Iraq in a Hard Place: Is Islamic State Winning?

On 3 June, US Deputy Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, announced that an estimated 10,000 Islamic State (IS) militants had been killed since the US-led international military coalition started its bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria in September 2014. At the beginning of the campaign, US intelligence estimates placed the total IS troop strength at between 20,000 and 31,500 – Blinken’s announcement would therefore suggest that IS has been considerably weakened by the airstrikes. Just a few months earlier, in April, the successful retaking of the city of Tikrit by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) prompted many observers to conclude that IS was on the back foot, and that the ISF had achieved a higher level of co-ordination and effectiveness. 

However, recent events suggest that such assumptions ought to be tempered with caution. Principally, claims about IS having adopted a defensive posture have been seriously undermined by the group’s recent territorial gains. On 17 May, IS pushed Iraqi forces out of the city of Ramadi in Iraq’s eastern Anbar province, breaking the momentum of the ISF offensive. On 21 May, IS also defeated Syrian regime forces in central Syria to capture the city of Palmyra. These events challenge the US narrative on the perceived success of the air campaign and raise the question: if IS has lost so much strength, how is the group still able to seize territory? 

Firstly, IS’s manpower is evidently much higher than previously assumed. IS continues to fight a war on multiple fronts: against the ISF and Shi’a militias in central Iraq; against Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq and Syria; against the regime forces of Syrian President Bashir Al Assad and Lebanese Hezbollah militia; and against other Syria-based Islamist militant groups such as Jabhat Al Nusra. To hold territory under these conditions, as well as make further gains, suggests a total troop number far in excess of the initial estimates. While an exact number is difficult to determine, the group’s extensive recruitment of foreign fighters, as well as local ones from newly seized areas, appears to have provided a constant supply of willing combatants.

Secondly, the impact of the US-led air campaign in Iraq may well have been overstated. IS has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to endure substantial pressure and adapt in response to emerging conditions. For instance, while air strikes may well have inflicted high IS casualties in frontline areas, it has not prevented IS from moving forces freely across Iraq, often exploiting weather conditions that impede the operation of surveillance and combat aircraft. IS also principally employs highly mobile and easily concealable weaponry and vehicles, presenting few significant targets for air strikes.

Consequently, long term success against IS largely hinges on the performance of the ISF which receive substantial training, armaments, and logistical support from the US. Despite this, there are serious doubts over the ISF’s capabilities and long term viability as a fighting force. As IS advanced on Ramadi, reports emerged of ISF troops abandoning their posts without firing a shot. Sophisticated weaponry is of little use when troops lack the will to fight. More alarmingly, with each major victory, IS seizes large amounts of US-manufactured military hardware from captured ISF stockpiles. For example, in the aftermath of recent fighting to the east of the city of Fallujah, IS published online videos showing the capture of a number of US-produced armoured Humvees and Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.

The Iraqi government has limited options available to counter the IS advance. The most effective and willing combatants in the offensive against IS have been Iran-backed Shi’a militias, who were instrumental in efforts to oust IS from Tikrit. Following the ISF defeat at Ramadi, the Iraqi government included Shi’a militia groups at the forefront of the counter-offensive to retake the city. However, increasing reliance upon the Shi’a militias threatens to reignite sectarian tensions. IS considers Shi’a to be apostates, and the Shi’a militiamen have in turn accused the local Sunni population of collaboration with IS. As a result, allegations of revenge attacks by the militias against civilians have surfaced in Sunni areas. For example, on 26 January 2015, Shi’a militia members entered the town of Barwana, in Diyala province, and executed over 56 Sunni civilians, accusing them of belonging to IS. By relying on Shi’a militias to lead the ground offensive against IS, the Iraqi government risks re-igniting the long-standing sectarian tensions which allowed IS to prosper following the US invasion. However, with a demoralised national army and a US government reluctant to commit to another ground deployment in Iraq, they may not have much of a choice.