Articles
Precious Cargo: Oil Tanker Hijackings in Southeast Asia
A resurgence in organised hijackings of small fuel tankers in Southeast Asian waters not only highlights a growing sophistication of piracy in the region but also suggests that counter piracy operations are facing several challenges, writes Mandira Bagwandeen.
In early April 2015, the Malaysian oil tanker, Dongfang Glory, was hijacked while transiting the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the world’s busiest and most dangerous shipping routes. Approximately 15 to 25 pirates boarded the Dongfang Glory, tied up the crew at gunpoint, stole their valuables, and damaged communication systems before siphoning fuel from the tanker’s hold. The pirates escaped with 300 metric tons of petroleum worth an estimated USD 100,000. This hijacking highlights a resurgence in sophisticated attacks against oil tankers in Southeast Asian waters, following a decline between 2010 and 2012. Indeed, Asia’s share of the global instances of piracy and armed robbery (PAR) has increased significantly over the past three years - accounting for 75 percent of PAR incidents in 2014 - as the number of attacks in other regions, such as along the Horn of Africa, decreased. Though piracy in Southeast Asia is not uncommon, since the beginning of 2015, more than half of all global pirate attacks have occurred in these waters. A closer look into the challenges of counter piracy operations provides some insight into why fuel-stealing pirates have been able to carry out numerous successful attacks.
Though opportunistic small-scale hit and run attacks occur frequently, an increase in well planned attacks targeting oil tankers (and to a lesser extent bulk carriers), underscores a high level of co-ordination among Southeast Asian pirates that seems indicative of organised crime. Unlike Somali pirates off the coast of East Africa, Southeast Asian pirates rarely take hostages and are instead primarily concerned with stealing cargo and liquid fuel to sell on the black market. Typically, small oil tankers under 5000 gross tons are the preferred targets as, when they are loaded, they move slowly, with their decks close to the water line, making it easier for pirates to pull up with a motorised skiff and board the vessel. Once on board, pirates are able to steal fuel worth upwards of USD 2 million in one robbery.
Despite the frequency of such attacks, countering piracy operations that target vessels transporting fuel in Southeast Asian waters has proven difficult.
Logistically, liquid fuels are hard to track as pirates often move their cargo through multiple middlemen or mix refined products with other grades of fuel, rendering it almost impossible to discern if a given oil supply has been illegitimately obtained. The absence of a trading hub for stolen fuel further makes it challenging to assess the perpetrators behind attacks. Though the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are well patrolled by marine police from Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the voluminous shipping traffic also makes it is easy for pirates to blend in. for example, it is common for small bunkering and provisioning craft to be seen alongside tankers for commercial reasons.
Other domestic and regional challenges hinder counter piracy operations, especially when ships traverse through several national jurisdictions. While more governments involved in anti-piracy efforts should translate into more effective counter measures, regional politics and jurisdictional directives impede cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. A lack of information sharing between these three states and maritime security groups has undoubtedly hampered counter-piracy efforts. In addition, since extensive intelligence is required to plan and execute a successful hijacking, bribery and corruption at regional ports is prevalent. Port officials and workers earning very little are likely to be attracted to receiving compensation for their tip-offs - undermining efforts to stem maritime banditry altogether.
Company activities further stymie counter piracy operations. Many private shipping companies do not report attacks, for example, as this may reflect negatively on the company’s safety record and may result in higher insurance premiums. Though companies may be tempted to take measures into their own hands by stationing armed guards on their vessels, firearms are illegal on commercial vessels in Singaporean, Indonesian and Malaysian waters. As such, other measures such as improved vigilance, fixing razor wire to the gunnels of tankers, and the use of high-pressure water hoses to fire at hostile vessels are being considered. More attention is also being paid to training crews to handle pirate attacks as they form the first line of defence. These measures are, however, ultimately reactionary and cannot effectively deter piracy in the region.
With an estimated 15.2 million barrels of crude oil passing through the Strait of Malacca every day, pirates are not short of targets. Given the various challenges facing counter piracy operations in the region, pirates are likely to take advantage of these deficiencies and increase the frequency of their attacks. However, if counter piracy measures between states and maritime security organisations do not become more cohesive and well-coordinated, fuel-stealing pirates may pair more with organised crime networks or even grow their own operations into effective syndicates; possibly refining their tactics to target bigger vessels transporting refined product cargo.