Politics by Other Means: Erdoğan's New War on Terror

In late July, the Turkish government initiated a dramatic shift in its security policy as it abruptly discarded a two-year ceasefire with the militant Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), sparking a resurgence of violence in the country’s south-east. Simultaneously, the Turkish air force carried out its first-ever military actions against the Islamic State (IS) militant group, which controls areas of territory along the Turkey-Syria border. Turkey has since been engaged in an ongoing aerial bombing campaign targeting both IS in northern Syria, as well as PKK outposts in Turkey’s south-eastern districts and in northern Iraq. However, rather than being perceived as a legitimate response to a security threat, the move has been widely criticised as a political ploy to boost support for the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP), while simultaneously de-legitimizing the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) ahead of snap elections.

In the months prior to this development, tensions had been steadily growing between the PKK and the government, and in mid-July the group accused the state of utilising the 2013 ceasefire to enhance its own military position rather than to pursue a genuine political solution. Subsequently, the PKK announced that the ceasefire had come to an end, and in the following weeks PKK militants carried out several shootings directed against security forces. However, instead of immediately retaliating to these provocations, the government’s decision to initiate military action against the group only came following an IS suicide bombing on 20 July against a Kurdish cultural centre in Suruc, a Kurdish-majority town 10km from the Syrian border, in which 33 people were killed. The government’s response was to publicly link the threat posed by IS with that of the PKK, framing military operations against both groups under the mantle of a broader counter-terrorism campaign.

While the Suruc attack can be viewed as a catalyst of sorts, these developments have taken place within the broader context of the June 2015 election, in which the AKP received 41 percent of the national vote – a significant drop from the previous election that saw the ruling party win 50 percent of the vote. In addition, for the first time, the HDP gained enough votes to meet the minimum threshold of 10 percent required for entry into parliament. This is a threat to Erdoğan and the AKP’s ambitions of securing a 60 percent majority that will allow them to move towards replacing the current parliamentary system with a presidential one.

As the AKP’s talks with potential coalition partners have deteriorated over the past few months, Erdoğan announced on 24 August that snap elections would take place on 1 November. As such, Erdoğan’s decision to jeopardise the peace-process appears to be driven by the prospect of de-legitimising the HDP and simultaneously generating support for the AKP from a pronounced counter-terrorism stance. The targeting of the PKK fits into this strategy: the AKP has long accused the HDP of being intimately connected to the PKK, although the former insists there is distance between the two organisations. Nevertheless, by framing the PKK as a terrorist threat, Erdoğan hopes to discredit the HDP by association.

However, if this is Erdoğan’s intention, it is not yet apparent that the effort has been successful. While the HDP has condemned the violence in general, its approach has been carefully managed to present an unbiased front favouring dialogue above all else. For instance, on 22 August, the leader of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtas, called on the PKK to agree to an unconditional ceasefire to prevent a further escalation of violence in the south-east. This approach appears to have been successful, as a recent poll showed increased support for the HDP since the June elections.

There is a high likelihood that Erdoğan’s strategy will backfire. The initiation of the peace-process with the PKK in 2014 generated substantial support for the ruling party from the Kurdish population. The government’s decision to abandon negotiations in favour of military action may reverse these gains. Furthermore, ongoing violence is also more likely to be attributed by voters to the AKP’s decisions rather than to the HDP’s failure to convince the PKK to lay down arms, despite the AKP’s allegations of the HDP’s links to the organisation.

The implications of Erdoğan’s counter-terrorism campaign for the security environment in Turkey are concerning. The bombing of the PKK appears to have hardened the organisation’s anti-government stance and increased its reluctance to engage in talks. As such, following the November elections, the government may find it difficult to reign in the violence. The current pattern of PKK attacks on security forces is therefore likely to persist in the south-east. In this light, Erdoğan and the AKP’s gamble for votes may end up costing more than they bargained for.