“Honourable Iraqis: your land has been completely liberated [from Islamic State],” said former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi at a media conference in Baghdad in December 2017. Standing on a podium with a large Iraqi flag behind him, Abadi boasted, “Today, our troops were able to completely liberate the governorates of Nineveh and Anbar, and they are in full control of the Iraqi-Syrian borders.” 

Fifteen months on, both Iraqi and US military officials fear that an IS resurgence is steadily underway in Iraq, particularly in several northern and western governorates. This time around, however, IS activity has been characterised by a return to asymmetric warfare. This has raised new concerns that although IS no longer controls significant territory, a renewed IS campaign could prompt revitalised kidnap for ransom and extortion threats in Iraq.

A Return to Asymmetric Warfare and the Threat of Kidnapping

The renewed kidnapping threat in Iraq is primarily a result of IS re-grouping and re-establishing its networks in several former strongholds since December 2017, especially in the Nineveh, Anbar, Kirkuk, Saladin and Diyala governorates. The group has changed its strategy from capturing territory to carrying out regular asymmetric attacks on security forces, community leaders and other civilians, primarily in rural and semi-urban areas. These attacks — typically conducted by small and self-sufficient cells of five to six individuals — have not only involved bombings and shootings but also kidnappings for revenge, intimidation and funding purposes. 

There have been dozens of kidnappings over the past fifteen months, primarily in villages, checkpoints and highways. For example:

• In February 2019, IS militants kidnapped seven civilians in two separate incidents in Anbar Governorate; two of them were killed before the rescue of the other five hostages. In the same month, seven truffle hunters were kidnapped and killed in Najaf Governorate. 
• In December 2018, 20 villagers were kidnapped in three separate incidents on the same day in Kirkuk Governorate. 
• In June 2018, 46 civilians, security personnel and tribal fighters were kidnapped in Nineveh Governorate, at least 20 of whom were reportedly executed. The victims have been almost exclusively local nationals, but this is largely due to the absence of foreign nationals in these areas.

IS has demonstrated a high intent to target foreign nationals in Iraq and Syria in the recent past and a return to such targets is likely should the opportunity arise.

Motivations for Kidnapping

Although many of IS’s hostages have been killed in recent months, IS cells have also used kidnapping to raise funds. There is little reporting on ransom amounts, but a February 2019 UN Security Council report and local sources confirm that IS has been financing its activities through kidnap for ransom and extortion rackets, sometimes through collaboration with local criminal groups. In its peak in 2014 and 2015, IS’s estimated revenues from kidnappings in Syria and Iraq averaged USD 25 million per year, and extortion amounts were even higher. Considering the group’s other revenue streams have been curtailed significantly over the past three years, Iraqi officials say IS will continue to engage in kidnap for ransom and extortion activities.

Inherent Security Vulnerabilities

The series of successful kidnapping, extortion and terrorism incidents over the past fifteen months are attributable not only to IS’s strategic and tactical shift but also to the considerable security vulnerabilities within Iraq. While the Iraqi military and the predominantly Shi’a Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) units have conducted regular counter-terrorism airstrikes and ground operations, the task is made extremely difficult by IS’s use of vast desert and mountain terrains as safe havens. Iraqi security forces — exhausted and mainly trained to liberate towns and cities from IS — are not equipped for the long and slow counter-insurgency that lies ahead. It could take several years before Iraqi security forces fill this capability gap. Intelligence gathering has also been hampered as a result of limited cooperation from Sunni communities, due to human rights violations by Shi’a militias and the fear of reprisal attacks by IS. This will persist until the central government in Baghdad manages to effectively reintegrate Iraqi Sunnis socially, politically and economically.

Outlook

The combination of IS’s intent and Iraq’s inherent security vulnerabilities may intensify the threat of kidnap and extortion threats in the foreseeable future. The group’s capabilities in northern and western Iraq received a further boost after hundreds of fighters crossed the border from Syria into Iraq in recent months. These developments pose formidable challenges to Iraqi officials who once declared comprehensive victory over IS. While local nationals will continue to be the primary victims, foreign nationals operating in or travelling to Iraq are still seen as attractive targets if the opportunity presents itself. This may not be a significant concern in major cities such as Baghdad and Erbil due to IS’s limited kidnapping capabilities there, but in places in and around Mosul, Ramadi and Kirkuk, for example, security vulnerabilities remain prominent.