Islamic State Claims Benghazi Suicide Attack
On 29 July, a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (S-VBIED) was deployed against Libyan National Army (LNA) forces in Gwarsha, Benghazi, killing two soldiers and wounding four others. The attack was subsequently claimed by Islamic State (IS) in an online statement that included photographs of the alleged attack taken by a camera-mounted drone. The bomber was identified as Ziyad Fawzi Gergum, a Libyan who reportedly joined IS initially in Benghazi and then later fought with the group in Sirte, before returning to Benghazi.
The attack, coupled with IS’s public claim of responsibility, indicates an active effort to reassert the group’s profile in Benghazi. Despite previous claims by the LNA earlier in 2016 that IS forces in Benghazi had been largely defeated, the group has maintained a presence in the city, fighting alongside other Islamist extremist brigades, including Ansar Al Sharia and the 17 February Brigade, against the LNA-led anti-Islamist Dignity Operation. However, reports of the ongoing conflict in Benghazi have not referred to IS activity for several months, which has lent credibility to the theory that their capabilities in the region had been substantially reduced. While this may still be the case, the attack has refocused attention on the IS presence in Benghazi. Furthermore, as speculation increases as to what lies ahead for IS in Libya, the attack has highlighted Benghazi as a possible destination for retreating IS militants fleeing the Bunyan Marsous operations in Sirte.
The protracted Islamist conflict in Benghazi is likely to make it an attractive alternative for Islamic State militants.
While an exodus from Sirte is likely to result in a scattering of IS, including to regional neighbours such as Tunisia, Niger and Chad, the protracted Islamist conflict in Benghazi is likely to make it an attractive alternative. However, should the group hope to grow its presence there, any anticipated influx of fleeing IS militants will be reliant on negotiating local support. Other groups such as the Benghazi Shura Revolutionary Council (BRSC) retain high levels of support among pro-Islamists in eastern Libya. The recently established BRSC splinter group known as the Benghazi Defence Brigade (BDB) has rapidly also gained prominence after it claimed responsibility for the shooting down of an LNA helicopter which killed three French troops. Since the incident the BDB has received alleged statements of support from high-profile quarters, including IS’ regional rival, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). While allegiances between militia groups are notoriously transient in Libya, it is likely that IS will need to ensure that its own profile continues to appear robust, despite its losses in Sirte, in order to increase its chances of successes among the multitude of active militant groups embedded in Benghazi, It is possible that this attack constituted part of the effort towards securing such a profile. Given the significant setbacks IS has encountered elsewhere in Libya, such as Sabratha and Derna, it is feasible that Benghazi could offer IS an alternative area of operation in Libya.