Libya on the Brink

At the end of June, elections were held in Libya for a new House of Representatives, which replaces the General National Congress (GNC), the politically divided and discredited former legislature. The voting took place largely peacefully, but the new House of Representatives now faces an almost impossible task: to legislate for a country which threatens to slide into anarchy and to do so in the absence of effective security and administrative institutions.

Over the past five weeks, Libya has witnessed intense fighting between the patchwork of armed militias which have grown increasingly numerous and influential since the end of the 2011 revolution. The violence has been largely concentrated in Benghazi, where former Libyan Army units under Khalifa Hafter are battling Islamist-aligned forces, and Tripoli, where armed groups from the rival towns of Misrata and Zintan are fighting for prized economic assets and political influence. These two conflicts are separate but share common foundations. There are several significant long-term causes underpinning the recent outbreak of violence, but the immediate trigger in both cases has been a backlash by Islamist factions after losing power in parliament in the June elections.

One of the main problems facing the House of Representatives is that the militias responsible for the current violence all claim to derive their legitimacy from various state institutions and ministries. Militia groups from across the political spectrum are even subsidised by the government, drawing in increasing numbers of disenfranchised young recruits. State sponsorship of the militias began soon after Gadhafi’s ouster when the transitional authorities were under intense pressure to project authority and restore some kind of security to Libya’s towns. The army and police, long marginalised by Gadhafi in favour of praetorian units controlled by his immediate family, had melted away entirely during the revolution. 

This hybrid security arrangement had mixed success from the start. In some communities, where militia groups have developed organically and can boast local roots, the militias have stepped neatly into a local policing role, guarding vital infrastructure and even repairing roads and houses.

However, in areas of significant strategic value or in communities with underlying religious or political tensions, militias have exploited their position to pursue their own political and economic interests. In the eastern province of Cyrenaica, federalist militias have seized vital oil ports and stifled production to secure greater autonomy, whilst elsewhere other militia groups control border posts and smuggling routes and engage freely in criminal activity. Islamists, Misratans, Zintanis, federalists, and ethnic minorities such as the Tebu or Tuareg have all used force to seize economic assets or pressure the elected government. 

However, the recent fighting in Tripoli and Benghazi has a more immediate trigger. Islamist groups have seen their political capital gradually eroded over the past six months; Islamist candidates suffered significant losses in the elections for the new House of Representatives; and Islamist militias have turned to force to regain the initiative. In Benghazi, former army general Khalifa Hafter uses strong anti-Islamist rhetoric to justify his current operation in Benghazi. Hafter’s forces, comprised of former army units, are targeting Ansar Al Sharia, an armed Islamist group whose community outreach activities give it deep roots amongst Benghazi’s population. 

In Tripoli, up until the recent outbreak of fighting, Zintani forces controlled the city’s international airport, an extremely lucrative asset. The Misratan and Islamist-aligned forces tolerated this whilst their candidates controlled the GNC and major ministries; however, the recent elections decisively shifted the balance of power away from them. Therefore, since mid-July, the Misrata-Islamist bloc has clashed repeated with rival militias in Tripoli in an attempt to claw back some degree of political and economic power and redress the growing imbalance. The fighting has forced the new House of Representatives to relocate away from the capital to the city of Tobruk in the east of the country, and on 24 August, the shift in power was compounded when the Misrata-Islamist militias seized control of Tripoli’s airport. 

Clearly, Libya’s new parliament has a difficult task ahead of it, and there are serious doubts whether the government has the means to restore security and prosperity. As well as brokering and enforcing an immediate ceasefire, the government must act in an inclusive manner and avoid the polarisation that has characterised Libyan politics thus far. Only by allowing all factions a seat at the table will the new legislature be able to make any progress towards developing broadly-accepted national security forces and state institutions.