Lasting peace or fleeting truce? Ukraine at a crossroads

Following the 16-hour marathon talks that led to the second Minsk agreement on 12 February, German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke of “a glimmer of hope, no more no less”. Merkel’s wariness was justified, as previous negotiations to end the ten-month conflict have proven futile, including the first Minsk agreement signed in September 2014. The new agreement’s first provision is a ceasefire that began on 15 February, which was observed in most conflict areas. However, pro-Russian separatists continued their assault on the city of Debaltseve, a strategic transport hub that connects rebel-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (also known as Donbass) by rail. By 18 February, Ukrainian troops began withdrawing from Debaltseve, with President Petro Poroshenko saying his soldiers “are holding the new defence lines”, putting a positive spin on yet another major military and psychological defeat for the Ukrainian army.

Western powers have strongly condemned the rebels’ capture of Debaltseve and have since threatened to impose more sanctions on Russia, although, ultimately, diplomatic efforts will focus on enforcing ceasefire compliance. The potential shipment of United States (US) weapons to Ukraine may only escalate the conflict without changing the outcome of a war in Russia’s backyard, which is why French President Francois Hollande and Chancellor Merkel spent significant political capital on the Minsk agreement. There is a possibility that the ceasefire will hold. In line with provisions in the Minsk agreement, several prisoner exchanges have taken place and both sides have reportedly started removing heavy artillery systems from the front line. Although small-scale outbreaks of violence have been reported in parts of eastern and southern Ukraine, on February 26, Ukrainian military reported that there were no combat fatalities for two consecutive days. Nevertheless, the conflict zones remain volatile, and full implementation of the Minsk agreement will be difficult for a number of reasons.

Firstly, there is the question of ceasefire enforcement. According to the Minsk agreement, only the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), an intergovernmental institution that addresses security-related concerns, has the mandate to monitor the ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, and withdrawal of foreign armed groups, mercenaries and military equipment. The OSCE is understaffed however, whilst its unarmed observers were previously denied access to certain conflict areas by the rebels. This explains Poroshenko’s recent call for United Nations (UN)-mandated peacekeepers to enforce the ceasefire instead, which was roundly dismissed by Russia and the separatists.

Secondly, there is an issue with border control. The Minsk agreement states that Ukraine’s full control over its border with Russia will only be restored by the end of 2015, after constitutional reforms in Ukraine grant Donbass special status and local elections are held.

If the rebels are not satisfied with certain aspects of these constitutional reforms, Ukraine may not gain control of its border until well after the 2015 deadline has passed. This will allow for the uninterrupted flow of weapons and troops from Russia in the interim, despite Russian denials to the contrary. The Ukrainian army recently highlighted these concerns when it accused Russia of sending more tanks, armoured vehicles and troops to southern Ukraine with the aim of capturing the strategic city of Mariupol to create a land corridor between rebel-held territories and Russia-controlled Crimea.

Finally, the Minsk agreement grants amnesty to those involved in the conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk, and calls on the Ukrainian government to restore socioeconomic links with rebel-held territories, such as with the payment of pensions. If Ukraine’s compliance with these provisions is not satisfactory to the rebels, further fighting cannot be ruled out. Separatists recently declared that if Ukraine considers joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), they would reject the Minsk agreement altogether, even though potential NATO membership was not central to the recent peace talks. Thus, future rebel offensives on government-held areas including Luhansk, Donesk, Kharkiv, Mariupol and Odessa are not entirely impossible, even though they will require significant military support from Russia. There have also been several bomb blasts in Kharkiv, Mariupol and Odessa in recent months, primarily targeting Ukrainian government and military institutions, highlighting the fragile security situation across Ukraine.

After several high-profile military defeats, Ukraine finds itself in a position of weakness while Western sanctions have had little noticeable impact on the military capabilities of the Russian-backed separatists. Poroshenko is also under immense pressure to address Ukraine’s severe economic challenges and implement much-needed reforms. On the other hand, the rebels do not have the capacity to govern an independent state in Donbass at present and require economic integration with western Ukraine despite financial assistance, humanitarian aid and direct gas supplies from Russia. Common sense suggests that necessity will force both sides to act in good faith. However, given the extent of mutual distrust and hostility, it is still too soon to expect lasting peace.

Following the 16-hour marathon talks that led to the second Minsk agreement on 12 February, German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke of “a glimmer of hope, no more no less”. Merkel’s wariness was justified, as previous negotiations to end the ten-month conflict have proven futile, including the first Minsk agreement signed in September 2014. The new agreement’s first provision is a ceasefire that began on 15 February, which was observed in most conflict areas. However, pro-Russian separatists continued their assault on the city of Debaltseve, a strategic transport hub that connects rebel-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (also known as Donbass) by rail. By 18 February, Ukrainian troops began withdrawing from Debaltseve, with President Petro Poroshenko saying his soldiers “are holding the new defence lines”, putting a positive spin on yet another major military and psychological defeat for the Ukrainian army.

Western powers have strongly condemned the rebels’ capture of Debaltseve and have since threatened to impose more sanctions on Russia, although, ultimately, diplomatic efforts will focus on enforcing ceasefire compliance. The potential shipment of United States (US) weapons to Ukraine may only escalate the conflict without changing the outcome of a war in Russia’s backyard, which is why French President Francois Hollande and Chancellor Merkel spent significant political capital on the Minsk agreement. There is a possibility that the ceasefire will hold. In line with provisions in the Minsk agreement, several prisoner exchanges have taken place and both sides have reportedly started removing heavy artillery systems from the front line. Although small-scale outbreaks of violence have been reported in parts of eastern and southern Ukraine, on February 26, Ukrainian military reported that there were no combat fatalities for two consecutive days. Nevertheless, the conflict zones remain volatile, and full implementation of the Minsk agreement will be difficult for a number of reasons.

Firstly, there is the question of ceasefire enforcement. According to the Minsk agreement, only the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), an intergovernmental institution that addresses security-related concerns, has the mandate to monitor the ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, and withdrawal of foreign armed groups, mercenaries and military equipment. The OSCE is understaffed however, whilst its unarmed observers were previously denied access to certain conflict areas by the rebels. This explains Poroshenko’s recent call for United Nations (UN)-mandated peacekeepers to enforce the ceasefire instead, which was roundly dismissed by Russia and the separatists.

Secondly, there is an issue with border control. The Minsk agreement states that Ukraine’s full control over its border with Russia will only be restored by the end of 2015, after constitutional reforms in Ukraine grant Donbass special status and local elections are held.

If the rebels are not satisfied with certain aspects of these constitutional reforms, Ukraine may not gain control of its border until well after the 2015 deadline has passed. This will allow for the uninterrupted flow of weapons and troops from Russia in the interim, despite Russian denials to the contrary. The Ukrainian army recently highlighted these concerns when it accused Russia of sending more tanks, armoured vehicles and troops to southern Ukraine with the aim of capturing the strategic city of Mariupol to create a land corridor between rebel-held territories and Russia-controlled Crimea.

Finally, the Minsk agreement grants amnesty to those involved in the conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk, and calls on the Ukrainian government to restore socioeconomic links with rebel-held territories, such as with the payment of pensions. If Ukraine’s compliance with these provisions is not satisfactory to the rebels, further fighting cannot be ruled out. Separatists recently declared that if Ukraine considers joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), they would reject the Minsk agreement altogether, even though potential NATO membership was not central to the recent peace talks. Thus, future rebel offensives on government-held areas including Luhansk, Donesk, Kharkiv, Mariupol and Odessa are not entirely impossible, even though they will require significant military support from Russia. There have also been several bomb blasts in Kharkiv, Mariupol and Odessa in recent months, primarily targeting Ukrainian government and military institutions, highlighting the fragile security situation across Ukraine.

After several high-profile military defeats, Ukraine finds itself in a position of weakness while Western sanctions have had little noticeable impact on the military capabilities of the Russian-backed separatists. Poroshenko is also under immense pressure to address Ukraine’s severe economic challenges and implement much-needed reforms. On the other hand, the rebels do not have the capacity to govern an independent state in Donbass at present and require economic integration with western Ukraine despite financial assistance, humanitarian aid and direct gas supplies from Russia. Common sense suggests that necessity will force both sides to act in good faith. However, given the extent of mutual distrust and hostility, it is still too soon to expect lasting peace.