Islamic State Kidnappings in Iraq

While the Islamic State (IS) militant group grabbed international attention in 2014 and early 2015 through the execution of several high-profile foreign hostages, the group’s kidnapping activities have since been dominated by mass kidnappings of local Syrians and Iraqis, many of whom have been ransomed off. As the group retreated in the face of advances by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Shi’a Muslim militias and Kurdish Peshmerga in 2016, it carried out similar mass kidnappings of Iraqi civilians, this time to use as human shields to limit the ability of opposing forces to employ air support and heavy weapons. As IS loses more territory in Iraq, the group is likely to increasingly revert to asymmetrical tactics in 2017, which may include a renewed focus on kidnapping in areas of government control.

IS has both financial and ideological motives for escalating its kidnapping operations as it loses territory in Iraq. Firstly, IS’s ability to survive in Iraq and continue to operate as a terrorist group will be largely predicated on its ability to effectively maintain and fund a network of cells in the country. As the loss of Mosul is likely to have a major impact on the group’s cash flow, kidnappings for ransom will become an increasingly attractive revenue stream. Secondly, despite IS’s assertions to the contrary, the loss of territory marks a significant symbolic defeat for the group, which has chiefly identified itself by its ability to hold and govern territory. This is likely to push the group to attempt to regain its ideological prominence by other means. While this is most likely to be marked by a steady increase in high-impact terrorist attacks, the propaganda effect of the group’s early foreign hostage executions is unlikely to be overlooked, and similar kidnapping operations offer the group the chance to bolster its fading profile.

IS is likely to lose the control of Mosul in the coming year; however, small cells of militant groups are likely to retain a presence in Sunni Muslim pockets in northern and western Iraq, where sympathy for the group is bolstered by a distrust of the ISF and their Shi’a militia allies. Operating from a similar profile, IS’s predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), had similarly established a practice of conducting frequent well executed kidnappings. At the group’s peak in 2006 and 2007, it often abducted targets from areas of government control, including foreign nationals and so-called ‘hard targets’, such as US troops. However, the capability of IS’s local cells to conduct similar kidnapping operations is likely to be lower. Without the benefit of a consolidated area of territory inside Iraq, and with access to Syria becoming more difficult, local cells will be under greater pressure from the security services, complicating the logistical requirements to conduct successful kidnapping operations. In addition, the ISF’s capabilities have improved substantially since AQI’s peak in 2006, which is likely to limit IS’s ability to operate in the same manner.