Articles
Is the Caliphate Coming to Kashgar? Islamist Militancy in Western China
A recently released Islamic State (IS) propaganda video explicitly threatened to target China in future attacks. While the group's focus on China is concerning, the primary terrorism threat in China and to Chinese interests abroad will continue to be posed by transnational terrorist groups from Xinjiang Province. However, competition resulting from a propaganda war between IS and these groups is likely to spur more ambitious attacks on Chinese interests in Central Asia and the Middle East, writes Rob Attwell.
The Islamic State (IS) militant group has directly threatened China. On 25 February 2017, the group released a 30-minute propaganda video in which a Uyghur fighter threatened to return to China and “spill rivers of blood.” He subsequently decapitated a prisoner who was suspended off the ground by his feet. This latest threat is reportedly driven by the Chinese government’s alleged oppression of religious and ethnic minorities, specifically the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim minority, in Xinjiang.
This is not the first time IS has taken aim at China. In 2014, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, the group’s leader, called China an “oppressor of Muslims” while in January 2016, IS sympathises staged a cyber-attack on an elite Chinese university by replacing its homepage with an IS flag. However, the most recent video is significant as it calls upon experienced Chinese IS fighters to return home to carry out future attacks. In contrast, previous propaganda videos have primarily consisted of recruitment drives encouraging Uyghurs to leave China to join IS in the Middle East. While IS has not demonstrated the capability to stage an attack in China to date, with estimates of between 100 and 300 Chinese Muslim nationals fighting for the group, the possibility of them returning home to stage attacks poses a new threat.
The video’s release comes amid China’s growing exposure to international terrorism. The Uyghur issue specifically has motivated attacks on Chinese interests and citizens abroad. In the most recent incident in August 2016, an ethnic Uyghur suicide bomber targeted the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, wounding three embassy staff. More broadly, Chinese nationals have been affected by global terrorism incidents. IS executed a Chinese national in Iraq in November 2015, for example, and Chinese citizens have been killed in attacks by IS and its affiliates around the world, including during the March 2016 Brussels airport bombings.
While the singling out of China by IS is concerning, the group does not have a competitive advantage in China and is ultimately likely to lose out to domestic groups.
Xinjiang-based militants are primarily interested in domestic issues. As such, IS’s goal of establishing a global modern caliphate stretching from Granada to Kashgar, the ancient Islamic cities now located in modern Andalucía, Spain, and Xinjiang, China, is unlikely to resonate with the majority of these militants, limiting the prospects for collaboration. IS also lacks credibility with most Uyghur militants, as it has only recently focused on tensions between segments of the Uyghur population and Chinese authorities, which date back roughly 150 years. The group’s credibility is further undermined by the fact that it has yet to stage a successful attack in China and lacks a network of contacts in the country.
In contrast, domestic groups have a track record of successful attacks, often involving the use of knives, explosive devices, and vehicle rammings targeting civilians and security personnel. IS’ lack of credibility is most evident in the number of Chinese Uyghur recruits fighting for IS affiliates compared to the number fighting for the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), a transnational Uyghur militant group originally from Xinjiang, in Iraq and Syria. While IS has attracted, at most, 300 Chinese Uyghurs, there are an estimated 2,000 Uyghurs fighting on the TIP’s behalf in Syria.
The release of the IS propaganda video is therefore indicative of growing competition among transnational terror groups for influence amongst Chinese and Central Asian Uyghurs. In response to IS’s video, the TIP released its own video on 27 February 2017 calling upon Uyghurs to wage war on “non-believers.” This propaganda war is likely to encourage greater militant activity directed against Chinese interests as the various groups will be eager to demonstrate that they are the true torchbearers of Uyghur militancy.
While additional attacks in China remain likely, authorities have increased security in Xinjiang in response to recent attacks. This has included the deployment of 10,000 armed police throughout the region and the offering of 100 million yuan, roughly USD 14.5 million, in rewards for anti-terror tip offs. As such, Uyghur militants and IS affiliates are likely to turn to targeting Chinese interests outside of the country, particularly in Central Asia and the Middle East.