On 4 April, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, leader of the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA), launched an offensive to capture Tripoli from the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Having solidified control in eastern Libya and swept through the south in January 2019, Haftar’s forces, ostensibly supported by Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), mounted a surprise assault on Tripoli to purge the city of what Haftar labels “terrorist groups.”

After early advances, the LNA’s offensive is now stagnating, likely invoking a drawn out conflict. Haftar had gambled on the element of surprise and a quick entry into Tripoli. That, however, did not happen; his forces failed to break through the defences of the GNA in southern Tripoli, resulting in now protracted fighting. According to the World Health Organisation, at least 250 people, including combatants and civilians, have been killed thus far. Haftar’s operation has dragged the country back to the brink of civil war and ended opportunities to formulate the new political accord the UN had hoped to produce in 2019.

Precursor to the Tripoli Offensive

Haftar and his eastern allies have long expressed their intent to seize Tripoli. Although Haftar and the LNA control eastern Libya and parts of southern Libya, capturing the capital would give them considerably more legitimacy at home and abroad. Haftar has consistently rejected the legitimacy of the GNA, seeing it as an obstacle to his ambition to rule Libya. Haftar’s expansion in the south in 2018 and early 2019 had shattered various peace initiatives and the balance of military power between the GNA and LNA. Haftar can now claim control over the bulk of Libyan oil production and most territory outside Tripolitania, which enables him to present himself as the last feasible guarantor of stability in the country

This power shift has caused local and international actors to reassess Haftar’s chances of taking power in Tripoli. On 15 April, US President Donald Trump expressed his support for Haftar’s military campaign on Tripoli. This endorsement of Haftar’s offensive indicates that the US views Haftar as the favourable contender in the conflict. The ramifications of Trump’s endorsement are uncertain at present. However, it could give Haftar the required international legitimacy to push ahead. At the same time, it stands juxtaposed to the long-faltering UN-led political process, making a military resolution more likely than a negotiated one.

A Haftar Victory: Feasible but not Certain

Haftar’s LNA is better organised than his GNA rivals. This advantage facilitated the LNA’s advance in the south, including securing Libya’s largest oilfield, El Sharara — although this was achieved through negotiations rather than fighting. On the back of this success, an LNA victory has become increasingly feasible. Yet, this scenario will depend on whether Haftar is able to win over enough militias from western Libya to join his forces and help him take control of Tripoli. Some of these militias have little to no loyalty to the GNA and are primarily interested in maintaining their power and resources through opportunistic arrangements. As such, these militias could change sides if the LNA’s military prospects improve.

Victory will also depend on the international community’s stance, especially the position of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. So far, these key players remain divided. While several external powers have condemned the recent fighting, calling on all parties to exercise restraint and withdraw to their prior locations, none of these statements have included the threat of sanctions or more decisive action against the warring parties. Meanwhile, the UAE and Egypt have continued supplying weapons, ammunition and logistical support to the LNA, fuelling the conflict. 

While victory is not beyond the LNA’s grasp, the emerging stalemate in Tripoli is a likely precursor to a prolonged war that will result in mounting civilian casualties and widespread infrastructural damage. Haftar has lost the element of surprise and miscalculated the level of military resistance that he would face, disrupting his ambition for a swift and decisive victory in Tripoli. Furthermore, GNA militias have not yet defected as Haftar had banked — an indication that the fighting could go on for many months.

What's Next for Libya?

Haftar’s offensive will further reduce the chances for a political deal as it has severely undermined the already fragile trust between western and eastern Libya’s stakeholders. It has also limited the ability of international actors to function as neutral arbiters and enforcers of any agreement in light of tacit international support for Haftar’s offensive. A military victory for Haftar, although still uncertain, can only come about after violent conflict in western Libya. Even if Haftar succeeds in seizing power at such cost, this is unlikely to lead to political stability, given the country’s proliferation of militias, weapons and deep divisions along regional, ideological, tribal, religious and even familial lines.

Overall, Haftar’s move has exacerbated Libya’s political fragmentation. This has damaged Haftar’s already poor reputation in western Libya, and once again raised serious doubts over whether he is genuinely committed to political reconciliation over securing complete power. The LNA, which has historically failed to be a unifying force, will struggle to frame its actions as serving the national interest. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the likelihood that any progress made on unifying Libya’s institutions will be jeopardised.