Black flags in the Kingdom: Jordan's extremist threat

In June 2014, a series of protests in the city of Ma’an in southern Jordan over alleged police brutality culminated in public displays of support for Islamic State (‘IS’), the Sunni militant group which currently controls large swathes of territory across Iraq and Syria. While Ma’an has long been perceived as a hub for anti-government sentiment in Jordan, the sense of alarm became more pronounced when the June protesters raised IS’ black flag over a traffic circle in the centre of the city. Simultaneously, a number of messages appeared across Arabic-language social media platforms proclaiming support for IS and describing Ma’an ominously as “the Fallujah of Jordan.” Despite the rapid response by the security forces in restoring calm to the streets of Ma’an, the demonstrations have created a palpable sense of unease across the country, particularly given the recent impact Islamist militancy has had on Jordan’s closest neighbours.

So far, the Hashemite Kingdom has been relatively insulated from the external threat posed by Islamist militant groups operating within Syria and Iraq. In response to territorial gains made by militants in southern Syria and western Iraq, Jordan has substantially reinforced its borders with additional troops. In June, the advance of IS forces to within close proximity of Jordan’s borders with Syria and Iraq prompted pre-emptive action by the Jordanian military, including its special forces, who conducted operations inside Iraq to stem the group’s progress. Additionally, since late September 2014, the Jordanian air force has been carrying out sorties inside Syria in conjunction with the US-led coalition. While Jordan falls distinctly within the proclaimed territorial ambitions of IS, the Kingdom is fortunate to possess a modern, well-equipped military backed by substantial funding from the US. It is therefore very unlikely that a coordinated IS military offensive will be projected from Iraq or Syria into Jordan.

Of greater concern is the worryingly high level of domestic support for militant extremism within Jordan itself, particularly amongst members of the Kingdom’s Salafi-jihadist movement. Salafi-jihadism is a radicalized offshoot of conservative Salafism, whose followers call for a strict interpretation of the Quran and the blanket application of Sharia law.

As the name implies, Salafi-jihadism differs ideologically from pure Salafism in that it espouses an overt commitment to waging holy war against the US, Israel, and other regimes deemed to be ‘infidel’. The Salafijihadist movement in Jordan is estimated at approximately 5,000 members, with the largest pockets of support existing in the southern cities of Ma’an and Zarqa. Whilst the presence of Salafi-jihadists has been long a source of concern for the Jordanian government, the movement’s role in facilitating the recruitment of Jordanians into foreign militant organizations has been flagged as an increasingly disturbing development. By recent estimates, there are 1,800 to 2,000 Jordanians fighting alongside Islamist militant groups in Syria and Iraq, with the majority of these fighters included in the ranks of Jabhat Al-Nusra (‘JAN’). As with other regional countries whose citizens have joined jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, these Jordanians represent a potential security threat if they are able to return home.

The threat from domestic extremism has not gone unnoticed in the Kingdom. The Jordanian government has implemented a number of measures in an attempt to address the growth of extremism and snuff out terrorist threats. This includes the regulation and supervision of Islamic educational institutions and religious leaders in a campaign to counter the radical narrative preached by IS and its affiliates. The government has also expanded the scope of its anti-terrorism laws, with the introduction of increasingly more repressive tactics directed against groups with suspected ties to extremist organisations. For example, over the past three months, the government has incarcerated over 20 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group which is also Jordan’s largest political opposition movement. However, whilst the state’s efforts have been interpreted in some quarters as a justified and proactive approach to internal security, there is a legitimate concern that the government’s actions reflect an intention to utilize the threat of extremism as a justification for suppressing political opposition and media criticism.

While the necessity for a policy to combat the threat of extremism is unquestionable, the means by which this is achieved poses significant difficulties. It is debatable whether the repression of moderate Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, is an adequate answer to the extremist question, particularly when the largest base of extremist support is located within the politically and economically marginalized sections of Jordanian society. For example, in Egypt the government’s violent crackdown on Islamist political movements has arguably contributed to the emergence of more radical groups, such as Bayt Al Maqdis, which recently pledged its allegiance to IS.

Central to this debate are questions concerning the principal drivers of Islamic extremism. Support for extremism in Jordan, as is acknowledged to be the case in many other states across the region, often has less to do with specific ideologies, and considerably more to do with underlying socio-economic conditions. Political and economic marginalization and disenfranchisement contribute towards an environment in which extremist narratives are able to gain a foothold. Jordan’s present economic difficulties are an obvious cause for concern. As the impact of regional instability on Jordan continues to grow, the Kingdom is becoming increasingly dependent upon foreign donors. The presence of approximately 600,000 Syrian refugees has placed significant additional pressure on Jordan’s struggling economy, exacerbating existing problems with widespread unemployment and service provision. Situated 200km south of Amman, Ma’an has an unemployment rate of 25 percent, a figure even higher amongst the youth, and has the potential to become fertile ground for extremist recruiters. With this in mind, Jordan could potentially be implementing a set of measures that are counter-productive to its end goals. While a blanket suppression of ideologies across the Islamist spectrum may succeed in constraining the activities of radical groups, it is also likely to further fuel public disgruntlement and anti-government sentiment.

In Jordan’s efforts to counter the threat of radicalism, the most effective course of action may not be an overreliance on an anti-extremist crackdown, but rather, the government should attempt to relieve the fundamental conditions that make extremism appear attractive in the first place. If the protests in Ma’an serve as any indication, then socio-economic marginalization and the perception of a repressive government should be considered to be primary drivers of extremism, particularly amongst Jordan’s younger demographic. Until these conditions are addressed through an effective mitigation strategy, the growth of the extremist threat in Jordan is likely to be sustained for as long its potential base of support remains marginalised and mired in poverty and, as a result, increasingly susceptible to the influence of radical narratives.