No Friends but the Mountains: What Kurdistan's Referendum Means for Iraq and the Region

The central government in Baghdad is serious about bringing the Kurdish provinces back under its control. Iraqi Vice President, Ayad Allawi, has already cautioned that the Kurdish independence referendum, held on 25 September, could spark a “civil war.” The current situation is mercurial, and there is significant uncertainty surrounding how, or whether, the conflict will be resolved. Despite the ceasefire agreed to on 27 October, subsequent skirmishes between Iraqi forces and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters along the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan suggest that confrontation remains a possibility if negotiations fail. The prospect of further conflict threatens to compromise the already-fragile security environment in Iraq, and has the potential to exacerbate tensions among Iran and Turkey’s own Kurdish populations.

The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) intended to use the referendum, which yielded a 72 percent turnout and a 92 percent vote in favour of independence, to strengthen the Kurdish claim for their own state. When Iraqi forces fled Islamic State’s (IS) rapid offensive into Kirkuk in 2014, the Peshmerga drove IS militants out of the province. The KRG subsequently took control of Kirkuk, which has long been a disputed territory between the KRG and Baghdad. But, after defeating IS in Mosul in July 2017, Iraqi forces had grown in strength and confidence. The KRG knew that once the Iraqi military succeeded against IS, Baghdad would set its sights on Kirkuk and its lucrative oil fields. The referendum therefore sought to strengthen the KRG’s position, by consolidating power in disputed territories. However, the Kurds overplayed their hand, and Baghdad responded with a show of force. By 17 October, Iraqi forces had assumed control of Kirkuk. Despite initially pledging to defend Kirkuk, Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrew behind the pre-2014 borders of Iraqi Kurdistan. 

To ease tensions, KRG President, Masoud Barzani, offered to freeze the referendum results and resolve the dispute through dialogue, in exchange for an immediate ceasefire. Baghdad eventually accepted, although not before Iraqi forces and Peshmerga units confronted one another along Iraqi Kurdistan’s borders. It is unclear whether Baghdad will agree to a compromise, as it has already stated opposition to Kurdistan’s independence. Furthermore, Baghdad has mandated Iraqi forces to secure border crossings with Turkey, which fall within KRG-controlled territory. Given that the most violent confrontations took place as Iraqi forces drew near Iraqi Kurdistan’s border in late October, it appears likely that Peshmerga will continue to resist Iraqi advances, should they attempt to enter Kurdish territory in the absence of a resolution.

However, a potential Kurdish insurgency in northern Iraq is not Baghdad’s only concern. Civil conflict in Erbil, Kurdistan’s capital, will also impair US-led coalition efforts against remaining IS cells. Erbil is an important base for coalition aircraft, and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which targets IS leadership. A deterioration of the security environment is also likely to invite further intervention by Turkey and Iran. Turkey has already deployed additional troops to its border with Iraqi Kurdistan, and has threatened to impose an economic blockade by rerouting a vital oil pipeline that runs through Kurdish territory. An escalation of conflict will also provide Iran with cause to extend its already-contentious influence in Iraq, through its backing of Shia Popular Mobilisation Units, which support Iraqi forces. 

Regionally, Turkey and Iran fear spillover effects of the referendum, which may inspire similar sentiments among Kurdish populations in the region. Turkey already faces an insurgency by the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK), and Ankara has voiced concerns over the potential for closer relations between the KRG and PKK to strengthen the Kurdish rebellion in south-eastern Turkey. Iran’s concern lies in the potential for its north-western Kurdish population to pursue their own bid for independence, which would prompt the second Kurdish separatist movement since the 1980s. Days before the referendum, Iranian Kurds held pro-Kurdistan demonstrations in Iran’s Kurdistan Province, and military units were deployed to maintain order. Nevertheless, the most likely course of action for Iran and Turkey is to watch Baghdad’s reaction, while pressuring Erbil economically through closing borders and restricting the KRG’s ability to export oil.

An often-repeated Kurdish proverb claims that Kurds have no friends but the mountains. The referendum has further estranged the Kurds from Baghdad, but has also increased tensions between Kurdish populations and the central governments of Turkey, Iran and Syria. Baghdad’s primary concern remains securing disputed territories, and it is unlikely that negotiations, or Barzani’s resignation on 29 October, will deter it from pursuing its economic and security interests. Given Kurds’ longstanding quest for independence, it is similarly unlikely that the KRG will cancel the referendum results, or relinquish control of Kurdish-controlled provinces without resistance. Regardless of efforts at rapprochement, the referendum has already begun to alter Iraq’s security landscape. Should negotiations fail and the ceasefire collapse, further skirmishes between Iraqi forces and Peshmerga fighters in northern Iraq are likely. In the longer term, hostile relations between Baghdad and the KRG will compromise post-war reconstruction and state-building, and also threatens to draw regional powers into another confrontation in Iraq.