Analysis: Qatar-GCC Dispute

On 5 June, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Egypt and Yemen’s internationally recognised government severed diplomatic ties with Qatar over its alleged support for terrorism. The sudden announcement accompanied several prohibitive measures against Qatar, including suspension of air, sea and land transportation. The move follows recent tensions over a controversial speech by Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, in which he allegedly criticised the US and expressed support for Iran, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (‘MB’). Qatar officially denied that the Emir ever made the speech, claiming the state-run news agency that reported on the speech was hacked, but failed to convince Saudi Arabia and its allies. While this incident may have triggered the cutting of ties, Saudi Arabia has long criticised independent trends in Qatar’s foreign policy, including its support for the MB and mostly positive relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s primary rival in the region.

The decision to sever diplomatic ties is not without precedent, although the suspension of transportation routes (including Qatar’s only land border with Saudi Arabia) represents a major escalation. For example, in March 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar over its support for the MB. They also reportedly threatened to close Qatar’s land border, impose sanctions and close Saudi airspace to Qatari planes, but did not implement these measures. Qatar subsequently ordered several MB activists to leave the country, signaling its intention to appease its GCC counterparts. The ambassadors returned to Doha nine months later as diplomatic relations normalised. However, from Saudi Arabia and its allies’ perspectives, it would appear that Qatar has not fully aligned its foreign policy to the GCC’s objectives, as it remains a backer of the MB and continues to maintain positive relations with Iran. Therefore, today’s decision was likely the latest and most severe attempt to pressure Qatar to change its foreign policy course.

The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs has condemned the measures as “unjustified” but did not announce any retaliatory measures. Facing significant regional isolation and negative economic impact, Qatar is most likely to compromise, as it has done in previous occasions, although the nature of this compromise is unclear. It is highly unlikely that the Saudi Arabia-led bloc would take such a drastic decision without having first informed President Donald Trump’s administration. Even if the US is not explicitly supportive of the Saudi Arabia’s decision, it most likely wants Qatar to abandon its support for the MB, Hamas, and renounce Iran. This was reflected in a statement made by the US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, which urged GCC countries to resolve their differences without explicitly condemning the actions of either side.

The impact of the dispute on Qatar is significant. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt have declared that they would stop flights in and out of Qatar. The closing of the land border between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, a route through which 40 percent of Qatar’s food supplies are reportedly delivered, could result in a food shortage, along with inflation and resultant unrest in the month of Ramadan. Furthermore, Saudi, Egyptian, Bahraini, Emirati, Yemeni and Libyan citizens are now banned from passing through, travelling to or living in Qatar, and vice versa. Citizens of these countries and Qatar have 14 days to leave. If these policies are implemented, they would cause significant business disruptions across most sectors.

There have been several unsubstantiated suggestions posted online on the social networking site Twitter that this ongoing crisis may culminate in either an internal or KSA-supported palace coup within Qatar, particularly given that several members of the Al Thani family may themselves wish for a leadership change as part of appeasement attempts and the immediate restoration of the status quo. We assess such a move to be unlikely at this stage – any leadership change would require both a strong consensus within the Al Thani family as well as an unofficial gesture of approval from the US government.