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FARC Peace Agreement: Delays, Discord and Demobilisation

The peace deal looks set to be signed in 2016, but FARC internal dissidence threatens to undermine demobilisation plans, writes Lloyd Belton.

The 22nd of June marked a watershed moment in Colombia’s history. The government under President Juan Manuel Santos announced that it had reached a deal with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) militant group, ending one of the world’s oldest wars. Although the agreement, which took four years to complete, was welcomed by the international media as an end to the 50-year-old conflict, numerous hurdles to lasting peace still need to be overcome. This includes the signing of a final peace deal and the subsequent hosting of a referendum on the issue. Significant doubts also remain over whether the majority of militants will adhere to demobilisation terms, suggesting a return to conflict is not off the cards. 

Confusion over the outlook for the conflict has largely been driven by the media as coverage of the peace deal incorrectly stated that the agreement effectively ended the world’s longest-running civil war. However, the document signed in Havana, Cuba, merely stipulated the terms and conditions of a permanent bilateral ceasefire, which will be implemented only once a final peace deal is signed, likely in August 2016. As such, the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government has largely continued with infrequent skirmishes in isolated parts of the country. 


The economic opportunities for demobilised FARC militants will therefore have to outweigh the attractiveness of illicit income streams like drug-trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion.
President Juan Manuel Santos

Negotiators therefore have the task of ironing out numerous issues before a final agreement is signed. This includes questions relating to transitional justice, land reform, and militant demobilisation. Even once the deal is finalised however, they will need to clear the final and perhaps most difficult step: a referendum, in which the ‘Yes’ campaign requires 4.5 million votes. While recent opinion polls suggest that support for the ‘Yes’ vote holds a slight lead over detractors of the peace process, a ‘No’ vote would not necessarily spell the end of the peace agreement, as the referendum is not legally binding. A recent Constitutional Court ruling leaves the door open for Congress to explore other avenues of constitutionally ratifying the peace deal. 

With the outcome of the peace agreement likely to be decided by the end of 2016, the finer details of the FARC’s demobilisation are set to come under the spotlight. Militants are expected to lay down their arms within six months of the agreement being signed, an unlikely prospect given the sheer number of militants involved. There is already considerable uncertainty as to whether all of the 8,000 FARC militants will actually demobilise, and there is growing concern about internal strife within the group. Already in early July, a FARC unit comprising 400 militants said it would not disarm under the deal brokered in Havana. Dissent among the FARC rank and file could lead to protracted demobilisation delays.

Even if most FARC militants demobilise, conflict in Colombia is likely to continue. As previous peace and demobilisation processes in Colombia have demonstrated, many militants are likely to relapse into criminality. The economic opportunities for demobilised FARC militants will therefore have to outweigh the attractiveness of illicit income streams like drug-trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. There is already evidence that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), the country’s second largest militant group, is positioning itself to absorb dissident FARC militants and assume territorial control. Some of Colombia’s largest organised crime groups are likely to try and do the same.

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