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Al Mourabitoun: The Story of a Lovechild

The latest attack by Al Mourabitoun against a Bamako-based restaurant has highlighted the lack of security in northern Mali. More needs to be done to counter terrorism in the country, writes Gabrielle Reid.
Al Qaeda in Mali
On 7 March 2015, five people, including a French and Belgian national, were killed during a terrorist attack against a popular restaurant, La Terrasse, in Mali’s capital, Bamako. The attack was claimed by the Sahel-based Islamist militant group, Al Mourabitoun. The Malian government vowed to find those responsible for the incident and take further steps to combat terrorism in the country. Amid an ongoing conflict in the north and expanding operations of transnational terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (‘AQIM’), in the wider Sahel, the recent Bamako attack has raised concerns over the threat that Al Mourabitoun, a relatively new actor, may pose to Mali and whether more needs to be done to counter terrorism.

Established in August 2013, Al Mourabitoun is the troublesome lovechild of two AQIM splinter groups: Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and the Al Mua’qi’oon Biddam (Those who Sign with Blood) Brigade, led by the notorious former AQIM commander, Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The groups’ merger was announced in a communiqué in August 2013 in which Belmokhtar claimed that Al Mourabitoun seeks to extend its operations across northern Africa, “from the Nile to the Atlantic”, “fighting the Zionist campaign aimed at Islam and Muslims around the world”, in allegiance with Al Qaeda. In response to the French-led counter-insurgency operations in Mali in 2013, the group also adopted an explicitly anti-French and anti-Western rhetoric. Prior to the official announcement of the groups’ merger, Al Mua’qi’oon Biddam and MUJAO had become increasingly cooperative and for many, the union was not a surprise. What was surprising was that Belmokhtar announced he would not lead the group as anticipated. Rather, a non-Algerian national, purported to be Ahmed al-Tilemsi, would take the lead. While this move was likely made to appease the leadership of MUJAO, it is believed that Belmokhtar continues to play a prominent role. It further seems as if little has changed regarding the group’s dynamics and objectives following the reported death of al-Tilemsi in December 2014, during a French-led military operation. Little is known about the new leader of Al Mourabitoun; however, it is likely that Belmokhtar has intensified his involvement.
Established in August 2013, Al Mourabitoun is the troublesome lovechild of two AQIM splinter groups: Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and the Al Mua’qi’oon Biddam (Those who Sign with Blood) Brigade

Belmokhtar has long been a controversial actor in the Sahel and was widely regarded as the black sheep of AQIM. AQIM letters, discovered in Timbuktu by French security forces combatting the AQIM insurgency in 2013, revealed that prior to his departure, Belmokhtar frequently acted independently of AQIM top commander, Abdelhamid Abu Zeid. Belmokhtar, often referred to as ‘Mr Marlboro’ given his connections to cigarette smuggling routes in the Sahel, had led AQIM’s northern battalion, or katiba, in Mali prior to the French intervention. Belmokhtar left the group in November 2012 over worsening differences with Abu Zeid, and reformed his katiba fighters under the Al Mua’qi’oon Biddam banner. However, despite having left AQIM, Belmokhtar was no shrinking violet, and shortly afterwards claimed responsibility for the attack against the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria in January 2013, in which 40 employees were killed.

Belmokhtar’s brazenness, coupled with MUJAO’s ability to drum up support from local communities in northern Mali, particularly in Gao, is likely to serve Al Mourabitoun well. After carrying out the very first suicide bombing in Mali in February 2013, MUJAO has demonstrated its ability to conduct coordinated attacks. The group has carried out a large number of attacks, including against the UN peacekeeping operation, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), killing two Chadian and two Senegalese peacekeepers in October and December 2013. Drawing on the combined experience of its founders, Al Mourabitoun appears to have the capability and intent to conduct further attacks within Mali, including in Bamako.

Although the French-led Operation Serval succeeded in preventing the southward advancement of the 2013 Islamist insurgency in Mali, a lack of state and security infrastructure in the north continues to provide a safe haven for terrorist groups, including Al Mourabitoun. The recent Bamako attack suggests that the conclusion of Operation Serval in July 2013 may have been premature. While the transformation of Operation Serval into the broader Chad-based Operation Barkhane mirrored the regionalisation of Islamist militancy in the Sahel, it did so without sufficiently ensuring that the UN or the Mali government would be able to provide much-needed security with a reduced French military presence. In October 2014, MINUSMA Force Commander, Major General Jean Bosco Kazura, echoed these concerns when he told the UN Security Council that he considered the operating environment of MINUSMA to have changed from a peacekeeping environment to one that required a counterterrorism mandate with greater capabilities to combat militancy in the north. Furthermore, while commended for its geographical reach, Operation Barkhane excludes both Libya and Algeria, leaving much of the arduous northern regions of Mali susceptible to transnational terrorism. With worsening insecurity in Libya opening up both recruitment avenues and weapon supplies, northern Mali remains a prominent territory for the proliferation of terrorist activity. This latest attack by Al Mourabitoun demonstrates the urgency in this regard, as more needs to be done to combat the terrorist safe-haven in the north of the country.

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