arrow-line asset-bg bars-line calendar-line camera-line check-circle-solid check-line check-solid close-line cursor-hand-line image/svg+xml filter-line key-line link-line image/svg+xml map-pin mouse-line image/svg+xml plans-businessplans-freeplans-professionals resize-line search-line logo-white-smimage/svg+xml view-list-line warning-standard-line
Articles

No Going Back? The FARC Peace Talks

Despite a recent uptick in FARC attacks, the Havana peace talks look set to continue. However, in his desperate push for peace, Colombia's president risks conceding too much, writes Lloyd Belton.

The ongoing peace talks between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist militant group, and the Colombian government are at a critical juncture. Colombians are desperate to see an end to a 50-year-old conflict that has cost the lives of 220,000 and displaced another six million. FARC militants and commanders remain focused on achieving agrarian and political reforms, but are nonetheless keen to escape prison sentences or jungle tombs. President Juan Manuel Santos, whose political legacy depends on the outcome of the peace talks, is desperate for a successful agreement. Santos currently faces the unenviable task of convincing approximately 45 million Colombians that the FARC, despite carrying out over 150 attacks since 22 May 2015, is genuinely committed to long-term peace in the country. He is also staving off growing demands from political rivals to set a deadline for the peace talks in Havana, which have dragged on for over two and a half years. There is no Plan B in the event that the talks fail: either peace is brokered in Havana or the Colombian military escalates its war against the guerrillas. Santos appears set on the former, recently appointing a new Minister of Defence many have labelled a ‘post-war minister’, in anticipation of a successful agreement. The FARC High Command is aware of Santos’ growing vulnerability, and will continue to attempt to capitalise on his perceived weakness in order to extract as many concessions as possible. However, the Colombian people, and even Santos himself, have their limits.

FARC and government representatives formally started negotiations in November 2014, and the talks have survived a number of significant tests, including the December 2014 kidnapping and release of an army general. At times, peace has seemed within reach; for example, in January 2015, Santos stated that the government was considering a bilateral ceasefire. However, although both sides have agreed to three out of six points aimed at ending the armed conflict, negotiations have stalled since the third point was agreed upon over a year ago. A number of other setbacks have tested the resolve and patience of both the negotiators and the Colombian public. In particular, the April 2015 FARC attack on a military base in Cauca, which killed 11 soldiers, and the May 2015 military bombardment of a FARC camp, which killed 26 militants, appeared at the time compromised the negotiations. Yet, despite declining support for the talks—with approval ratings falling from a high of 69 percent to 52 percent this year—both government and FARC negotiators remain determined to iron out a peace agreement. As the FARC’s Central High Command know all too well, Santos has bet all his political capital on the success of the negotiations and cannot afford to emerge empty-handed.

The FARC is playing a game of cat and mouse with Santos. All throughout the peace process, and even during its six-month unilateral ceasefire, the FARC has continued its attacks on infrastructure – such as electricity transmission towers, oil pipelines, aqueducts - as well as army bases and police stations. These attacks have intensified since the FARC lifted its ceasefire in May 2015, and millions of Colombians across the country have since been affected by the ensuing blackouts and oil spills, designed to pressure Santos into declaring a bilateral ceasefire. Santos has not yielded, and as far as the government is concerned, a bilateral ceasefire was all but discarded following the FARC’s April 2015 attack on Colombian troops in Cauca. Although they may not be able to secure a bilateral ceasefire, which would almost certainly give them time to regroup and rearm, the FARC still holds all the cards. Santos remains vulnerable primarily because the FARC understand, and will attempt to exploit, his greatest weakness: a growing desperation to secure an end to the civil war before he leaves office in 2018. FARC negotiators can stall the talks, thereby frustrating public opinion and rendering Santos increasingly desperate for a peace agreement, or carry out terrorist attacks to achieve the same result. An increasingly desperate and frustrated Santos is more likely to give into the concessions demanded by the militants, including political participation and an amnesty.

In order to secure a peace agreement without making too many concessions, the Santos government needs to commit itself to a twofold strategy. On the one hand, the armed forces should continue their low intensity war against the FARC in rural areas as escalating the military campaign would only incite further FARC reprisals. On the other hand, the government should also focus its efforts on accelerating the peace negotiations, yet without setting a permanent deadline for the talks, as a deadline would put unnecessary pressure on the Santos administration. The recent appointment of Luis Carlos Villegas as Defence Minister was a smart move in this regard. Villegas, a former union boss, ambassador, and Havana negotiator, is well respected across Colombia, including by the FARC. Villegas is touted as a Minister of Defence who can lead Colombia into a post-war period, whereas his predecessor, Juan Carlos Pinzón, was lauded for successes on the battlefield. In any event, Villegas’ appointment is a sign that the government is not preparing for anything other than peace, albeit an imperfect one. Therefore, the government should do precisely that: focus on building the platform and capacity for a peace settlement, including raising the estimated USD 45 billion needed for post-war reconstruction.

This cost, although seemingly high, is a small price to pay when compared to the USD 12.7 billion spent on the war every year, not to mention the significant losses in FDI as a result of the conflict. Furthermore, the government should continue to focus on protecting vulnerable infrastructure across the country. This cannot be limited to protecting electricity infrastructure on the outskirts of key cities like Bogotá and Medellín, but also in poorer parts of the country, such as Buenaventura, Tumaco, and Caquetá. By mitigating the impact of the FARC’s terrorist attacks, Santos can once again build public support for the peace process.

Despite a recent uptick in FARC-related violence, Santos remains determined to secure a peace agreement. The country and government are preparing for peace. Santos and Villegas need to focus their efforts on the negotiations in Havana, where, despite all the doom and gloom at home, real advances - for instance, recent agreements to create a truth commission and to carry out joint demining programmes - are still being made. Ultimately, the FARC wants peace during Santos’ administration because there are no guarantees that a post-Santos administration will be as lenient or patient. Whether or not an end to the FARC’s 50-year-old insurgency will entirely mitigate the risks of war and terrorism is a different question. The Colombian government still has to contend with the FARC’s ‘little brother’, the National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as numerous paramilitary successor groups, known as ‘bandas criminales emergentes’ or ‘Bacrim’. Santos, however, needs to remain focused on the FARC peace agreement, and leave the war against the ELN and Bacrim, and any potential future peace agreements, to his successors.

The ongoing peace talks between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist militant group, and the Colombian government are at a critical juncture. Colombians are desperate to see an end to a 50-year-old conflict that has cost the lives of 220,000 and displaced another six million. FARC militants and commanders remain focused on achieving agrarian and political reforms, but are nonetheless keen to escape prison sentences or jungle tombs. President Juan Manuel Santos, whose political legacy depends on the outcome of the peace talks, is desperate for a successful agreement. Santos currently faces the unenviable task of convincing approximately 45 million Colombians that the FARC, despite carrying out over 150 attacks since 22 May 2015, is genuinely committed to long-term peace in the country. He is also staving off growing demands from political rivals to set a deadline for the peace talks in Havana, which have dragged on for over two and a half years. There is no Plan B in the event that the talks fail: either peace is brokered in Havana or the Colombian military escalates its war against the guerrillas. Santos appears set on the former, recently appointing a new Minister of Defence many have labelled a ‘post-war minister’, in anticipation of a successful agreement. The FARC High Command is aware of Santos’ growing vulnerability, and will continue to attempt to capitalise on his perceived weakness in order to extract as many concessions as possible. However, the Colombian people, and even Santos himself, have their limits.

FARC and government representatives formally started negotiations in November 2014, and the talks have survived a number of significant tests, including the December 2014 kidnapping and release of an army general. At times, peace has seemed within reach; for example, in January 2015, Santos stated that the government was considering a bilateral ceasefire. However, although both sides have agreed to three out of six points aimed at ending the armed conflict, negotiations have stalled since the third point was agreed upon over a year ago. A number of other setbacks have tested the resolve and patience of both the negotiators and the Colombian public. In particular, the April 2015 FARC attack on a military base in Cauca, which killed 11 soldiers, and the May 2015 military bombardment of a FARC camp, which killed 26 militants, appeared at the time compromised the negotiations. Yet, despite declining support for the talks—with approval ratings falling from a high of 69 percent to 52 percent this year—both government and FARC negotiators remain determined to iron out a peace agreement. As the FARC’s Central High Command know all too well, Santos has bet all his political capital on the success of the negotiations and cannot afford to emerge empty-handed.

The FARC is playing a game of cat and mouse with Santos. All throughout the peace process, and even during its six-month unilateral ceasefire, the FARC has continued its attacks on infrastructure – such as electricity transmission towers, oil pipelines, aqueducts - as well as army bases and police stations. These attacks have intensified since the FARC lifted its ceasefire in May 2015, and millions of Colombians across the country have since been affected by the ensuing blackouts and oil spills, designed to pressure Santos into declaring a bilateral ceasefire. Santos has not yielded, and as far as the government is concerned, a bilateral ceasefire was all but discarded following the FARC’s April 2015 attack on Colombian troops in Cauca. Although they may not be able to secure a bilateral ceasefire, which would almost certainly give them time to regroup and rearm, the FARC still holds all the cards. Santos remains vulnerable primarily because the FARC understand, and will attempt to exploit, his greatest weakness: a growing desperation to secure an end to the civil war before he leaves office in 2018. FARC negotiators can stall the talks, thereby frustrating public opinion and rendering Santos increasingly desperate for a peace agreement, or carry out terrorist attacks to achieve the same result. An increasingly desperate and frustrated Santos is more likely to give into the concessions demanded by the militants, including political participation and an amnesty.

In order to secure a peace agreement without making too many concessions, the Santos government needs to commit itself to a twofold strategy. On the one hand, the armed forces should continue their low intensity war against the FARC in rural areas as escalating the military campaign would only incite further FARC reprisals. On the other hand, the government should also focus its efforts on accelerating the peace negotiations, yet without setting a permanent deadline for the talks, as a deadline would put unnecessary pressure on the Santos administration. The recent appointment of Luis Carlos Villegas as Defence Minister was a smart move in this regard. Villegas, a former union boss, ambassador, and Havana negotiator, is well respected across Colombia, including by the FARC. Villegas is touted as a Minister of Defence who can lead Colombia into a post-war period, whereas his predecessor, Juan Carlos Pinzón, was lauded for successes on the battlefield. In any event, Villegas’ appointment is a sign that the government is not preparing for anything other than peace, albeit an imperfect one. Therefore, the government should do precisely that: focus on building the platform and capacity for a peace settlement, including raising the estimated USD 45 billion needed for post-war reconstruction.

This cost, although seemingly high, is a small price to pay when compared to the USD 12.7 billion spent on the war every year, not to mention the significant losses in FDI as a result of the conflict. Furthermore, the government should continue to focus on protecting vulnerable infrastructure across the country. This cannot be limited to protecting electricity infrastructure on the outskirts of key cities like Bogotá and Medellín, but also in poorer parts of the country, such as Buenaventura, Tumaco, and Caquetá. By mitigating the impact of the FARC’s terrorist attacks, Santos can once again build public support for the peace process.

Despite a recent uptick in FARC-related violence, Santos remains determined to secure a peace agreement. The country and government are preparing for peace. Santos and Villegas need to focus their efforts on the negotiations in Havana, where, despite all the doom and gloom at home, real advances - for instance, recent agreements to create a truth commission and to carry out joint demining programmes - are still being made. Ultimately, the FARC wants peace during Santos’ administration because there are no guarantees that a post-Santos administration will be as lenient or patient. Whether or not an end to the FARC’s 50-year-old insurgency will entirely mitigate the risks of war and terrorism is a different question. The Colombian government still has to contend with the FARC’s ‘little brother’, the National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as numerous paramilitary successor groups, known as ‘bandas criminales emergentes’ or ‘Bacrim’. Santos, however, needs to remain focused on the FARC peace agreement, and leave the war against the ELN and Bacrim, and any potential future peace agreements, to his successors.


S-RM’s GSI is the simplest way to get a fresh perspective on the security risks affecting you, your work, and your travel.

Find out more