Proliferation of CBRN Knowledge from the Levant
Chemical attacks in Syria have all but disappeared from the world’s media but despite this, there have been some 13 alleged incidents involving the use of toxic gases (most probably chlorine or R22) this year alone. Accusing fingers have been pointed at the regime and Islamic State (IS) in equal measures. Across the border in Iraq, there have been numerous reports of chlorine gas being used in roadside bombs. One Iraqi bomb disposal expert, Haider Taher, reported that his team had defused dozens of devices containing chlorine during the March offensive against IS.
In addition to the threats in Syria and Iraq, security services around the globe have expressed concern about returning jihadis bringing the chemical knowledge they have acquired in Iraq and Syria home with them. Most notable was an incident in February in Indonesia, when a chlorine IED was discovered in a shopping centre in Depok, a suburb of Jakarta. Indonesian police immediately accused returning jihadis and warned “that the Syrian conflict is providing fresh oxygen to local extremist networks”.
Security services around the globe have expressed concern about returning jihadis bringing the chemical knowledge they have acquired in Iraq and Syria home with them.
Historically, a number of terrorist organisations have overtly publicised their intent to conduct CBRN attacks but lacked the capability. The threat therefore lacked credibility. However in the Levant, IS have successfully demonstrated both their intent and capability to deliver small scale, albeit, improvised chemical attacks. This special report assesses the evolving threat posed to the wider region and global community.
Capability
IS have demonstrated relative localised success at acquiring CBRN material in the Levant, including the capture of a chlorine production facility in June 2014 and the theft of 40kg of Uranium 238 from Mosul University in July 2014. However, much of this success in acquiring CBRN material can be attributed to the breakdown of regional law and order and is not representative of the global picture.
Globally, there are strict controls governing access to CBRN material. Numerous conventions, treaties and agreements restrict the research, development, stockpiling and movement of CBRN weapons, material and, in many cases, their pre-cursor chemicals. Arguably the most successful of these has been the Chemicals Weapons Convention (CWC), which was first drafted in 1992 and entered into force on 29 April 1997. Such restrictions have dramatically reduced the availability of state sponsored chemical warfare agents, weaponised biological agents, specialist nuclear material and the associated hardware required to manufacture or cultivate the agent.
In addition to restrictions in availability, there have been significant developments in detection, identification and monitoring capabilities by scientific, law enforcement, and border control agencies. These technical advances have further inhibited proliferation, as well as enabling the rapid identification of threat agents in the event of an interdiction or arrest operation. Trace detection and forensic analysis have become increasingly sophisticated.
The consequence of these positive restrictions makes it less likely that we will see an attack using traditional state sponsored CBRN weapons, such as the chemical warfare agent sarin. Conversely, it is more likely that terrorist organisations may seek to use improvised CBRN weapons incorporating toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) or readily available biological substances, such as ricin, abrin or anthrax.
The potential shift towards improvised weapons is fuelled by a combination of greater availability of knowledge and materials on the internet, and a global increase in commercial, industrial and medical uses of TICs and biological substances. In the UK alone, there has been an increase of biological safety level 3 laboratories from 347 in 2007, to an estimated 600 in 2012.
Intent
The increase in potential capability must be tempered against the assessed intent of a terrorist group and their willingness to utilise CBRN weapons. The UK has identified 674 international terrorist organisations on their proscribed list, up from 52 in 2014.
This compares with the US State Department who have designated 59 foreign groups. Of these, many do not represent a widespread global threat nor have they expressed an intent to use CBRN weapons. The intent appears to be predominantly the domain of the extremist groups and disenfranchised lone wolf.
Therefore, despite the number of proscribed terrorist organisations increasing, the number of threat groups willing to conduct a CBRN attack remains broadly unchanged.
Impact on CBRN Threat
Threat is assessed as a function of capability, intent, presence and opportunity. Whilst the assessed intent of prevalent threat groups in Europe and North America remains broadly unchanged, the capability in terms of access to CBRN material through the availability of TICs and biological substances has increased. Coupled with access to knowledge through online resources, the overall threat can be viewed in isolation as marginally increased.
However, when reviewed on a global scale and taking account of returning jihadis, both the presence and opportunity attributed to lone wolves is growing. A number of individuals will have already been schooled in the development and use of chemical IEDs and, to some extent, become desensitised to normal behavioural restraints in their use. It is assessed that the overall threat from non-state sponsored, improvised CBRN weapons is growing. It is recommended that individuals and organisations with elevated threat profiles review their mitigation measures and resilience.