Articles
From Mosul To Mumbai: Islamic State In India
ASHLEIGH SOMAROO discusses the reasons behind the recent increase in Islamic State-sympathisers in India and whether or not they maintain the capacity to launch coordinated and sophisticated attacks in the country.
In May 2016, the Islamic State (IS) militant group made its first public appeal to Muslims residing in India either to travel to IS-held territories, or to stage attacks on Hindus at home. Thereafter, in November 2016, the Indian federal government reported that so far that year, 68 IS-sympathisers had been arrested across several Indian states. Of these, 50 individuals, including 31 suspects from South India, were subsequently interrogated by the National Investigation Agency (NIA). The prospect of an IS attack in the country was further heightened that same month when the US Embassy in New Delhi issued a terrorism alert. These threats and warnings were realised on 7 March 2017 when IS launched its first successful attack in India, bombing a passenger train in Madhya Pradesh, injuring 10 civilians.
Islamist militancy in India has historically been concentrated in the contested northern state of Jammu and Kashmir. Local militant groups, such as Lashkare-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Indian Mujahideen (IM) have maintained a presence in this region since the late 1990s. While local and international news media report that JeM and IM have pledged allegiance to IS, a coordinated attack between IS and these local affiliates has yet to occur. Rather, the IS threat appears to have manifested itself through local sympathisers primarily located in the southern Indian states of Maharashtra, Telangana and Kerala, who operate in small, loosely connected, so-called “modules”. The main drivers behind this phenomenon can be attributed to the prominence of Salafism in this region and the alleged persecution of locals.
Salafism is an ultra-conservative movement of Islam, which IS claims to follow. It is also an ideology adhered to by Saudi Arabian state institutions, who in turn, have introduced this ideology to South India as a by-product of extensive funding in the region, primarily in the form of the financing of mosques, madrasas and other educational institutions. As adherence to Salafism has grown in the region, however, so too has a sense of animosity towards Hinduism and the West. This has been compounded by the alleged persecution of the Salafist community by Indian security forces, who have reportedly arrested several Salafi preachers on allegations of promoting terrorism. Moreover, existing divisions have reportedly been exacerbated by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, whose senior officials have on several occasions issued religiously-charged and inflammatory statements against the country’s Muslim communities.
IS has sought to capitalise on these grievances. The militant group has focused on these issues by mocking “Muslims living in harmony with Hindus who worship cows, trees and the sun.” The group has further turned to emotive issues between Indian Hindus and Muslims, using religious disputes over claims to holy sites across the country to incite radicalism. As the self-appointed protector of Salafism in India, IS has stated “we will come back, with the sword, to free you, to avenge Babri mosque, Gujarat, Kashmir.” These divisions and grievances have served as an anchor for IS to increase its appeal among marginalised Muslims residing in the country.
Despite the large number of IS sympathisers lured by this appeal, IS operatives in the country do not appear to maintain significant capacity for launching sophisticated or coordinated attacks across the country. To date, the IS suspects arrested in India have mostly engaged in what can be framed as preliminary radicalisation activities. These include attempting to flee the country to join IS in the Middle East, or establishing training camps to radicalise and arm future militants. The most prominent attack thwarted thus far involved two IS affiliates who were arrested in February 2017 for attempting to carry out a series of bomb attacks across Gujarat State.
Furthermore, IS sympathisers operating in India appear loosely-connected and lack an organisational structure. As such, the most likely form of IS-inspired attacks in India are expected to be perpetrated by lone actors or small “modules”, carrying out attacks with small improvised explosive devices, knives or vehicle rammings. However, as witnessed with increasing frequency in Europe, such attacks have the capacity to result in both significant infrastructure damage and high civilian casualty numbers.
Islamist militancy in India has historically been concentrated in the contested northern state of Jammu and Kashmir. Local militant groups, such as Lashkare-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Indian Mujahideen (IM) have maintained a presence in this region since the late 1990s. While local and international news media report that JeM and IM have pledged allegiance to IS, a coordinated attack between IS and these local affiliates has yet to occur. Rather, the IS threat appears to have manifested itself through local sympathisers primarily located in the southern Indian states of Maharashtra, Telangana and Kerala, who operate in small, loosely connected, so-called “modules”. The main drivers behind this phenomenon can be attributed to the prominence of Salafism in this region and the alleged persecution of locals.
Salafism is an ultra-conservative movement of Islam, which IS claims to follow. It is also an ideology adhered to by Saudi Arabian state institutions, who in turn, have introduced this ideology to South India as a by-product of extensive funding in the region, primarily in the form of the financing of mosques, madrasas and other educational institutions. As adherence to Salafism has grown in the region, however, so too has a sense of animosity towards Hinduism and the West. This has been compounded by the alleged persecution of the Salafist community by Indian security forces, who have reportedly arrested several Salafi preachers on allegations of promoting terrorism. Moreover, existing divisions have reportedly been exacerbated by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, whose senior officials have on several occasions issued religiously-charged and inflammatory statements against the country’s Muslim communities.
IS has sought to capitalise on these grievances. The militant group has focused on these issues by mocking “Muslims living in harmony with Hindus who worship cows, trees and the sun.” The group has further turned to emotive issues between Indian Hindus and Muslims, using religious disputes over claims to holy sites across the country to incite radicalism. As the self-appointed protector of Salafism in India, IS has stated “we will come back, with the sword, to free you, to avenge Babri mosque, Gujarat, Kashmir.” These divisions and grievances have served as an anchor for IS to increase its appeal among marginalised Muslims residing in the country.
Despite the large number of IS sympathisers lured by this appeal, IS operatives in the country do not appear to maintain significant capacity for launching sophisticated or coordinated attacks across the country. To date, the IS suspects arrested in India have mostly engaged in what can be framed as preliminary radicalisation activities. These include attempting to flee the country to join IS in the Middle East, or establishing training camps to radicalise and arm future militants. The most prominent attack thwarted thus far involved two IS affiliates who were arrested in February 2017 for attempting to carry out a series of bomb attacks across Gujarat State.
Furthermore, IS sympathisers operating in India appear loosely-connected and lack an organisational structure. As such, the most likely form of IS-inspired attacks in India are expected to be perpetrated by lone actors or small “modules”, carrying out attacks with small improvised explosive devices, knives or vehicle rammings. However, as witnessed with increasing frequency in Europe, such attacks have the capacity to result in both significant infrastructure damage and high civilian casualty numbers.