Friends or foes? NATO-Russia tensions in Europe's backyard

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and its alleged military involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine have increased concerns over Russia’s possible expansionist ambitions in other parts of Europe, particularly the Baltic region. In response, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has deployed the largest contingent of its forces to the Black Sea and Baltic regions since the Cold War. Seven member states, including the US, are participating in coordinated military drills in the region over the next three months. Troop deployments in the Baltic region currently stand at over 3,000 and include over 750 heavy vehicles. Furthermore, as many as 13,000 NATO troops will participate in military exercises in Estonia in May 2015. Russia has responded in kind by placing its northern fleet in full combat readiness in the Arctic: these military overtures amount to 38,000 troops, 41 warships, 15 submarines and 110 aircraft. This standoff suggests that, once again, NATO-Russia relations are reaching a low point.

Occasional cooperation amid mutual distrust and conflicting interests

The post-Cold War relationship between NATO and Russia has historically been marked by distrust and mismatched interests, but also by periods of cooperation. One of the first cooperative mechanisms was established in 1997, with the creation of the Permanent Joint Council: a forum for joint consultation. Later, the NATO-Russia Council, a mechanism that gave Russia equal status as members on matters primarily pertaining to counter-terrorism, was established in 2002. Cooperation was further realised during the NATO-led Active Endeavour counter-terrorism mission in the Mediterranean in 2004 and during joint-counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden in 2012. Russia also assisted the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan throughout the war and until 2014. 

Nevertheless, efforts to integrate Russia and its interests into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture have ultimately failed. Although NATO is a defensive organisation tasked with safeguarding the security of its members, at times Russia has interpreted the organisation’s actions as hostile to its regional security interests. NATO rejected Russia’s proposed Pan European Security Treaty in 2008, for example, because the treaty would prevent NATO from acting independently of Russia. Similarly, Russia has vehemently opposed NATO’s construction of a missile defence system in Europe. In this regard, it has even occasionally threatened to aim its own missile arsenal at European targets, most recently in March 2015, when it warned Denmark that its support for the missile defence programme may lead to a Russian nuclear response.

Yet, the most significant grievance for Russia to date has been NATO’s expansion into the former Soviet states. During negotiations over the reunification of Germany in 1990, Western powers allegedly promised not to expand NATO membership further east. However, successive rounds of enlargement have taken place, with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joining the organisation in 1999. This was followed by two more rounds of expansion in 2004 and 2009 to include nine other Eastern European states.

While the existence of a formal non-expansion agreement is disputed, Russia has interpreted NATO’s enlargement as a direct threat to its sphere of influence in the region. As such, Russia has attempted to prevent further NATO advancements in the east. Russia’s continued support for Georgia’s two breakaway territories (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) – including during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War – has, for example, been widely perceived as a manoeuvre to block Georgia’s bid to join NATO. Moreover, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 has been interpreted as an attempt by Russia to assert its power in Eastern Europe. Most recently, the Russian government perceived the fall of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych as an augury for Ukraine joining NATO, a development that would leave the future of Russia’s Crimea-based Black Sea Fleet in doubt. As several former Soviet states show increasing interest in aligning themselves with Western organisations, Russian foreign policy has become more aggressive to preserve its regional political, economic and security interests, further straining relations.

The future of NATO-Russia relations

The future of NATO-Russia relations are most likely to be shaped by each other’s mismatched interests in Eastern Europe. Several commentators, including Anders Rasmussen, former NATO Secretary General, have suggested that Russia may next target the Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which are all NATO members are undoubtedly wary of Russia’s intentions. Tensions have also increased following Russia’s arrest of Eston Kohver, an Estonian intelligence agent, and seizure of a Lithuanian fishing boat in September last year, both under disputed circumstances.

The likelihood of a direct Russian military attack on any of these countries is slim, as Article 5 of NATO’s constitution requires member states to respond militarily to direct external aggression. Western policymakers have nevertheless expressed concerns that Russia may engage in “hybrid warfare” – a mixture of conventional and unconventional military and non-military tactics that involves the use of cyber warfare, disinformation and local proxies – as seen in Crimea and allegedly, eastern Ukraine. More specifically, Russia may use the alleged discrimination of sizeable ethnic Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia – many of whom do not have citizenship status – as pretexts to sow instability in those countries. However, these Russian minorities are generally more integrated into their local societies than their counterparts in some regions of eastern Ukraine, which further mitigates the risk of direct Russian intervention in the Baltics.

Russia’s strategic interests therefore lie more broadly in maintaining diplomatic, economic and military influence over its neighbours that are not EU or NATO members. This explains Russia’s desire to prevent any additional former Soviet Union state from joining these organisations by repeatedly objecting to Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO membership bid. Protests have previously been successful, as objections by Russia led NATO to deny the two countries Membership Action Plans (MAPs) during the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest.

Following Russia’s military involvement in both these countries, their governments have expressed a renewed interest in reapplying for membership.

Both Ukraine and Georgia face several obstacles to joining NATO, however. Firstly, with all NATO members having to consent to new additions, France and Germany are expected to oppose the granting of MAPs, as they did in 2008, to avoid confrontations with Russia. Secondly, the status of disputed territories by Russia-backed armed separatists in both Ukraine and Georgia is further likely to discourage a NATO membership offer. Not only does the security situation remain volatile in Ukraine, for example, but Russia has signed strategic treaties with Georgia’s two breakaway territories in recent months to increase military cooperation. Thirdly, in order to join NATO, Ukraine would have to implement significant security sector reforms and eradicate high levels of corruption. This process can take many years, as Georgia, which started reforms in the mid-2000s, knows all too well. Lastly, strong political forces oppose NATO accession in both states, as many feel it is not worth risking Russia’s ire in its own backyard. Taken together, these factors limit the likelihood of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. However, while they may not join NATO, the organisation has not ruled out the possibility of supplying weapons to Ukraine to fight pro-Russian militants: a move that would further sour NATO-Russia relations.

Despite concerns to the contrary, open warfare between Russia and NATO is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, several issues including NATO’s further expansion to former Soviet states, ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and a longstanding dispute over NATO’s missile defence programme are likely to fuel mutual distrust and suspicion of each other’s intentions in the short to medium term.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and its alleged military involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine have increased concerns over Russia’s possible expansionist ambitions in other parts of Europe, particularly the Baltic region. In response, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has deployed the largest contingent of its forces to the Black Sea and Baltic regions since the Cold War. Seven member states, including the US, are participating in coordinated military drills in the region over the next three months. Troop deployments in the Baltic region currently stand at over 3,000 and include over 750 heavy vehicles. Furthermore, as many as 13,000 NATO troops will participate in military exercises in Estonia in May 2015. Russia has responded in kind by placing its northern fleet in full combat readiness in the Arctic: these military overtures amount to 38,000 troops, 41 warships, 15 submarines and 110 aircraft. This standoff suggests that, once again, NATO-Russia relations are reaching a low point.

Occasional cooperation amid mutual distrust and conflicting interests

The post-Cold War relationship between NATO and Russia has historically been marked by distrust and mismatched interests, but also by periods of cooperation. One of the first cooperative mechanisms was established in 1997, with the creation of the Permanent Joint Council: a forum for joint consultation. Later, the NATO-Russia Council, a mechanism that gave Russia equal status as members on matters primarily pertaining to counter-terrorism, was established in 2002. Cooperation was further realised during the NATO-led Active Endeavour counter-terrorism mission in the Mediterranean in 2004 and during joint-counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden in 2012. Russia also assisted the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan throughout the war and until 2014. 

Nevertheless, efforts to integrate Russia and its interests into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture have ultimately failed. Although NATO is a defensive organisation tasked with safeguarding the security of its members, at times Russia has interpreted the organisation’s actions as hostile to its regional security interests. NATO rejected Russia’s proposed Pan European Security Treaty in 2008, for example, because the treaty would prevent NATO from acting independently of Russia. Similarly, Russia has vehemently opposed NATO’s construction of a missile defence system in Europe. In this regard, it has even occasionally threatened to aim its own missile arsenal at European targets, most recently in March 2015, when it warned Denmark that its support for the missile defence programme may lead to a Russian nuclear response.

Yet, the most significant grievance for Russia to date has been NATO’s expansion into the former Soviet states. During negotiations over the reunification of Germany in 1990, Western powers allegedly promised not to expand NATO membership further east. However, successive rounds of enlargement have taken place, with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joining the organisation in 1999. This was followed by two more rounds of expansion in 2004 and 2009 to include nine other Eastern European states.

While the existence of a formal non-expansion agreement is disputed, Russia has interpreted NATO’s enlargement as a direct threat to its sphere of influence in the region. As such, Russia has attempted to prevent further NATO advancements in the east. Russia’s continued support for Georgia’s two breakaway territories (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) – including during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War – has, for example, been widely perceived as a manoeuvre to block Georgia’s bid to join NATO. Moreover, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 has been interpreted as an attempt by Russia to assert its power in Eastern Europe. Most recently, the Russian government perceived the fall of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych as an augury for Ukraine joining NATO, a development that would leave the future of Russia’s Crimea-based Black Sea Fleet in doubt. As several former Soviet states show increasing interest in aligning themselves with Western organisations, Russian foreign policy has become more aggressive to preserve its regional political, economic and security interests, further straining relations.

The future of NATO-Russia relations

The future of NATO-Russia relations are most likely to be shaped by each other’s mismatched interests in Eastern Europe. Several commentators, including Anders Rasmussen, former NATO Secretary General, have suggested that Russia may next target the Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which are all NATO members are undoubtedly wary of Russia’s intentions. Tensions have also increased following Russia’s arrest of Eston Kohver, an Estonian intelligence agent, and seizure of a Lithuanian fishing boat in September last year, both under disputed circumstances.

The likelihood of a direct Russian military attack on any of these countries is slim, as Article 5 of NATO’s constitution requires member states to respond militarily to direct external aggression. Western policymakers have nevertheless expressed concerns that Russia may engage in “hybrid warfare” – a mixture of conventional and unconventional military and non-military tactics that involves the use of cyber warfare, disinformation and local proxies – as seen in Crimea and allegedly, eastern Ukraine. More specifically, Russia may use the alleged discrimination of sizeable ethnic Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia – many of whom do not have citizenship status – as pretexts to sow instability in those countries. However, these Russian minorities are generally more integrated into their local societies than their counterparts in some regions of eastern Ukraine, which further mitigates the risk of direct Russian intervention in the Baltics.

Russia’s strategic interests therefore lie more broadly in maintaining diplomatic, economic and military influence over its neighbours that are not EU or NATO members. This explains Russia’s desire to prevent any additional former Soviet Union state from joining these organisations by repeatedly objecting to Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO membership bid. Protests have previously been successful, as objections by Russia led NATO to deny the two countries Membership Action Plans (MAPs) during the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest.

Following Russia’s military involvement in both these countries, their governments have expressed a renewed interest in reapplying for membership.

Both Ukraine and Georgia face several obstacles to joining NATO, however. Firstly, with all NATO members having to consent to new additions, France and Germany are expected to oppose the granting of MAPs, as they did in 2008, to avoid confrontations with Russia. Secondly, the status of disputed territories by Russia-backed armed separatists in both Ukraine and Georgia is further likely to discourage a NATO membership offer. Not only does the security situation remain volatile in Ukraine, for example, but Russia has signed strategic treaties with Georgia’s two breakaway territories in recent months to increase military cooperation. Thirdly, in order to join NATO, Ukraine would have to implement significant security sector reforms and eradicate high levels of corruption. This process can take many years, as Georgia, which started reforms in the mid-2000s, knows all too well. Lastly, strong political forces oppose NATO accession in both states, as many feel it is not worth risking Russia’s ire in its own backyard. Taken together, these factors limit the likelihood of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. However, while they may not join NATO, the organisation has not ruled out the possibility of supplying weapons to Ukraine to fight pro-Russian militants: a move that would further sour NATO-Russia relations.

Despite concerns to the contrary, open warfare between Russia and NATO is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, several issues including NATO’s further expansion to former Soviet states, ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and a longstanding dispute over NATO’s missile defence programme are likely to fuel mutual distrust and suspicion of each other’s intentions in the short to medium term.