Libyan militias: Dual service providers

On 7 June, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed sanctions on six individuals – four Libyans and two Eritreans – accused of leading human trafficking networks in Libya. Although this is the first time the UNSC has sanctioned individuals for their involvement in human trafficking, the move comes amid a series of punitive economic, judicial, and military actions taken by Libya and a range of other countries this year to target the illicit activities of militias in Libya. For example, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on entities allegedly involved in oil smuggling, Libyan authorities issued 205 arrest warrants for individuals suspected of smuggling migrants to Europe, and the Libyan Air Force carried out air strikes against alleged fuel smuggler sites along the Libyan-Tunisian border. However, despite this multi-pronged approach to combat militia smuggling activities in Libya, these efforts are unlikely to have any substantive impact on either the illicit activities of Libyan militias or their influence in the country. Whilst multilateral and national government actions may restrict the ability of certain individuals to engage in or prosper from illicit activities, they do not serve as a sufficient disincentive. Instead, the continued reliance on militias in Libya to provide local security services, despite their participation in criminal activity, gives militias little incentive to change their behaviour.

Smuggling in Libya

Competing centres of power and a lack of strong institutions have contributed to a thriving smuggling industry in Libya, in which militia members are active participants. Fuel smuggling and human trafficking are particularly prevalent in the country. According to the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC), between 30 and 40 percent of the fuel either refined in Libya or imported into the country is stolen or smuggled. Militias have reportedly received payments to guard the trucks of fuel smugglers. Meanwhile, Libya has become an integral point on the route used by sub-Saharan migrants to reach Europe, which human traffickers have exploited. Here, militias have played key roles in the trafficking process, including controlling departure areas for migrants, migrant camps, safe houses, and boats.

Dual security and crime providers 

The efforts by the UN, OFAC, and Libyan authorities have been narrow in their approach, targeting a relatively small number of individuals involved in smuggling activities in Libya. As such, they fail to address the underlying issue of how militias have gained such a prominent and powerful role within the country – namely, the integration of militias into formal security institutions. These punitive actions do not address the fact that, despite their regular participation in illicit activities such as fuel smuggling and human trafficking, militias have largely been tasked with providing policing and security services across the country.

This issue was evident in the UN’s decision to include Abd al Rahman al Milad, commander of an EU-funded Zawiya coastguard unit, among the human traffickers sanctioned earlier this month. The UN has alleged that, despite his role in the coastguard, al Milad collaborates with migrant smugglers. However, this issue extends far beyond al Milad and the Zawiya coastguard, as a UN panel of experts reported that most Libyan militias involved in human trafficking activities are also nominally affiliated to official state security institutions. For example, while the Anas al Dabbashi militia was providing security for the Millitah oil and gas terminal in the coastal city of Sabratha, it was also reportedly acting as a major facilitator of migrant smuggling. The commander of the Anas al Dabbashi militia, Ahmed al Dabbashi, was another target of the UN’s recently announced sanctions.

Despite their dominant presence, militia groups have proven themselves to be unreliable security partners since they often ultimately remain loyal to their own commanders and to financial incentives. This became evident in Tripoli in January 2017 when the National Salvation Government (NSG), led by Khalifa Ghwell, took control of several ministries from the UN-recognised Presidency Council. Two militias aligned with the Presidency Council reportedly refused to oppose Ghwell’s return to Tripoli in response to a financial award.

Despite the targeting of prominent smugglers in Libya with sanctions, arrest warrants, and air strikes, neither Libyan authorities nor the international community have made concerted efforts to oppose the militia-dominated system in Libya. On the contrary, militias are being increasingly absorbed into state security institutions. The ability of militias to continue operating in the country with authority, autonomy, and impunity has important implications for both the stability of Libya and commercial ventures within the country.

A costly and unreliable environment 

Given the powerful dual role militias currently have within Libya as providers of security services and autonomous actors engaged in illicit activities, they have little incentive to support any path towards unified, stable, or accountable state institutions. However, the more legitimacy militias receive from Libyan authorities and the more profits they gain from illicit activities, the harder it will become in the future to counteract the influence of militias throughout the country. This continued influence of militias in Libya and their engagement in illicit activities have three important consequences for commercial operators in Libya.

First, given the strength of militias in Libya and the grey area they inhabit regarding their legitimacy as security providers, reliance on them for security and policing functions leaves little recourse if the militias stop providing these services. For instance, the al Fil oil field in south-west Libya shut down in February 2018 and remained closed for at least two months after guards withdrew from the oil field to protest unpaid wages. The walkout was reportedly instigated by members of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), an armed group originally established to protect Libya’s oil assets but which now comprises various local units following their own laws and incentives. According to the NOC chairman, the guards were attached to the Ministry of Defence, and thus it was the responsibility of the ministry to respond to their demands. However, there is not substantial evidence of prior negotiations between either the Ministry of Defence or the NOC and local militia groups concerning the control and management of oil facilities. This raises uncertainty about how long such discussions would likely last as well as how a private company would be able to play a role in such negotiations and how it would ensure the outcome meets both its commercial and compliance requirements while taking into account potential reputational concerns stemming from negotiating with militias.

Second, the ability of militias to act autonomously and with impunity can negatively affect the continuity of business operations, particularly those involving oil fields, pipelines, terminals, and ports. For instance, the Ryayna Patrol Brigade, a militia from the north-west city of Zintan, was able to halt oil production at al Fil, al Sharara, and al Hamada oil fields in south-west Libya for several days in 2017 when it shut down pipelines to the refinery and port in Zawiya. The militia claimed it wanted to compel the NOC to invest more in the Zintan area, but other reports alleged the militia leader was trying to force authorities to release a cousin arrested on smuggling charges. An even more likely issue moving forward is the potential for clashes between rival militias as they fight over territory and for control of oil infrastructure. Such clashes could significantly derail business operations. For instance, on 14 June, fighting started when the PFG militia attacked the Ras Lanuf and al Sidra oil terminals in order to try to wrest back control of the terminals from the self-styled Libyan National Army, which had seized the terminals from the PFG in September 2016. The head of the Libyan NOC announced that the fighting had destroyed two crude oil tanks at Ras Lanuf, reducing storage capacity, and as of 20 June, had cut Libyan oil output in half. The closure of oil facilities, the damaging of equipment, reduced storage capacity, and uncertainty over the resumption of business activities contribute to a costly and uncertain environment for international companies operating here.

Third, the illicit activities of militias have the potential to reduce profits and to cost companies resources. In addition to the revenue lost from interrupted business operations, the diversion of oil or fuel from legitimate sources to illegal storage sites for the purposes of smuggling can hurt a company’s profit if the diversion occurs prior to a company transferring ownership of and responsibility for the commodity to another party. Furthermore, the diversion of goods to militias or smuggling networks, particularly those linked with sanctioned individuals, can also have negative reputational consequences, as well as potential financial and legal penalties if the company has failed to put adequate risk measures in place. The continued trafficking of migrants across the Mediterranean will also likely strain the resources of commercial vessels, as they may need to help rescue stranded or sinking boats and carry the resources for providing emergency first aid to rescued individuals. This occurred in January 2017 when a British-flagged commercial ship that was checking a pipeline off the Libyan coast responded several times to help migrants stranded on overcrowded boats. The crew of the ship helped distribute life jackets, food, and water in addition to waiting with the boat until additional help could arrive.

Moving forward

The increasing strength of militias in Libya will be a significant impediment for any efforts to establish a unified government or to create strong and accountable institutions, both of which are required to improve the investment and operational environment in Libya. However, in the absence of these elements, commercial operators in the country will need to have clear contingency plans in place for any disrupted business activities or attempts to divert resources. The UNSC’s new sanctions place a further imperative on carrying out due diligence in order to assess potentially fickle local partners, and to ensure that funds will not be diverted towards illicit activities.