Moscow Calling: The Crisis in Ukraine and its Implications for the Baltic States

Since the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s intervention in eastern Ukraine, political commentators and international investors alike have been looking cautiously at Russia’s ‘near abroad’, wary of what implications the country’s expansionist outlook may have for other neighbouring states. Nowhere has this been more the case than in the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all of which gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Despite gaining entry into the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the 2000s, the countries are still viewed in Moscow as part of Russia’s sphere of influence. The Baltic States are a key market for Russian energy exports, and all three countries – with the exception of Lithuania – have sizeable ethnic Russian minorities. Recent unrest and Russian interference in Ukraine have prompted observers to consider what impact the events there could have on Russia’s relations with the Baltic countries, and how the region’s Russian communities will respond to them. It has even led some commentators to ponder whether Russia could launch another irredentist ‘land grab’ in the Baltic region itself.

There are certainly similarities, on paper at least, between the Ukrainian and Baltic scenarios. Estonia and Latvia have sizeable ethnic Russian communities just as in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, where tensions between Ukraine’s interim administration and pro-Russian separatists are running high. In practice, however, Ukraine represents a very different proposition to Russia. Lying as it does between Russia and an EU/NATO bloc, Ukraine is of far greater strategic importance than the Baltic States. A westward looking Ukraine with a roadmap towards future EU integration would also be a disastrous development for Russia’s fledgling Eurasian Customs Union. This key policy initiative of the Kremlin currently includes only Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and it is widely accepted that its economic viability and future expansion plans would be thrown into doubt were Ukraine not to join. However, the most significant deterrent against any Russian military aggression in the Baltic States is the countries’ NATO membership and the security it affords them. NATO defence chiefs and member states have responded to Russia’s actions in Ukraine with more than mere denouncements, with around 6,000 troops from member states recently coordinating in heightened military exercises in Estonia. The US has also deployed over 600 troops to Poland and the UK has deployed fighter jets to patrol Baltic airspace, all in a bid to demonstrate their continuing support for NATO allies.

Of course, the remote likelihood of a Russian military incursion does not mean that the Baltic region is insulated from Russia’s destabilising influence.

With its actions in Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to interfere in its neighbours’ internal affairs in order to safeguard its strategic interests when threatened. One such strategic interest is energy exports, which play a vital role in the Russian economy. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have all stressed their commitment to reduce their considerable dependency on Russian energy imports, a policy which could have serious implications for Russia’s influence in the region. Lithuania, for example, is set to open the region’s first LNG terminal in the Black Sea Port of Klaipeda later this year. One of the tools Russia has employed with great effectiveness in Ukraine has been to foment social and political unrest in the country by pitting an ethnic Russian minority population in the East against the interim national government through a mix of propaganda, misinformation and scaremongering. There is a risk that Russia may adopt similar destabilising tactics in the Baltics with a view to halting the region’s move away from the Russian sphere of influence.

The ethnic Russian populations of both Estonia and Latvia are less typically pro-Russian than their Ukrainian counterparts. Instances of civil unrest in the communities have also lessened considerably since 2007, when Estonia witnessed violent clashes between security services and ethnic Russians angry at the removal of a Soviet war memorial. However, the preconditions for wide scale pro-Russian, anti-government protest in both countries is certainly present. Both countries’ Russian populations harbour deep seated resentments linked to citizenship laws and language requirements which disenfranchise them from participating in the political process. Similarly to ethnic Russians in Ukraine, the Russian communities in both countries are exposed almost exclusively to Russian television and media, and therefore Russian state propaganda, in the absence of Russian-language domestic alternatives. The ethnic Russian populations of Estonia and Latvia are also concentrated overwhelmingly in the capitals of Tallinn and Riga, meaning there is an increased potential for civil unrest to gather momentum in the cities. Both governments have introduced initiatives aimed at addressing ethnic Russians’ grievances – Estonia’s newly elected Social Democratic coalition, for example, has a more conciliatory stance on the status of the Russian language than its predecessor, and Latvia has recently seen the emergence of a pro-European civil society movement for ethnic Russians. However, much still needs to be done to better include ethnic Russians in national life, and so long as the Baltics continue to pursue their course away from Russian influence, the potential for destabilising civil unrest in the region will remai