Russian Returns: How will Moscow Leverage its Recent Resurgence in the Middle East?

Western hesitation to take action in the Syrian civil conflict left a vacuum that Russia has filled to its considerable advantage. The decision to support Syrian President Bashir Al Assad’s campaign to recapture Aleppo presented Russia with an opportunity to reclaim some of the country’s former prominence on the global stage. To that end, the results of that decision have far surpassed expectation. Through one committed, but comparatively brief air campaign, Russia has now positioned itself as the de facto global mediator in the world’s most closely watched conflict, to the visible exclusion of the US. The campaign has not only preserved the Assad regime for the foreseeable future, but managed to achieve this on Russian terms. It has allowed Russia to secure a localised neighbourhood of stability for its first permanent Mediterranean air base in Tartus as well as a reliable corridor from the Mediterranean, through Iraq and Iran, to the Caspian Sea.

While Russia’s recent forays into the Middle East may have been a geopolitical success, the Kremlin has a diverse portfolio of interests in the Middle East, including economic investments, oil price stability, countering Islamist extremism and longstanding defence contracts. Following its successes in 2016, it is likely to leverage its resurgence in influence in the region to cement existing alliances with pro-Russian regimes, and also forge new ones. In each of its objectives, 2017 looks set to be a year of growth for Russia in the Middle East.

SYRIA 

The Syrian conflict is expected to outlast the government recapture of Aleppo, given the strength of the insurgency in the country, and the extent of territory still held by other rebel groups, including IS and Syria’s Kurds. However, while Russian Special Forces and air power will remain a feature of the conflict, President Vladimir’s Putin’s willingness to commit military resources extends only as far as areas of direct Russian interest. As long as Assad remains firmly in control of key cities, Russia is unlikely to increase military support over 2017.

TURKEY 

The twists and turns of Russia’s complex relationship with Turkey surprised many in 2016, a year that was bookended by the shooting down of a Russian jet in November 2015 and the assassination of Russia’s ambassador to Turkey in December 2016. Both of these incidents were related to Russia’s role in the Syrian conflict, where the two countries have supported opposing sides. However, the changing dynamics of the conflict have altered the relationship and 2017 looks set to be a year of increased alignment for Presidents Putin and Erdoğan on both geopolitical and economic interests. In Syria, the clearest indication of this turnaround is Turkey’s role in the tentative ceasefire talks between select rebel groups and President Assad in early 2017. Its presence validates Russia’s new-found importance and snubbed the Obama administration. Energy is also an area for potential increased co-operation in 2017. Prior to the shooting down of the jet in November 2015, President Putin had proposed a new gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea. While talks on the pipeline project stalled in 2016, an agreement between the two energy ministers was signed in October, which will allow Russia to strengthen its position in the European gas market. These talks, as well as plans for a Russian-built nuclear power plant in Turkey, are likely to accelerate over the coming months.

IRAN 

Syria has provided a convergence of interests for Russia and Iran for the time being, although relations remain complicated by Iran’s own regional rivalries and its position towards Israel. Primary to Russia’s interest will be expanding both the nuclear fuel co-operation agreements between the two states, as well as their extensive defence co-operation. Iran has a budget of over USD 40 billion to upgrade its weapons capabilities after the lifting of sanctions, a share of which Russia will be eager to win.

THE GULF 

Despite previously frosty ties with the Gulf countries, 2017 is likely to see further advances in the relationship between Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, most notably Qatar. Qatar’s Investment Authority made a series of large investments in the Russian economy in the latter half of 2016, purchasing a 19.5 percent stake in Russia’s state oil company, Rosneft, with resources giant, Glencore; a 24.9 percent stake in the Pulvoko Airport at St Petersburg in July 2016; and is already one of the largest shareholders in Russia’s state-owned VTB Bank. Many in Qatar see the potential for a strong bilateral partnership that may eventually influence broader geopolitical dynamics across the region.

EGYPT 

Russia’s longstanding alliance with Egypt continued to strengthen in 2016, despite a brief setback following the October 2015 Russian passenger plane bombing. The two countries took part in joint military exercises in the Sinai in October and the Egyptian government made several new major purchases of Russian weapons during the year. Support for the region’s staunchly anti-Islamist strongman, President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi is a key measure for Russia in stemming Islamist extremism, which is both a domestic and foreign policy priority for the country. The travel advisory to Russian tourists to avoid Egypt following the plane attack will also likely be lifted during the course of 2017. 

LIBYA 

In Libya, the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, requested Russian military support against Islamist militants in the Benghazi conflict and visited Moscow on at least two occasions in the second half of 2016. He has subsequently intimated that Russia may push for a lifting of the UN arms embargo on Libya on behalf of the LNA, which would be a significant international shift in Libya’s political dispensation. Should momentum behind Field Marshal Haftar continue to build, Russia may emerge well placed to form lasting alliances with the new political leadership in Libya, which could result in the creation of Russia’s second air base in the Mediterranean, likely near Benghazi.

SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi support for Islamist militant groups, Russia’s tentative alliance with Iran and their support for opposing sides in the Syrian conflict have historically put Russia and Saudi Arabia at loggerheads. However, Russia’s move in December 2016 to join production cuts by members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to stabilise the oil price is likely to invite more functional economic-based diplomacy between the two countries in 2017.