Islamic State in Central Asia: Between Myth and Reality

Since the emergence of Islamic State (IS) in 2014, Central Asian governments, along with various media outlets and commentators, have claimed that IS poses an imminent danger to regional security. This narrative has been bolstered by the presence of Central Asian nationals fighting in Syria. While the risk of IS-inspired terrorism varies across the region – which comprises Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – it has likely been exaggerated.

Regional governments undoubtedly take IS very seriously. In July 2015, Kyrgyzstan reportedly foiled two IS attacks, which resulted in the killing of six alleged IS militants and arrest of seven. Tajikistan has also arrested dozens of suspected IS recruits over the past year, and Uzbekistan has claimed that IS are planning attacks inside the country. However, it is challenging for observers to prove the involvement of IS in these incidents given the lack of transparency across Central Asian regimes. These governments have also been accused of exaggerating the threat posed by IS as a pretext to suppress domestic opposition and support their requests for military aid from the US and Russia.

In particular, the adherence of potential militants to Islamist principles has been used as a pretext to clamp down on political and religious movements. For example, in September 2015, Tajikistan’s second largest political party, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), was banned by authorities. The Tajik government often linked the IRPT to IS, and a high court ruled in September that the party should be designated a terrorist organisation. In another example in February 2015, Kyrgyzstan arrested Rashot Kamalov, a popular Imam and government critic, on extremism charges, which independent observers have described as politically-motivated. Undeniably, Islamist ideology is one of the sources of radicalisation for those who have joined IS. Nevertheless, since most Central Asian recruits are migrant workers based in Russia, their experience there, including discrimination by Russian authorities, is likely to be an equally important factor in driving them towards IS.

In January 2015, the International Crisis Group, citing figures from Western and Russian intelligence officials, estimated that between 2,000 and 4,000 Central Asians have joined IS. However, this figure has been challenged by some experts, who claim that the total number of Central Asians fighting for various militant groups in Syria (not just IS) is in fact less than 1,500. Notably, the majority of these individuals are thought to be recruited in Russia – not Central Asia – where they work as migrant labourers.

However, returning fighters do not necessarily pose an imminent threat. The conflicts in Syria and Iraq appear unlikely to end any time soon, and, consequently, experienced fighters are unlikely to return over the next 12 months. Many Central Asian fighters have died in combat, and the number is bound to increase in the coming months as the conflict intensifies following Russia’s involvement. Even if some fighters start returning in the medium to long term, the extenisve powers enjoyed by most of the region’s security forces are likely to prevent them from carrying out frequent attacks.

Some might partially attribute regional governments’ concerns over IS to the pre-existing threat posed by regional terrorist groups including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). However, although these groups reportedly operate cells in the region, they have not been able to carry out major attacks in Central Asia in the last five years. Fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) since the early 2000s has diminished their capabilities. There have been reports that some IMU fighters have pledged allegiance to IS, and are fighting alongside the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. Although incidents of border violence involving these militants cannot be ruled out, their ability to cause major instability inside the borders of Central Asia is also limited.

Nevertheless, the threat posed by IS should not be dismissed altogether. Even if IS fails to develop strong cells in the region, the ‘lone wolf’ terror threat remains. The narrative of returning jihadists may have been embellished, but it could also emerge in the long term, especially in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan where security forces are under-resourced. Finally, regional governments’ clampdowns on domestic political and religious movements may succeed in preventing radicalisation and disenfranchising Islamists in the short to medium term, but repressive policies could also force individuals to go underground and become extremists, in the name of IS or other jihadist groups.