Articles
Orlando: Deconstructing Mateen's Motives
The Orlando attack underscores the complex motives behind lone actor violence, which makes these types of assaults particularly difficult for authorities to thwart, writes Lara Sierra-Rubia.
Amidst the horrific violence of the deadliest attack in the United States since 9/11, and the most lethal mass shooting in US history, was a reminder of the motivational complexity that underpins acts such as Orlando. Despite simplifications of the narrative to fit a news cycle, or a presidential campaign message, the facts as they emerge demonstrate again how ‘lone wolves’ can act on a multitude of impulses, and that understanding these remains crucial to limiting our collective vulnerability to these threats.
It has been well-publicised that during the siege, Mateen placed a call to 911, pledging his allegiance to Islamic State (IS). Mateen also claimed that he carried out the attack in order to stop the US from carrying out airstrikes against IS in Syria and Iraq. He further expressed solidarity with the Tsarnaev brothers who carried out the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, and a suicide bomber who died on behalf of the Al Nusra Front, a militant group at odds with IS. Within hours of the attack, Amaq News Agency, IS’s official media arm, claimed that the attack was carried out by an IS fighter.
However, it is notable that this weight of evidence began to unravel under scrutiny. It emerged that Mateen had been interviewed three times by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in two separate investigations – one regarding inflammatory comments to co-workers and another regarding possible links to Moner Mohammad Abu Salha, a US citizen who carried out a suicide attack in Syria. Both investigations were closed after the FBI failed to find credible information to corroborate the concerns. While Mateen had been previously investigated for showing verbal support for Islamist militant organisations, including rivals Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, investigators noted that he did not display major signs of radicalisation in the years or months preceding the Orlando attack. Key behavioural shifts suggesting radicalisation was underway were not evident. Mateen did not become noticeably more religious, his dress or appearance did not become more conservative, and his relationship with his family did not change dramatically. Ultimately, ongoing investigations have thus far shown that Mateen did not have any connection to IS. Barring the emergence of further revelatory evidence, it is apparent that Mateen acted in his own capacity.
If Mateen’s jihadist motivations were false, then that raises yet further questions of his true motives, his decision to lace them with Islamist invective and what this means for those charged with countering similar incidents in the future. Over the last few weeks, some accounts of Mateen’s motives have turned to emphasise hate of the LGBT community. However, this binary approach is also too simplistic. Behavioural analysts have commented that Mateen’s background is more suggestive of a mass shooter profile. He was bullied in school, had well-documented behavioural and mental health problems, jumped from job to job, took steroids and was reportedly abusive to spouses. While this profiling is not scientifically accurate, these factors point to a more intricate combination of drivers behind the attack.
Like the December 2015 San Bernardino shootings, the Orlando attack seemed to amalgamate personal motives with an IS brand. Because ‘lone wolves’ operate on their own, their personal agendas often mix with those of the terrorist group they claim to serve. In San Bernardino, the perpetrators targeted a holiday party in the county health department where one of them worked, as opposed to a more symbolic Western target in a major US city. Mateen’s selection of an LGBT nightclub also suggests that personal motives were a significant factor. While IS does espouse homophobic ideology, the group has tended to prioritise other groups as more worthy targets for attack, including Christians, Jews and Westerners in general. Reports suggest that Mateen was homophobic. His father claimed that Mateen became upset when he saw two men kissing a few months before the attack. These reports stand in contrast to other reports suggesting that Mateen may have been gay himself, or at least confused about his sexuality. Several regular patrons at Pulse have claimed that Mateen came to the club on many occasions over the last three years. Other individuals have claimed that they were in contact with Mateen via gay dating mobile applications.
The aforementioned factors open up the possibility that Mateen may have pledged allegiance to IS to ensure that the massacre gained as much media and public attention as possible. Indeed, the group’s May 2016 general call to arms during Ramadan sent a message to would-be jihadists to “martyr” themselves in a do-it-yourself attack, while still enabling IS to claim responsibility for incidents in the West. During the siege, Mateen took time to search social media to see if the story had been picked up in the news.
It is possible that this convergence reflects a worrying relationship of convenience between alienated, suicidal individuals in the West seeking attention, and a militant group that is losing pivotal strongholds and resources in Syria and Iraq. According to European University Institute professor Olivier Roy, these cases are “more about the Islamisation of radicalism than the radicalisation of Islam”. In these instances Islamist militancy is used as a one size-fits-all banner for radical individuals intent on carrying out violence, but who do not necessarily have a significant commitment to Jihadist ideology.
It is possible that this convergence reflects a worrying relationship of convenience between alienated, suicidal individuals in the West seeking attention, and a militant group that is losing pivotal strongholds and resources in Syria and Iraq. According to European University Institute professor Olivier Roy, these cases are “more about the Islamisation of radicalism than the radicalisation of Islam”. In these instances Islamist militancy is used as a one size-fits-all banner for radical individuals intent on carrying out violence, but who do not necessarily have a significant commitment to Jihadist ideology.
The simplicity of the Orlando attack – which did not require significant planning or training – and the interplay of radical ideology and personal grievances as motives for the shooting highlight the inherent difficulty in preventing lone actor attacks. Nevertheless, developing a comprehensive picture of the motives and drivers behind lone wolf attacks is essential for countering the threat. Worryingly, recent reports indicate that the private security company that Mateen used to work for provides security for a significant proportion of US nuclear facilities. A statistic which underscores the need to develop a more comprehensive profile for these types of lone actors in which warning signs can be detected. If assessments of these types of actors only involve partial analysis of motives, large gaps will remain for further attacks with potentially catastrophic consequences.
Amidst the horrific violence of the deadliest attack in the United States since 9/11, and the most lethal mass shooting in US history, was a reminder of the motivational complexity that underpins acts such as Orlando. Despite simplifications of the narrative to fit a news cycle, or a presidential campaign message, the facts as they emerge demonstrate again how ‘lone wolves’ can act on a multitude of impulses, and that understanding these remains crucial to limiting our collective vulnerability to these threats.
It has been well-publicised that during the siege, Mateen placed a call to 911, pledging his allegiance to Islamic State (IS). Mateen also claimed that he carried out the attack in order to stop the US from carrying out airstrikes against IS in Syria and Iraq. He further expressed solidarity with the Tsarnaev brothers who carried out the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, and a suicide bomber who died on behalf of the Al Nusra Front, a militant group at odds with IS. Within hours of the attack, Amaq News Agency, IS’s official media arm, claimed that the attack was carried out by an IS fighter.
However, it is notable that this weight of evidence began to unravel under scrutiny. It emerged that Mateen had been interviewed three times by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in two separate investigations – one regarding inflammatory comments to co-workers and another regarding possible links to Moner Mohammad Abu Salha, a US citizen who carried out a suicide attack in Syria. Both investigations were closed after the FBI failed to find credible information to corroborate the concerns. While Mateen had been previously investigated for showing verbal support for Islamist militant organisations, including rivals Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, investigators noted that he did not display major signs of radicalisation in the years or months preceding the Orlando attack. Key behavioural shifts suggesting radicalisation was underway were not evident. Mateen did not become noticeably more religious, his dress or appearance did not become more conservative, and his relationship with his family did not change dramatically. Ultimately, ongoing investigations have thus far shown that Mateen did not have any connection to IS. Barring the emergence of further revelatory evidence, it is apparent that Mateen acted in his own capacity.
If Mateen’s jihadist motivations were false, then that raises yet further questions of his true motives, his decision to lace them with Islamist invective and what this means for those charged with countering similar incidents in the future. Over the last few weeks, some accounts of Mateen’s motives have turned to emphasise hate of the LGBT community. However, this binary approach is also too simplistic. Behavioural analysts have commented that Mateen’s background is more suggestive of a mass shooter profile. He was bullied in school, had well-documented behavioural and mental health problems, jumped from job to job, took steroids and was reportedly abusive to spouses. While this profiling is not scientifically accurate, these factors point to a more intricate combination of drivers behind the attack.
Like the December 2015 San Bernardino shootings, the Orlando attack seemed to amalgamate personal motives with an IS brand. Because ‘lone wolves’ operate on their own, their personal agendas often mix with those of the terrorist group they claim to serve. In San Bernardino, the perpetrators targeted a holiday party in the county health department where one of them worked, as opposed to a more symbolic Western target in a major US city. Mateen’s selection of an LGBT nightclub also suggests that personal motives were a significant factor. While IS does espouse homophobic ideology, the group has tended to prioritise other groups as more worthy targets for attack, including Christians, Jews and Westerners in general. Reports suggest that Mateen was homophobic. His father claimed that Mateen became upset when he saw two men kissing a few months before the attack. These reports stand in contrast to other reports suggesting that Mateen may have been gay himself, or at least confused about his sexuality. Several regular patrons at Pulse have claimed that Mateen came to the club on many occasions over the last three years. Other individuals have claimed that they were in contact with Mateen via gay dating mobile applications.
The aforementioned factors open up the possibility that Mateen may have pledged allegiance to IS to ensure that the massacre gained as much media and public attention as possible. Indeed, the group’s May 2016 general call to arms during Ramadan sent a message to would-be jihadists to “martyr” themselves in a do-it-yourself attack, while still enabling IS to claim responsibility for incidents in the West. During the siege, Mateen took time to search social media to see if the story had been picked up in the news.
It is possible that this convergence reflects a worrying relationship of convenience between alienated, suicidal individuals in the West seeking attention, and a militant group that is losing pivotal strongholds and resources in Syria and Iraq. According to European University Institute professor Olivier Roy, these cases are “more about the Islamisation of radicalism than the radicalisation of Islam”. In these instances Islamist militancy is used as a one size-fits-all banner for radical individuals intent on carrying out violence, but who do not necessarily have a significant commitment to Jihadist ideology.
It is possible that this convergence reflects a worrying relationship of convenience between alienated, suicidal individuals in the West seeking attention, and a militant group that is losing pivotal strongholds and resources in Syria and Iraq. According to European University Institute professor Olivier Roy, these cases are “more about the Islamisation of radicalism than the radicalisation of Islam”. In these instances Islamist militancy is used as a one size-fits-all banner for radical individuals intent on carrying out violence, but who do not necessarily have a significant commitment to Jihadist ideology.
The simplicity of the Orlando attack – which did not require significant planning or training – and the interplay of radical ideology and personal grievances as motives for the shooting highlight the inherent difficulty in preventing lone actor attacks. Nevertheless, developing a comprehensive picture of the motives and drivers behind lone wolf attacks is essential for countering the threat. Worryingly, recent reports indicate that the private security company that Mateen used to work for provides security for a significant proportion of US nuclear facilities. A statistic which underscores the need to develop a more comprehensive profile for these types of lone actors in which warning signs can be detected. If assessments of these types of actors only involve partial analysis of motives, large gaps will remain for further attacks with potentially catastrophic consequences.