Le Pouvoir's Sacrifice: Steering change to preserve continuity in Algeria

After weeks of intensifying but peaceful protests in almost every province of the country, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced on 11 March that he will not run for a fifth term and that presidential elections, initially planned for 18 April, will be postponed. He also formed a new caretaker government and appointed veteran diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi to lead a national conference tasked with drafting a new constitution before a new election date is set. However, the president’s concessions failed to appease protesters, and many have vowed to continue their mobilisation, with further demands and a visible appetite for broad-based political change.

Since mid-February, Algeria, a bastion of stability in a relatively volatile region, has witnessed scenes reminiscent of the 2010–2011 Arab Spring from which the country had been largely insulated. Although recent events have accelerated the end of Bouteflika’s presidency, there remains significant uncertainty over how the situation will play out in the coming months. While the protest movement seems to have reached a critical mass, ground-breaking regime change is still highly questionable.

THE STRAW THAT BROKE THE CAMEL'S BACK

The 82-year-old Bouteflika, first elected in 1999, has made few public appearances since suffering a stroke in 2013. His last public address was in 2014. However, his announcement on 10 February that he would seek a fifth term despite his fragile health sparked outrage across Algerian society. Yet, this is not the sole driver of the recent unrest but one of several grievances that have developed over the past five years. Many of the protests were aimed not just at Bouteflika but also more generally at Algeria’s stagnant political system, which is perceived as corrupt and incapable of addressing many of the public’s needs. Economic concerns have also fuelled much of the unrest. The oil and gas-dependent economy had suffered from a decline in crude prices in 2014, and the unemployment rate now stands at approximately 12 percent. More than a quarter of Algerians under the age of 30 are jobless. Sharp increases in the price of basic items such as sugar, oil and flour have also affected the cost of living. Such price increases reached between 20 and 30 percent in the first few months of 2019 alone.

WHY NOW?

These issues have prompted thousands of smallscale protests in recent years. Authorities had, to some extent, tolerated weekly service delivery protests, union strikes and some anti-government mobilisation in areas outside of Algiers. Yet, the latest round of protests represents the largest and most widespread since 2011, when a series  of uprisings swept much of the Middle East. Algeria managed to avoid the worst of the unrest, partly because memories of its decade-long civil war in the 1990s seemed to dissuade broader mobilisation, and because the government had expanded its social welfare programme.

However, while expecting a fifth Bouteflika mandate to be unpopular with the Algerian public, the political elite did not foresee an escalation in protest action, including protests reaching the once sanctuary capital, Algiers. This time, a compounded and unified point of resentment, coupled with the unspoken support of influential members of the ruling elite, proved a powerful mobiliser. Simultaneously, government forces appear less willing than before to intervene in protests. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project — an organisation that collates and analyses data on political violence and protests — 90 percent of demonstrations proceeded without government intervention over the past two months. This is a notable increase from the January 2011 protests, where less than 75 percent of demonstrations saw no government intervention.

RULING BEHIND THE SCENES

Algeria has been governed by an opaque alliance that falls into three broad categories: the military, the business elite and the civil government, in particular, bureaucrats within the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN). This political  establishment is collectively known as Le Pouvoir (The Power). For decades, much of this faction’s legitimacy stemmed from the fact that many of its members participated in the struggle for independence. Bouteflika, for example, is among the last remaining elites of that generation and is widely credited with assisting in Algeria’s stability following a civil war that claimed an estimated 200,000 lives.

These political-military elites have been locked in a decades-long power struggle, which lends complexity to the Algerian government’s power structure and contributed to the March 2019 crises. The decision to once again present Bouteflika’s candidacy suggests that the elites presumably responsible for choosing his successor could not reach a consensus. Consequently, the reforms put forward in response to the unrest in March 2019 are tactical concessions, aimed at defusing protests, giving Le Pouvoir more time to build consensus over an optimal succession plan. At this stage, however, there is no definitive candidate best placed for this role. Generally, the political elite will only accept a candidate who would safeguard their political and commercial interests.

TO A NEW EQUILIBRIUM

The trajectory of these protests is far from certain. The position of the security services has not yet been defined and various opposition parties are divided and do not enjoy mass credibility.  However, continued popular unrest is inevitable in the coming weeks. This will add urgency to the dealings of the national conference and potentially fuel the competition among the military, the ruling coalition, the business elite and civil society over a succession plan. The current spate of protests is historic, and Algeria is approaching the beginning of the post-Bouteflika era, but there is still a large question around the possibility of complete and systemic change in the country. Le Pouvoir is expected to drag out this transition process — and will work to buy time and co-opt or divide the groups behind the protests — rather than promote systemic reform. 

A direct military intervention in politics, similar to the Egyptian military’s 2013 ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood, is unlikely unless Algeria’s security environment deteriorates dramatically. Instead, the military will seek to remain heavily involved in decision-making behind the scenes, including choosing Bouteflika’s successor. 

In the longer term, if mass mobilisation continues to grow, the establishment is likely to allow for more concessions, gradually opening up the political system. However, if the protests start to lose momentum, a managed transition will take shape, where Le Pouvoir can determine a consensus candidate to win a carefully orchestrated election process.

IMPACT ON COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS

The government is expected to effectively contain the unrest during the transition period, reducing the impact of the protests on commercial operations in the country. However, protests and strikes will likely continue in the short term. Most protests in Algeria are generally peaceful. Yet, in intensified forms of protest and forcible government intervention, acts of vandalism and looting may occur. As such, businesses in the vicinity of protest sites face a threat of malicious damage and sabotage. Commercial operations are also likely to be negatively impacted by sporadic road closures and traffic disruptions. Furthermore, powerful unions have been embroiled in the ongoing civil unrest, which will likely result in regular disruptions to public services. 

At the socio-economic level, the government is not expected to effectively implement major reforms over the transition period, and public frustration is likely to increase. The government’s focus over the next year will be on the national conference, constitutional amendments and upcoming elections. This, along with a laborious policymaking process, will delay economic recovery and add to social pressure. As such, further outbreaks of anti-government protests are expected over the long term.