Deepening Tensions: Turkey's Invasion of Northern Syria

On 24 August, Turkish special forces and armoured units crossed the country’s southern border into northern Syria, marking the first major Turkish ground incursion into Syrian territory since the start of the civil war. As Turkish forces and allied militias swiftly seized the Islamic State (IS)-held border town of Jarablus, many commentators framed the Turkish operation, dubbed ‘Euphrates Shield’, as a turning point in the anti-IS campaign. However, in addition to IS, the Turkish military is targeting US-backed Kurdish militia units in northern Syria – namely, the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG). In the weeks since the operation started, this unfolding dynamic has seen a steady resurgence of conflict in areas recently liberated from IS in northern Syria and threatens to destabilise the region long after IS is gone.

In late 2014, Turkish government and military officials expressed their intent to establish a ‘buffer zone’ inside northern Syria, using a mix of Turkish ground forces and local Syrian militias with US air support. However, until August 2016, Turkey’s commitment to taking military action in Syria against IS was limited. While allowing US and allied planes to launch strikes on IS from Turkish soil, the Turkish military had done little apart from fortify the border area and conduct infrequent airstrikes and artillery strikes on nearby IS positions. Against this backdrop, the ground-based assault on Jarablus is unprecedented in Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian conflict.

While Turkish military involvement in northern Syria will undoubtedly hasten the collapse of IS, it is intimately linked to its own internal conflict with the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK), a Kurdish militant movement based in Turkey’s Kurdish-majority south-east. The Turkish state has largely indicated that it sees IS as a lesser threat to its national security than the presence of a consolidated Kurdish political-military force in northern Syria. Indeed, Turkey has expressed vociferous opposition to the growing strength of the YPG – which is closely connected to the PKK through both shared political goals and personnel – on its southern border. As such, the Turkish presence in Syria threatens to introduce a new set of problems to the region.

Until August 2016, the ground component of US-led operations against IS in northern Syria had been principally conducted by a US-backed coalition of Arab and Kurdish militias – including the YPG – known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In May 2016, the SDF started an operation to liberate the so-called ‘Manbij pocket’, an IS-held 100km stretch of territory in northern Syria adjacent to the Turkish border. Turkey’s response to the offensive was mixed. When the SDF first threatened to take Manbij in late 2015, Turkey responded by announcing that the Euphrates River – marking  the boundary between IS and YPG-held territories in northern Syria – would constitute a “red line” for the YPG, which if crossed would prompt military action by Turkey. However, Turkey subsequently changed its position to grudging acceptance of the offensive on condition that YPG elements withdraw east of the Euphrates after securing territorial gains.

As the SDF offensive met significant success, Turkey sprang into action against Jarablus amidst growing uncertainty over whether YPG elements would in fact abide by the requirement to withdraw. Turkey’s move into northern Syria therefore marks less of a change in its anti-IS policy, and rather the enactment of a long-standing objective of denying Kurdish forces control of any further areas of territory proximate to the Turkish border. On 28 August, Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stated that Turkey intended to fight the YPG to the same degree as it was combating IS, echoing sentiments expressed in July 2015 when Turkey began simultaneously bombing IS and the PKK in what was framed a “counter-terrorism” drive.

Despite the conflict between Turkey and the YPG, the US has expressed full support for the Turkish operation. In mid-September, US officials announced that they had deployed 40 special forces personnel to work alongside Turkish forces in operations against IS. However, this is likely to complicate the US relationship with Kurdish units within the SDF. Many elements within the YPG, which in recent weeks has worked closely with US special forces to push IS from the towns and villages surrounding Manbij, feel betrayed with the recent turn in events. After the Turkish forces arrived in northern Syria, YPG fighters were quoted saying that “the Kurds have no friends but the mountains”. Despite this, the Kurds in Syria will recognise that their best chance of fulfilling their political objectives lies in continuing to work with the US as closely as possible in order to continue receiving international support and military aid. Nonetheless, this raises questions about whether this erosion of trust will compromise future US-SDF operations as the inevitable push to retake the IS stronghold of Raqqa approaches.

The Turkish presence has also reignited sectarian conflict in areas occupied by the SDF, with early signs of an open rebellion against SDF units in the Manbij pocket. Since the Turkish move against Jarablus, a number of Sunni Arab groups in the area, resentful of any semblance of ‘occupation’ by Kurdish forces, have issued statements explicitly rejecting the SDF’s presence. In several areas, the SDF has encountered sudden violent opposition; a senior Kurdish commander in the Jarablus area was assassinated two days ahead of the Turkish operation. Turkey has also empowered and armed local rebel groups in Aleppo and Azaz, many of which have already clashed with Kurdish militias around Jarablus. The outcome is looking increasingly likely to be an intensification of local-level sectarian violence in areas newly cleared by the SDF.

Cognisant of these developments, the US has attempted as far as possible to keep the two sides from engaging one another. US officials have reportedly warned Turkish officials that no US planes will provide air support to Turkish forces moving southward, only to those moving west to clear IS territory. Similarly, the US has stressed to the SDF that future military aid will only be forthcoming for SDF operations north of Raqqa, and that all Kurdish SDF units must withdraw east of the Euphrates River. While this has prompted the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from areas around Jarablus, tensions remain high and further clashes between Turkish forces and Kurdish militia units in the region are likely as the operation progresses. Turkish-backed militias have maintained that they will eventually advance towards Manbij, while the SDF have vowed to defend the area from all comers.

Both the Turkish and SDF campaigns against IS are likely to meet eventual success. The self-proclaimed IS ‘caliphate’ is increasingly beleaguered and steadily losing ground on multiple fronts. Now, with its logistical chains to Turkey effectively cut off by the Turkish military advance, the group is increasingly swiftly heading towards a military defeat. However, for newly liberated areas in northern Syria, volatile sectarian divisions coupled with the competing ambitions of both regional and international players have contributed to a dangerously overcrowded political space. In what is steadily shaping up to be a race for territory in the wake of the impending defeat of IS, the long-term outcome for northern Syria is unlikely to be harmonious.

On 24 August, Turkish special forces and armoured units crossed the country’s southern border into northern Syria, marking the first major Turkish ground incursion into Syrian territory since the start of the civil war. As Turkish forces and allied militias swiftly seized the Islamic State (IS)-held border town of Jarablus, many commentators framed the Turkish operation, dubbed ‘Euphrates Shield’, as a turning point in the anti-IS campaign. However, in addition to IS, the Turkish military is targeting US-backed Kurdish militia units in northern Syria – namely, the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG). In the weeks since the operation started, this unfolding dynamic has seen a steady resurgence of conflict in areas recently liberated from IS in northern Syria and threatens to destabilise the region long after IS is gone.

In late 2014, Turkish government and military officials expressed their intent to establish a ‘buffer zone’ inside northern Syria, using a mix of Turkish ground forces and local Syrian militias with US air support. However, until August 2016, Turkey’s commitment to taking military action in Syria against IS was limited. While allowing US and allied planes to launch strikes on IS from Turkish soil, the Turkish military had done little apart from fortify the border area and conduct infrequent airstrikes and artillery strikes on nearby IS positions. Against this backdrop, the ground-based assault on Jarablus is unprecedented in Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian conflict.

While Turkish military involvement in northern Syria will undoubtedly hasten the collapse of IS, it is intimately linked to its own internal conflict with the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK), a Kurdish militant movement based in Turkey’s Kurdish-majority south-east. The Turkish state has largely indicated that it sees IS as a lesser threat to its national security than the presence of a consolidated Kurdish political-military force in northern Syria. Indeed, Turkey has expressed vociferous opposition to the growing strength of the YPG – which is closely connected to the PKK through both shared political goals and personnel – on its southern border. As such, the Turkish presence in Syria threatens to introduce a new set of problems to the region.

Until August 2016, the ground component of US-led operations against IS in northern Syria had been principally conducted by a US-backed coalition of Arab and Kurdish militias – including the YPG – known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In May 2016, the SDF started an operation to liberate the so-called ‘Manbij pocket’, an IS-held 100km stretch of territory in northern Syria adjacent to the Turkish border. Turkey’s response to the offensive was mixed. When the SDF first threatened to take Manbij in late 2015, Turkey responded by announcing that the Euphrates River – marking  the boundary between IS and YPG-held territories in northern Syria – would constitute a “red line” for the YPG, which if crossed would prompt military action by Turkey. However, Turkey subsequently changed its position to grudging acceptance of the offensive on condition that YPG elements withdraw east of the Euphrates after securing territorial gains.

As the SDF offensive met significant success, Turkey sprang into action against Jarablus amidst growing uncertainty over whether YPG elements would in fact abide by the requirement to withdraw. Turkey’s move into northern Syria therefore marks less of a change in its anti-IS policy, and rather the enactment of a long-standing objective of denying Kurdish forces control of any further areas of territory proximate to the Turkish border. On 28 August, Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stated that Turkey intended to fight the YPG to the same degree as it was combating IS, echoing sentiments expressed in July 2015 when Turkey began simultaneously bombing IS and the PKK in what was framed a “counter-terrorism” drive.

Despite the conflict between Turkey and the YPG, the US has expressed full support for the Turkish operation. In mid-September, US officials announced that they had deployed 40 special forces personnel to work alongside Turkish forces in operations against IS. However, this is likely to complicate the US relationship with Kurdish units within the SDF. Many elements within the YPG, which in recent weeks has worked closely with US special forces to push IS from the towns and villages surrounding Manbij, feel betrayed with the recent turn in events. After the Turkish forces arrived in northern Syria, YPG fighters were quoted saying that “the Kurds have no friends but the mountains”. Despite this, the Kurds in Syria will recognise that their best chance of fulfilling their political objectives lies in continuing to work with the US as closely as possible in order to continue receiving international support and military aid. Nonetheless, this raises questions about whether this erosion of trust will compromise future US-SDF operations as the inevitable push to retake the IS stronghold of Raqqa approaches.

The Turkish presence has also reignited sectarian conflict in areas occupied by the SDF, with early signs of an open rebellion against SDF units in the Manbij pocket. Since the Turkish move against Jarablus, a number of Sunni Arab groups in the area, resentful of any semblance of ‘occupation’ by Kurdish forces, have issued statements explicitly rejecting the SDF’s presence. In several areas, the SDF has encountered sudden violent opposition; a senior Kurdish commander in the Jarablus area was assassinated two days ahead of the Turkish operation. Turkey has also empowered and armed local rebel groups in Aleppo and Azaz, many of which have already clashed with Kurdish militias around Jarablus. The outcome is looking increasingly likely to be an intensification of local-level sectarian violence in areas newly cleared by the SDF.

Cognisant of these developments, the US has attempted as far as possible to keep the two sides from engaging one another. US officials have reportedly warned Turkish officials that no US planes will provide air support to Turkish forces moving southward, only to those moving west to clear IS territory. Similarly, the US has stressed to the SDF that future military aid will only be forthcoming for SDF operations north of Raqqa, and that all Kurdish SDF units must withdraw east of the Euphrates River. While this has prompted the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from areas around Jarablus, tensions remain high and further clashes between Turkish forces and Kurdish militia units in the region are likely as the operation progresses. Turkish-backed militias have maintained that they will eventually advance towards Manbij, while the SDF have vowed to defend the area from all comers.

Both the Turkish and SDF campaigns against IS are likely to meet eventual success. The self-proclaimed IS ‘caliphate’ is increasingly beleaguered and steadily losing ground on multiple fronts. Now, with its logistical chains to Turkey effectively cut off by the Turkish military advance, the group is increasingly swiftly heading towards a military defeat. However, for newly liberated areas in northern Syria, volatile sectarian divisions coupled with the competing ambitions of both regional and international players have contributed to a dangerously overcrowded political space. In what is steadily shaping up to be a race for territory in the wake of the impending defeat of IS, the long-term outcome for northern Syria is unlikely to be harmonious.