“Do you think we will leave?” The Curious Case of the Caliphate in Iran

When Islamic State (IS) militants carried out simultaneous attacks on 7 June against the Iranian parliament and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, killing 17 people and wounding 54, parliamentarians casually dismissed the events by taking ‘selfies’ during the parliamentary session. Despite their nonchalance, the Tehran attacks are a significant development, particularly in a country which has managed to remain insulated from the regional threat posed by IS since it declared its caliphate in Iraq and Syria in 2014. Yet, as IS continues to suffer territorial losses in Mosul and Raqqa, it is likely to place a greater emphasis on its smaller regional networks. While it is unlikely that the Tehran attacks will remain a solitary incident, the attack suggests an effort on the part of IS to project the appearance of strength and relevance, rather than its ability to establish a strong presence in Iran.

Iran’s involvement in Syria and Iraq has placed its regional policy at direct odds with that of the self-declared Islamic State. Yet, while IS has previously stated its intent to target Iran over the country’s support for Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) in Western Anbar, the Iraqi regime, and anti-Sunni militant groups, the reason as to why it has waited until now to do so is far more complex. At first glance, Iran’s predominantly Shia Muslim population appears to be a prime target for IS, which practices an extreme form of Wahhabism and considers Shiites to be apostates. Yet, while IS attacks on Shia civilians increased outside of Iraq following the group’s split from Al Qaeda in 2014, the group refrained from targeting Iran. It is therefore likely that IS’s recent shift in focus – both within the Middle East as well as in Europe – has been prompted by significant territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, as US-led coalition forces advance on IS strongholds in Mosul and Raqqa. Rather than consolidate what remains of its strength, the group has urged its supporters and cells, such as those involved in the Tehran attacks, to carry out attacks on civilian targets. This reflects a desire to signal that IS remains relevant and capable of staging high-impact attacks in the region and abroad.

Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether IS will be capable of establishing a significant presence in Iran itself. The likelihood that IS militants fleeing Iraq and Syria will cross over into Iran’s western border is low, as Iraqi Kurdistan’s Peshmerga forces maintain strong control over their territory. While the Iraqi government-controlled territory to the south of the Iran-Iraq border remains relatively porous, the potential for militant infiltration is significantly mitigated by the strong presence of Iranian border security forces. Furthermore, the potential for an IS presence to proliferate from within Iran’s borders is similarly low. IS has previously attempted to recruit from Iran’s minority Sunni population, as indicated by a Farsi language propaganda video released in March 2017, suggesting that the group is intensifying efforts to foment unrest among the marginalised, and potentially sympathetic, Sunni community. Whilst some observers have pointed out that Iran’s border regions are vulnerable to extremism, and therefore recruitment, it is unlikely that the Salafism advocated by IS will take hold. Border communities may harbour discontent towards those occupying Iran’s decision-making structures, but strong state institutions and a stable regime offer a less permissive environment for radicalisation than the largely ungoverned spaces of Syria and Iraq. A more likely scenario is that attacks within Iran will be carried out by small IS-affiliated cells or sympathisers. Furthermore, the use of small arms and rudimentary explosives during the 7 June attack suggests that while groups may be well-organised, they are likely to possess limited capabilities. With the alert level raised, and a heightened security presence at symbolic places and bureaucratic buildings across Tehran, attackers have largely lost the element of surprise, which is likely to further mitigate their ability to carry out high-impact attacks.

In a short video released by IS’s Amaq news agency during the attack, an Arabic voice asks rhetorically, “Do you think we will leave?” While some doubt the authenticity of the video, the question is nevertheless pertinent: can IS establish a presence and launch further attacks in Iran? Given the loss of IS territory in Raqqa and Mosul, and the need for IS to now magnify the perception of its relevance and capabilities in the region, there is a high likelihood that the group will increase its reliance on its peripheral cells. It is therefore similarly likely that IS will urge militants and sympathisers to carry out rudimentary terrorist-style attacks that require only low capabilities – such as small arms and simple explosives - to execute. This increases both the likelihood of IS establishing a presence, as well as conducting subsequent attacks in Iran. However, while the possibility of further attacks remain, they are likely to occur infrequently, and have a limited impact on the domestic stability and security of the government.