Business as Usual? Elections in Central Asia

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 74, and President Islam Karimov, 77, have ruled Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as authoritarian leaders. Their two decades of rule have been marked by the suppression of all legitimate political opposition, rendering the most recent elections, in which they each garnered over 90 percent of the vote, mere formalities. Throughout the two countries’ post-Soviet history, Nazarbayev and Karimov presented themselves at home and to the outside world as guarantors of political and economic stability. Indeed, stability was the central theme of this year’s elections, which was expected given the recent regional economic slowdown and geopolitical tensions in and around Central Asia. However, the issues most pertinent to long-term stability went unaddressed: who will eventually succeed these two aging leaders? And what implications will this have for domestic and regional stability?

The succession question 

Like other countries in the region, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s political systems are organised around strong leaders who tolerate little dissent. Nazarbayev and Karimov have maintained their hold on power by constantly balancing the interests of political and economic elites beneath them, sometimes playing them against one another. However, despite their old age and repeated rumours of ill health, there is no visible succession plan in place, fuelling significant speculation. Given uncertainty over the remaining length of their tenures, it is worth considering what the implications of Karimov or Nazabayev’s sudden departure might be.

The constitution in both countries lays out a succession procedure. If the Kazakh president dies or is incapacitated, the head of the senate serves out the remainder of the term; in Uzbekistan, the head of the senate assumes leadership for three months until elections are held. However, consensus building and infighting among political and economic elites influence Central Asian politics more than constitutional processes. For example, in Turkmenistan, following the death of President Saparmurat Niyazov in 2006, the constitutionally designated successor was arrested and negotiations between elites saw Deputy Prime Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow become president. 

In both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, political elites are often drawn from the president’s family. Consequently, there is a possibility that the incumbents will handpick a relative as their successor, as seen in Azerbaijan in 2003. In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev (married to Dinara Nazarbayeva), and his daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, have been touted as potential successors.

In Uzbekistan, Karimov’s eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was once viewed as a successor until she publicly fell out of favour with him. She is currently under house arrest, facing corruption charges. 

There is also a possibility that the incumbents will select a candidate from the current administration, following the example of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who endorsed Vladimir Putin in 1999. Potential Kazakh candidates include Nurtai Abykayev, Chairman of the National Security Committee and long-time Nazarbayev ally, and Prime Minister Karim Masimov. In Uzbekistan, although Rustam Inoyatov, the Chairman of the National Security Service, is deemed a potential successor, he might be challenged by Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has links to influential oligarchs and the country’s vast agricultural industry. Finance Minister Rustam Azimov may also be in the running. Considering the secretive nature of both regimes, it is possible that there may be other potential candidates behind the scenes, driving ongoing speculation.

Socio-economic challenges 

While Nazarbayev and Karimov have overseen significant economic growth and ensured relative political stability during their tenure, the recent economic slowdown in neighbouring Russia – a major trading partner for both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – along with falling oil prices has negatively impacted both countries. 

The drop in the value of Russia’s currency, the rouble, has flooded Kazakhstan with low-cost Russian goods and resulted in local producers dismissing their workers. In Uzbekistan, on the other hand, Russia’s currency crisis has led to a drop in the value of remittances from the two to three million Uzbeks working in Russia. Remittances currently make up 12 percent of Uzbekistan’s GDP, and the potential return of thousands of disgruntled migrant workers would place the Uzbek economy under significant strain, exacerbating the already high rates of unemployment and poverty.

The drop in the oil price has also impacted both economies. Oil represents two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s exports, and low oil prices have led to decreased government revenues, threatening social spending over the next 12 months. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Kazakhstan’s growth forecast dropped from 5.1 percent in last September to 1.5 percent this year; a significant drop over such a short period.

If, as expected, the Russian economy and oil price do not bounce back to early-2014 levels, both countries’ economic recoveries will be hindered. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are therefore wary of the instability that could potentially follow. When poor socio-economic conditions contributed to anti-government unrest – in Andijan, Uzbekistan, in 2005 and Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan, in 2011 – security forces responded with lethal force against unarmed protesters. While Nazarbayev and Karimov are at the helm, their strong security apparatuses are likely to mitigate the risk of large-scale unrest. However, their sudden departure from power, if not followed by a peaceful transition, could exacerbate the socio-economic challenges and also lead to elite infighting.

Geopolitical dynamics

Beyond domestic grievances, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and alleged military involvement in eastern Ukraine – which it justified by the need to protect ethnic Russians – has alarmed Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Ethnic Russians, who make up 22 percent of Kazakhstan’s population, are largely based in the country’s north. Although a Crimea-style Russian annexation is unlikely – as northern Kazakhstan is not as strategically important as Crimea – Kazakhstan remains wary of Russian intentions in the region. It has maintained that the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) should be purely trade-related and have no impact on its national sovereignty or independence. Despite being a major security ally of Russia, Kazakhstan has also sought to lessen its dependence on Russia and balance its geopolitical interests by maintaining good relations with China, the European Union (EU) and the US.

Uzbekistan, on the other hand, does not have a significant ethnic Russian population nor a shared border with Russia. However, Uzbekistan has a frosty relationship with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over the proposed construction of the Kambarata-1 and Rogun dams, which Uzbekistan alleges threaten its economic and environmental interests. Border disputes have occasionally resulted in fatal confrontations involving Uzbek soldiers and are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. For Karimov, potential cross-border instability from Afghanistan is also a major concern, especially following the departure of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops in December 2014.

Both Nazarbayev and Karimov have been instrumental in turning Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan into two of the most powerful and stable states in the region. Because of this, if their respective departures are followed by a power vacuum instead of a smooth and organised transition, these long-standing tensions, along with underlying socioeconomic challenges, are likely to intensify.