Beyond Banditry: Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines

Since late March, the Armed Forces of the Philippines had been tracking Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militants in the jungles of Basilan and Jolo islands, in the hope of freeing 18 foreigners being held hostage by the group and capturing their leader, Isnilon Hapilon. However, on 9 April, their subsequent offensive resulted in the largest single-day combat loss for the armed forces so far this year. In a 10-hour confrontation, 18 soldiers were killed, four were beheaded, and 56 others sustained injuries. The ASG reportedly sustained 24 casualties. 

The ASG’s notoriety has weakened since the early 2000s, largely as a result of a government crackdown. The group has been reduced to primarily relying on kidnapping-for-ransom and extortion to sustain its existence, leading to its members variously described as bandits and criminals in local media. However, this recent confrontation, and the beheading of John Ridsdel, a Canadian hostage, affirming that it remains a key security threat in the Philippines. 

Due to an offensive against the ASG that began in 2002 and lasted little over a decade, the organisation has devolved from a well-organised group into several factions, making it difficult to determine its size, objectives, and operational capacity. Nevertheless, reported estimates place membership between 300 and 400, down from approximately 1,250 in the early 2000s. Established in 1991, the group was originally driven by radical Islamist ideology with the aim of establishing a caliphate across Mindanao. However, its contemporary factions seem more interested in profiting from kidnap-for-ransom, extortion, arms smuggling, drugs trafficking, and money laundering. Yet, it still engages in acts of terror, albeit on a smaller scale, using small arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), targeting civilians, government and military personnel and assets. The ASG has been unable to execute large-scale bombings since the early 2000s, with the most notable incident being the 2004 Manila Bay bombing that killed 116 people. While some ASG members reportedly desire to stage mass-casualty attacks, a lack of clear leadership, reduced operational capabilities, and a substantial military presence in western Mindanao hinders the group from returning to its former strength. 

Part of ASG’s efforts to strengthen have included reconsidering its relationships with global jihadi movements. Historically, ASG has been linked to Al Qaeda, however two videos, one released in August 2014 and another in January 2016, show Hapilon declaring allegiance to Islamic State (IS). It remains unclear whether all of ASG has defected to IS, or individual factions. Nevertheless, Hapilon’s pledges of allegiance have raised fears that the ASG will increase its kidnapping and terror activities in IS’s name. Concerns have been compounded by reports of IS’s council appointing Hapilon as the leader of IS in the Philippines, and the organisation’s ambitions to reportedly establish a branch in the south. However, too much significance shouldn’t necessarily be ascribed to these developments at this stage. The ASG’s motivation for aligning with IS appears largely strategic; given the group’s decline in the past decade, the ASG is likely trying to revive its image and seek relevance amongst the Philippines’ plethora of rebel and terrorist organisations. Drawing on the IS brand serves as a marketing tool to recruit potential members and expand the ASG’s organisational capacity. The group’s activities are also more likely to remain driven by profits rather than the prophet, despite a recent ASG hostage video from October 2015 resembling the theatrics of IS cinematography. Whilst a high-impact IS-inspired attack in the short term would also serve to raise the ASG’s profile, the group continues to be closely monitored by national security forces, stymieing efforts to stage a significant attack. 

The strength of the ASG of today pales in comparison to the early 2000s. However, its ability to inflict substantial military casualties requires analysis and understanding. While pledges of allegiance to IS have, to date, not altered the group’s modus operandi significantly, IS’s potential influence over the group warrants heightened concern over future changes in attack patterns. The affiliation could provide a motivator for ASG factions to coalesce and re-establish the group’s status. Likewise, the recent beheading of a hostage has also given the group international prominence, which they may seek to maintain through further actions. To do this, the group will have to overcome its fractured structure, and the military’s continuous monitoring. The Philippines and the international community will hope that these efforts remain unsuccessful.

Since late March, the Armed Forces of the Philippines had been tracking Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militants in the jungles of Basilan and Jolo islands, in the hope of freeing 18 foreigners being held hostage by the group and capturing their leader, Isnilon Hapilon. However, on 9 April, their subsequent offensive resulted in the largest single-day combat loss for the armed forces so far this year. In a 10-hour confrontation, 18 soldiers were killed, four were beheaded, and 56 others sustained injuries. The ASG reportedly sustained 24 casualties. 

The ASG’s notoriety has weakened since the early 2000s, largely as a result of a government crackdown. The group has been reduced to primarily relying on kidnapping-for-ransom and extortion to sustain its existence, leading to its members variously described as bandits and criminals in local media. However, this recent confrontation, and the beheading of John Ridsdel, a Canadian hostage, affirming that it remains a key security threat in the Philippines. 

Due to an offensive against the ASG that began in 2002 and lasted little over a decade, the organisation has devolved from a well-organised group into several factions, making it difficult to determine its size, objectives, and operational capacity. Nevertheless, reported estimates place membership between 300 and 400, down from approximately 1,250 in the early 2000s. Established in 1991, the group was originally driven by radical Islamist ideology with the aim of establishing a caliphate across Mindanao. However, its contemporary factions seem more interested in profiting from kidnap-for-ransom, extortion, arms smuggling, drugs trafficking, and money laundering. Yet, it still engages in acts of terror, albeit on a smaller scale, using small arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), targeting civilians, government and military personnel and assets. The ASG has been unable to execute large-scale bombings since the early 2000s, with the most notable incident being the 2004 Manila Bay bombing that killed 116 people. While some ASG members reportedly desire to stage mass-casualty attacks, a lack of clear leadership, reduced operational capabilities, and a substantial military presence in western Mindanao hinders the group from returning to its former strength. 

Part of ASG’s efforts to strengthen have included reconsidering its relationships with global jihadi movements. Historically, ASG has been linked to Al Qaeda, however two videos, one released in August 2014 and another in January 2016, show Hapilon declaring allegiance to Islamic State (IS). It remains unclear whether all of ASG has defected to IS, or individual factions. Nevertheless, Hapilon’s pledges of allegiance have raised fears that the ASG will increase its kidnapping and terror activities in IS’s name. Concerns have been compounded by reports of IS’s council appointing Hapilon as the leader of IS in the Philippines, and the organisation’s ambitions to reportedly establish a branch in the south. However, too much significance shouldn’t necessarily be ascribed to these developments at this stage. The ASG’s motivation for aligning with IS appears largely strategic; given the group’s decline in the past decade, the ASG is likely trying to revive its image and seek relevance amongst the Philippines’ plethora of rebel and terrorist organisations. Drawing on the IS brand serves as a marketing tool to recruit potential members and expand the ASG’s organisational capacity. The group’s activities are also more likely to remain driven by profits rather than the prophet, despite a recent ASG hostage video from October 2015 resembling the theatrics of IS cinematography. Whilst a high-impact IS-inspired attack in the short term would also serve to raise the ASG’s profile, the group continues to be closely monitored by national security forces, stymieing efforts to stage a significant attack. 

The strength of the ASG of today pales in comparison to the early 2000s. However, its ability to inflict substantial military casualties requires analysis and understanding. While pledges of allegiance to IS have, to date, not altered the group’s modus operandi significantly, IS’s potential influence over the group warrants heightened concern over future changes in attack patterns. The affiliation could provide a motivator for ASG factions to coalesce and re-establish the group’s status. Likewise, the recent beheading of a hostage has also given the group international prominence, which they may seek to maintain through further actions. To do this, the group will have to overcome its fractured structure, and the military’s continuous monitoring. The Philippines and the international community will hope that these efforts remain unsuccessful.