Navigating the Hype: Terrorism and the Rio Olympics

An estimated 500,000 foreign fans, 10,500 athletes from 207 countries, and four million Brazilian nationals are expected to attend the Olympics and Paralympics in Rio de Janeiro in August and September. Of the half a million fans attending the Games, a fifth will travel from the US with many British and French fans making the trip across the Atlantic as well. Given the high-profile nature of both events, the Olympics and Paralympics remain obvious targets for Islamist militant groups like Islamic State (IS). The group has already demonstrated the capacity to stage high-impact attacks in Western Europe and North America this year, whilst the recent arrest of IS sympathisers in Brazil in July has added to growing fears that Rio is next. In response to this threat, Brazilian authorities have deployed approximately 87,000 security personnel across the city, staged daily counter-terrorism drills and have increased cooperation with international intelligence partners. Yet, despite the hype, there is little evidence to suggest that IS or its affiliates have the capacity to stage an organised or coordinated attack in Brazil. However, in the wake of the Orlando and Nice attacks, authorities remain concerned about the threat posed by lone-actors. 

Brazil and wider Latin America are largely considered isolated from the threat of Islamist militancy. Brazil itself is not involved in the war against IS in Syria or Iraq and has generally remained neutral on Middle Eastern affairs, reducing the motivation for reprisal attacks. In addition, the absence of a significant local Muslim population somewhat hinders domestic radicalisation and the emergence of a home-grown threat. To date, only one Brazilian national is believed to have joined IS. In contrast, approximately 1,700 French and 800 UK nationals are currently fighting for IS in Iraq and Syria. However, although the threat of terrorism in Brazil is seemingly low, the Olympics arguably present a unique opportunity for a group like IS. While IS may have a negligible support base in the country, Olympic organisers and some foreign governments are still concerned about the possibility of a lone-actor attack over the duration of the games. As such, Rio’s counter-terrorism capabilities and preparations have come under increasing scrutiny. 

The November 2015 coordinated attacks across Paris, and particularly against the Stade de France, marked a watershed moment in Brazil’s counter-terrorism preparations and prompted a review and overhaul of its capabilities. These attacks were also soon followed by IS’s first direct threat against Brazil when Maxime Hauchard, a French IS fighter, warned that Brazil would be the group’s next target. In response, the Brazilian government scrambled to reassure the world that it was ready to address any terrorism threat. In reality, its counter-terrorism preparations and capabilities at the time were arguably weak relative to some European and North American governments. In particular, doubts were raised about the capabilities of Brazil’s intelligence agency, the Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN), which has historically been underfinanced. 

The Olympics security contingent has since adopted a twin approach to addressing the terrorism threat at the Games, focusing on both the quantity and quality of its intelligence services. Authorities have deployed an estimated 87,000 personnel, including 65,000 police officers and 22,000 soldiers to Rio – the largest in Olympic history – whilst simultaneously emphasising training, awareness, and response. Over 10,000 police officers and special force marines deployed in the city have received special training on how to identify and respond to terrorist threats, including biological terrorist attacks. Moreover, since early July, police and soldiers have carried out numerous counter- terrorism drills across the city, including at train stations, stadiums, and airports. Alongside this, authorities have focused on awareness campaigns, distributing information pamphlets to local residents on how to identify suspicious individuals, objects, and cars. Hotel, bar, and restaurant owners have also been given exclusive access to a mobile app that will allow them to report suspicious activity directly to police. 

International cooperation on intelligence has also become a key component of Rio’s security preparations. In April 2016, Olympic authorities inaugurated the Integrated Anti-Terrorism Centre (CIANT) based in Brasília. This multinational intelligence body comprises representatives from over 100 countries participating in joint counter-terrorism monitoring and response operations alongside the ABIN. In addition, over 250 foreign police and intelligence officers from 55 countries, including the US, the UK and France, will provide assistance to Brazilian security forces in Rio for the duration of the Games. Together, CIANT and the Brazilian Ministry of Defence will oversee 28 smaller counter-terrorism command posts distributed across Rio. 

With greater international cooperation on intelligence, ABIN’s counter-terrorism monitoring capabilities have improved significantly over the past half year alone. The 21 July arrest of 11 individuals suspected of being part of a domestic IS cell is indicative of this, as Brazilian security forces responded swiftly to US-led intelligence. The suspects have since been accused of posting messages sympathetic to IS online and of planning an attack against the Olympics. Although this marked the first high-profile security operation against IS sympathisers in the country, and produced immediate shockwaves within the domestic and international media, Brazilian authorities were quick to downplay the actual threat. Brazil’s Justice Minister described the so-called ‘cell’ of IS sympathisers as “disorganised” and “amateur”, noting that none of them had ever actually met. Preparations for an attack against the Games had also not proceeded beyond online discussions. Brazilian authorities nevertheless continue to emphasise that the terrorism threat is “minimal”, but have promised that every lead will be “investigated exhaustively.” According to government reports, more than 100 people are currently being monitored in Brazil on suspicion of IS sympathy. 

Although weaknesses remain in Brazil’s security apparatus, authorities appear to have addressed a number of intelligence gaps. However, while these measures are likely to mitigate the risk of a coordinated attack, lone-actor attacks are extremely difficult to predict and prevent. Already, supporters of IS have encouraged sympathisers to carry out knife attacks against Israeli and US civilians whilst other suggestions have included the poisoning of food and drinks of spectators. More sophisticated appeals have suggested the use of explosive-laden drones to carry out attacks. ‘Soft spots’, such as bars, restaurants, beaches, and other tourist sites in Rio therefore remain the most vulnerable during the Games, as the sheer number of security personnel at stadiums, airports, and other Olympic venues largely reduces the likelihood of an attack against these sites.