Rio's Security Environment to Deteriorate Further

Twenty-one of the world’s 50 most violent cities are in Brazil. Barring São Paulo, many Brazilian cities saw a significant increase in incidents of violent crime, including homicides, muggings, and cargo and car theft in 2016. This is most evident in Rio de Janeiro, where a failing security strategy has come under increased scrutiny, particularly in the wake of the August 2016 Olympic Games. Although a military occupation of the city during the Games brought a brief respite in violence, homicides continued to rise soon after the closing ceremony. Without an effective strategy to combat increasing cargo theft, mugging, break-in, and vehicle theft rates, Rio’s security situation looks set to deteriorate further in 2017. 

Rio’s security crisis has been particularly acute relative to other Brazilian cities due to two key factors: a deepening state-level economic crisis, which has precipitated policing budget cuts, as well as an intensifying inter-gang turf war. 

In 2016, there was no investment in Rio’s police forces, with personnel and funding shortages prompting ongoing police strikes in the city. The October 2016 resignation of Rio’s long-serving Secretary of Public Security, Mariano Beltrame, amid a wave of violent shootouts near some of the city’s wealthiest neighbourhoods, marked a low point in the crisis. It may have also effectively signalled the end of the city’s favela pacification programme (UPP), Beltrame’s signature policy. The UPP programme has slowly unravelled due to funding constraints and growing mistrust in the police following several incidents of egregious human rights violations. 

2016 also saw a growing incidence of gang violence in Rio, a trend set to worsen in 2017. For years, drug-trafficking, cargo theft, extortion, and other criminal enterprises were dominated by Rio-based organised crime groups, namely Comando Vermelho (CV), Amigos dos Amigos (ADA) and Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP). However, in late 2016, evidence emerged suggesting that the São Paulo-based Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), arguably Brazil’s largest and most sophisticated organised crime group, had ended its long-standing commercial alliance with CV and was attempting to wrest control of Rio’s lucrative illicit drug market. Although the CV-PCC war has so far largely played out in violent prison riots in the north of the country, police reports suggest that the PCC is positioning itself in strategic areas on the outskirts of Rio, likely in preparation for an all-out turf war. 

With the state’s economic recession deepening, a much-needed overhaul of Rio’s security strategy to combat increasing inter-gang violence is unlikely in the short to medium term. Any response to growing levels of violent crime in the city is instead expected to depend on the federal government, which plans to launch an emergency national security plan, known as the Plano Nacional de Segurança (PNS). This strategy envisions expanding the prison system, harsher sentences for criminals, and greater collaboration between the country’s complex network of police and judicial authorities. The focus will be on reducing homicides and combating drugs and arms-trafficking, with Rio receiving particular attention. 

The PNS is not the first federal government attempt to launch a national security plan. Similar attempts under the Lula Da Silva and Dilma Rousseff governments came unstuck after initial success, undermined by bureaucracy and an unwillingness on the part of state and federal police forces to share information. Police forces at a national and city-level remain siloed, particularly in Rio, and the exclusion of the military police, the city’s most prominent security force, from the PNS, is anticipated to further undermine attempts to facilitate collaboration. As such, it is unlikely that the PNS will effectively address growing crime levels in the city.