America Decides: Two Candidates, Two Very Different Visions for US/Russian Relations

As Secretary of State between 2009 and 2013, Hillary Clinton’s foreign policy views are often equated with the restricted and cautious approach favoured by President Obama’s administration. However, most political analysts agree that Clinton favours a more active, interventionist style. Indeed, she recently criticised Obama’s reported foreign policy maxim: “don’t do stupid stuff”, by saying that reluctance to intervene in the world’s affairs should not constitute an organising principle of policy. Where Obama has appeared conciliatory, Clinton can be expected to adopt a more active attitude. In the context of the Clinton-Putin relationship, which is known to be particularly cold, this will likely translate into a more hard-line resistance to Russian expansionism. Clinton has, for example, been vocal about Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine, in 2014 comparing Putin’s actions to those of Adolf Hitler. Clinton is also strongly in favour of the US and EU sanctions imposed on Russia as a response to its invasion of Ukraine, and would likely want to see them expanded or at the very least extended. She is also more likely to provide the Ukrainian government with significant lethal aid to fight the Russian-backed insurgents in the war-torn east of the country.

By contrast, Trump appears to view Putin in a much more positive light than Clinton. While it is difficult to discern the policy platform of the mercurial Republican nominee, he has stated that he would “get along very well” with the Russian President. In September 2016, Trump also came under a barrage of criticism from both ends of the US political spectrum for appearing on Russian state-owned television, where he proceeded to praise the Russian President’s leadership skills. Analysts have also pointed to other, less overt ties between the Trump camp and the Kremlin: Paul Manafort, chairman of Trump’s campaign, previously served as a lobbyist for the pro-Russian former Ukrainian President Yanukovych.

The Kremlin’s apparent support for Trump’s presidential bid has also provoked disquiet among many observers in the West. Putin and the Russian administration have openly praised Trump, and the Russian state is widely considered to have orchestrated cyberattacks on the Democratic Party aimed at discrediting the Clinton campaign. Longstanding observers of Soviet and Russian foreign policy might be forgiven for seeing parallels between this 21st century cyberwarfare and the activities of the Comintern during the 20th. The Soviet government used the organisation to persistently promote sympathetic Soviet causes and political parties abroad. Lenin and Stalin may not have recognised the term ‘cyberwarfare’, but they would certainly have been familiar with its aims. Trump’s ‘America First’ rhetoric suggests that his administration would be far more hesitant in throwing its weight around on the world stage. The most critical opponents of Trump’s campaign have characterised the candidate as a ‘useful idiot’ which the Kremlin is tacitly supporting in order to enjoy greater freedom in its increasingly expansive foreign policy. 

Clinton’s harder stance on Russia may result in frosty diplomatic relations, and an escalation of tensions in Ukraine and Syria- where the US and Russia back opposing parties could certainly follow her election as President. However, history shows that taking a confidently strong stance on Russian adventurism abroad brings dividends in the end. The 20th century witnessed the effectiveness of the US policy of containment towards the USSR, including its application in times of Soviet economic distress. Russia’s GDP is currently the size of Spain’s, and smaller than Italy’s.

The West’s ability to constrain the Russian economy via sanctions is a significant policy tool, but it is also a strategy that takes time to bear fruit. Restrained by the already weak Russian economy, and faced with the potential of more sanctions, a pragmatic Putin may eventually be forced to opt for a thaw in US-Russian relations by reducing its involvement in Syria and Ukraine. Russia is not the USSR, but it responds to assertive foreign policy in much the same way its forbearer did. For the West, Clinton’s brand of offensive defence may represent the best chance for better relations with Russian in the long term.