Failure to Launch: Where is Islamic State in Algeria?
On 29 October, the Islamic State (IS) militant group claimed the assassination of a police officer in a restaurant in the eastern city of Constantine. It constituted a rare urban attack, and the first IS attack to be independently confirmed, in Algeria since 2014. IS’s defeat in its stronghold of Sirte in neighbouring Libya has caused concern that Algeria will become an alternative safe haven for fleeing IS militants; the recent assassination will aggravate these concerns. However, the likelihood that the group will be able to leverage the incident as a launch pad for a full-fledged insurgency in Algeria is low, given the country’s distinct security and socio-historical dynamics.
IS first gained attention in Algeria in August 2014 when its affiliate, Jund al Khilafa (JaK), claimed responsibility for the beheading of a French mountaineer in the remote region around Constantine. However, JaK has since languished following this dramatic introduction. Many of its members, including senior leaders, have been killed in security operations, preventing the group from establishing any meaningful territorial presence. Even subsequent arrests of suspected JaK supporters have revealed a lack of capacity to plan and execute complex attacks.
While several features of Algeria – including its size, terrain and geographic position – have made it an attractive location for militant activity, IS has been unable to establish a secure operational foothold in the country to date. Despite its porous borders and proximity to regional instability, Algeria is not as penetrable as its empty desert landscapes suggest.
This is attributable to several security and socio-historical dynamics that set the country apart from some of its more unstable neighbours. The first of these is its superior military strength. Algeria has the largest defence budget in Africa, with annual military spending exceeding USD 10.5 billion in 2016, more than Tunisia, Libya and Morocco combined. This funds a security force of over 512,000 active personnel, compared to 200,000 in Morocco and 40,500 in Tunisia, and a substantial arsenal of modernised weapons and equipment. Furthermore, the armed forces have benefited from decades of experience fighting armed Islamist insurgents during the Algerian civil war of 1992 to 2001. This experience has evolved into a sophisticated counter-terrorism capability, which is noticeably absent from Algeria’s security counterparts in neighbouring states.
Despite its porous borders and proximity to regional instability, Algeria is not as penetrable as its empty desert landscapes suggests.
The second obstacle to IS’s advancement is an entrenched populist suspicion of Islamist extremism, another legacy of the country’s civil war. During that period, which became known as Algeria’s black decade, the secular government fought a wave of Islamist insurgencies, led primarily by a jihadist group known as the Armed Islamist Group (GIA). The GIA’s stated motivation was to create instability to facilitate an eventual overthrow of the government. In doing so, it advanced the idea of an Islamic state and became increasingly associated with a brutal campaign of violence against civilians, including town massacres, bombings, the forced imposition of Sharia law and the execution of any suspected deserters or opponents. IS is therefore hindered by its own reputation for terrorist tactics with which Algerians are wearily familiar. Algeria’s low profile among IS foreign fighters is indicative of this, despite widespread socio-economic challenges. Whereas its neighbours, Tunisia and Morocco, are estimated to have each sent an estimated 3,000 and 1,500 fighters respectively to conflict areas in the Middle East since 2014, the number of Algerians who have travelled to support IS is estimated at under 100. As such, while Tunisians and Moroccans may be more susceptible to the political promises of IS recruiters and the ethical rationalisations of its methods, Algerians’ collective experience with similar extremism has made them less vulnerable to such ideology.
On the contrary, IS’s biggest rival in North Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), has proven to be much more judicious in distancing itself from these tactics among local communities. While its own activities have also been curtailed by the restrictive security environment in Algeria, AQIM has nevertheless successfully maintained a small, but enduring, presence in the north of the country as well as an extensive regional footprint across the trans- Sahelian regions bordering the south, including Mali, Niger and southern Libya. In order to sustain this footprint, the group depends on partnering with existing insurgent groups to portray an image of a local protector. This stands in stark contrast to IS’s use of indiscriminate violence, which has alienated the group among local populations.
The recent assassination is an important reminder of IS’s enduring aspiration to incorporate Algeria into its global portfolio. However, it does not signify a change in the restrictions the group faces in establishing itself in the country. While further low-impact attacks, particularly around Constantine, are likely, attention on the group should not distract from the more adept threat of AQIM.