime groups have been piecemeal, only temporarily addressing security concerns. Nowhere is this more evident than in Rio de Janeiro, where the local government’s weak pacification strategy looks set to be tested once again in pre-Olympics favela occupations. 

Rio security forces are expected to occupy at least two more favela complexes in the north of the city in 2016, in preparation for the August Olympics. Chapadão and Pedreira, two of the city’s most violent areas, are likely to be occupied sometime between April and May 2016, although there is considerable uncertainty about the launch date of these operations. Following the occupations of some of the city’s other favelas in recent years, Chapadão and Pedreira have become safe havens for a number of Rio’s organised crime groups, including Comando Vermelho (CV) and Amigos dos Amigos (ADA).

For Olympic organisers, Chapadão and Pedreira’s proximity to the Deodoro Sports Complex (approximately five kilometres from the Olympics venue), which will host hockey, BMX and equestrian events during the games, is a serious concern. Shootouts between CV and ADA gang members, as well as Military Police (PM), occur regularly in these favelas, and local residents are often caught in the crossfire.

Unlike previous occupations, the army is unlikely to be involved in the occupations of Chapadão and Pedreira; instead, federal, highway and state military police are expected to carry out the operations. According to reports, the army’s role is likely to be limited to providing back-up support to the police. However, there are already concerns that a police-led operation is likely to be more violent and less effective, as recent reports by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International have highlighted growing evidence of extrajudicial killings and evidence tampering by Rio’s military police. 

In the past five years, the police have been responsible for 16 percent of homicides in Rio (or 1,519 murders), excluding off-duty police officers. Such violence and corruption has undermined local community trust in the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) set up in pacified favelas, where in some favelas, such as Maré, local residents have started calling for the return of the army. Police-led occupations of Chapadão and Pedreira are likely to be further undermined by budget constraints, and Rio authorities recently suggested that the security operations may even be delayed until after the Olympics. 

Occupying Chapadão and Pedreira may partically mitigate organised crime risks to spectators attending the Olympics. Ultimately, however, occupying these favelas would only be a short-term and localised solution to the wider organised crime problem in Rio, which will continue to pose a long-term risk.