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Ennahda: The ascendancy of the pragmatists

Ennahda, one of Tunisia's largest political parties, used its annual congress on 20 May 2016 to announce that it was abandoning political Islam by formally separating its religious and political activities, writes Hamish Kinnear
Ennahda, one of Tunisia’s largest political parties, used its annual congress on 20 May 2016 to announce that it was abandoning political Islam by formally separating its religious and political activities. The announcement, made by Rached Gannouchi, the party’s leader, points towards the ascendancy of Ennahda’s pragmatists within an ideological battle for the heart of the party. 

Radical past and ‘moderate’ present 

Ennahda’s abandonment of political Islam reflects the party’s longer-term trend towards ideological moderation. Originating as a 1970s manifestation imposing Sharia law and rejecting democracy as a ‘Western’ ideological import, Ennahda has experienced decades of repression. Banned by the Tunisian state in 1989, its Islamist message was also rejected by large swathes of the Tunisian population, inducing the party to moderate its erstwhile radical ideology. By 2011, when Ennahda was legalised again in the wake of the toppling of the regime of former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the party’s leadership were referring to themselves as ‘moderate’ Islamists and publically announcing their intention to participate in a nominally secular democratic system of governance.  

Troubled governance 

Yet lingering doubts about Ennahda’s commitment to a secular, democratic Tunisian state still persisted. Elected as the governing party in 2012, Ennahda quickly ran into trouble. Already facing widespread economic malaise and mass unemployment, the party was accused by secular rivals and a hostile Tunisian press of condoning Salafist vigilantism and failing to sufficiently combat jihadist terrorism. 

Ennahda’s allegedly ‘sympathetic’ treatment of Islamist groups was linked to an internal battle between its revolutionary and pragmatic factions. The revolutionary faction, consisting primarily of Ennahda members present in Tunisia during the Ben Ali-era, sought to avoid overt action, lest it result in accusations that they were continuing Ben Ali’s repressive policies. Meanwhile, the pragmatist faction, comprising mainly exiled Ennahda members who returned to Tunisia after the revolution, advocated working more closely with rival secular parties, many of whom advocated a crackdown on armed Islamist groups. 

Further divisions were exposed when the revolutionaries sought the mass incarceration of corrupt officials and legislation to ban Ben Ali-era officials from politics. In contrast, pragmatists advocated for a moderate transitional justice agreeable with other parties, in particular Nidaa Tounes, a ‘big tent’ secular party, which counts amongst its members several politicians previously belonging to the now-dissolved RCD, the single ruling party of Tunisia between 1956 and 2011. 

Disputes in 2013 over the proposed designation of Islam as Tunisia’s principal source of legislation, combined with the ousting of the Islamist-leaning government in Egypt and the assassination of two secularist Tunisian politicians, eventually led to the retirement of Ennahda’s administration in early 2014 and the creation of a caretaker government. Nidaa Tounes took over as the governing party in late 2014, after winning parliamentary and presidential elections.  

Lessons learned 

Ennahda’s experience as the leading party of government in 2012-2014 can be construed as the relative failure of its revolutionary faction. The party’s attempts, predominantly by more radical members, to insert contentious clauses into the post-revolutionary constitution proved unpopular and this, combined with Ennahda’s lack of resolve in the face of terrorism, contributed heavily to its loss in the 2014 elections. 

Ennahda’s announcement of its formal abandonment of political Islam represents the ascendancy of the pragmatists over more revolutionary factions within a party seeking greater appeal with the electorate. Ennahda now actively distances itself from more radical Islamist groups and supports a postrevolutionary constitution, ratified in January 2014, which is shorn of Sharia-inspired legislation. 

Consequences for economic revival 

Ennahda’s pragmatic stance suggests that it is more willing to throw its weight behind a controversial piece of legislation to exonerate some Ben Ali-era businessmen from their involvement in pre-revolutionary corruption, if they return money accrued through illegal means. This capital, much of which was frozen in the wake of the revolution, could be released back into a Tunisian economy currently reeling from stunted growth. An early version of this legislation, the economic reconciliation bill, had previously been introduced by Nidaa Tounes in July 2015, but was later shelved following public protests. For foreign investors, a redrawn economic reconciliation bill will elevate the importance of due diligence checks on potential business partners and investment targets in order to comply with anti-bribery and corruption regulations, and to minimise reputational risk. 

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