Japanese Security Reforms: Allowing the JSDF to Flex its Muscles

Since assuming office in 2012, Japan’s Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, has sought to give the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) more muscle. One of the principal elements of Abe’s proposed reform drive has been the introduction of new legislation which affords the JSDF greater freedom to operate abroad, something which Japan’s pacifist constitution has traditionally limited. In July 2014, Abe’s cabinet approved a reinterpretation of Article 9 - a clause in the constitution that renounces war as a means to resolve international disputes - to enable Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defence. This marked a significant shift in the country’s post-WWII military policy of neutrality. To legally permit the deployment of the JSDF overseas, two security bills are being reviewed by the Japanese parliament which, despite domestic opposition, is likely to be passed due to Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) parliamentary majority.

The first bill, the International Peace Support Bill, would allow Japanese troops to participate in a campaign under the justification of collective self-defence, either when Japan’s survival is threatened or when a close ally is attacked, provided there are no other appropriate means to protect Japanese interests and citizens. The second bill, the Peace and Security Legislation Development Bill, seeks to simplify the process by which the Japanese government can authorise the overseas deployment of the JSDF to provide logistical support for an allied force. The bill removes the necessity for parliament to pass a unique temporary law for every such operation. However, the bill does contain a provision that notes that the government would still need the approval of parliament before deploying troops. If the proposed reforms are adopted, the JSDF is likely to assume a stronger role in regional and international security matters.

Japan faces various regional security threats: North Korea’s missile programme, China’s belligerence in the South China Sea, and Beijing’s perceived aggression towards the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands (Japan’s control of the islands is contested by China, which refers to them as the Diaoyu Islands). Japan is also not exempt from the global threat of terrorism, as numerous Japanese business and aid agencies operate abroad. Consequently, Abe argues that the bills would enable the JSDF to protect and rescue Japanese nationals overseas.

Internationally, the bills have received a mixed response. On the one hand, the US has welcomed the proposed changes to Tokyo’s security policy as it allows Japan to assume a greater role in the Japan-US security alliance. As such, there are concerns that the JSDF could become embroiled in various US-led conflicts, especially in the Middle East where the US is carrying out an extensive counter-terrorism campaign against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. Though Abe maintains that Japan will avoid assisting the US in its Middle East operations, Japanese forces may be required to aid their ally should the IS threat escalate significantly. In such a scenario, there is a possibility that IS or its sympathisers could target commercial Japanese assets in the Middle East and North Africa, where 800 Japanese businesses currently operate, or in other parts of the world where Islamist extremist groups have pledged allegiance to IS. The IS kidnapping of two Japanese tourists in Syria, in January 2015, demonstrated that Japanese nationals are not exempt from the IS threat. Should Japan’s involvement in the anti-IS fight expand to involve the JSDF, there is a risk that other Japanese nationals could become targets, not only in the Middle East and North Africa, where 12,000 Japanese nationals currently live, but closer to home, in countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, where terrorist organisations that have pledged allegiance to IS often carry out politically-motivated kidnappings.

Unsurprisingly, China is opposed to Abe’s security reforms. Beijing has urged Tokyo to avoid “crippling regional peace and security” and jeopardising China’s sovereignty and security interests. Although a war between Japan and China is unlikely to occur over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, if Japan were to assume a more aggressive posture then naval standoffs between Japanese and Chinese vessels are likely. Furthermore, as witnessed in September 2012, anti-Japanese sentiment in China could result in protests targeting Japanese businesses and factories, as well as Japanese nationals working in or visiting China. Violent anti-Japanese protests could significantly impact business operations, subsequently affecting revenue earnings.

Until the security bills are passed, it is difficult to determine exactly how the JSDF will evolve and where military units will be deployed. As such, the potential scenarios involving the JSDF and consequent risks to Japanese assets and citizens, highlighted above, are somewhat speculative. Nevertheless, if the JSDF assumes a stronger role in upholding regional and international peace and security, Tokyo will need to carefully and strategically calculate the global positioning of its troops to avoid repercussions that could threaten Japanese assets and nationals abroad.