A Thaksin Issue

For more than four months, Thai politics has been in the midst of an intense contestation between the largely working-class ‘red shirt’ movement of the Pheu Thai party, who support incumbent Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, and the mainly middle-class ‘yellow shirt’ protestors of the Democrat Party. The yellow shirts aim to see Yingluck’s government removed and replaced by an unelected ‘People’s Council’, which would oversee a process of political reform. They argue that Yingluck is manoeuvring for the return from exile of her brother Thaksin, who served as prime minister from 2001 until 2006 when he was ousted in a coup, and who they claim is controlling Yingluck’s government from exile.

The unrest began when Suthep Thaugsuban, the yellow shirt’s unofficial leader, launched a protest movement against perceived corruption in Yingluck’s government. Protests escalated and protestors declared a resolution to ‘Shutdown Bangkok, Restart Thailand’, building barricades and blocking road junctions in an effort to bring commerce and everyday life in Bangkok to a halt until the political impasse is resolved. Since 21 January, a 60 day state of emergency has been in place, which provides Yingluck’s administration with the authority to invoke curfews, censor the media, disperse gatherings and use military force to secure order. A snap general election on 2 February was boycotted by yellow shirt supporters, who further disrupted voting at around ten percent of polling stations. A subsequent attempt to annul the election was dismissed by the constitutional court, although the results will remain invalid until by-elections are held in remaining districts and a parliamentary quorum is reached. Fraught and drawn out talks are ongoing between the election commission and the government on the issue. The commission believes that polls should not be held while the risk of unrest remains. The government argues that polls must be held sooner to meet constitutional requirements and accuse the commission of trying to prevent them from taking up their mandate.

A consensus on political reform may yet be reached between the government and opposition. Yingluck’s party could reasonably commit to political reform measures without compromising its strong electoral prospects or the sanctity of the electoral process. As several political commentators point out, both sides share a commitment to democratic values. The difference is one of emphasis: the red shirts stress the value of elections as a core component of democracy, while the yellow shirts see the government’s alleged corruption as a fundamental breach of its democratic mandate. Nevertheless, the bitterness of the political debate, which has divided families and entrenched opposing views, makes conciliation hard to envisage. This is compounded by the disaffection of the country’s rice farmers, approximately one million of whom remain unpaid under a rice subsidy program launched by Thaksin, which is a central pillar of Yingluck’s government policy. If the farmers join with the opposition, as many have threatened, Yingluck’s bargaining power will be seriously reduced.

The military is keen to avoid a repeat of the violence that followed coups in 2006 and 2010, during which military rulers struggled to rule the country effectively. Military leaders have repeatedly expressed support for a civilian-led resolution. However, given the strong alignment of interests between the military and the yellow shirts, should a compromise not be reached, there is a high risk of a military-led coup. In this event, the army would likely seek to hand over to implicitly-chosen civilian leaders to avoid problems of governance. Protests in Bangkok would be quickly suppressed but rural areas of the country, where support for the Shinawatras is high, would likely see mass protests, riots and shutdowns on a scale similar to that witnessed during previous periods of political violence in 2008 and 2010. An all-out civil war remains unlikely, although a military-backed government would undoubtedly polarise the country even more.

A further driver of political violence would be the death of Bhumibol Adulyadej, the country’s 86 year old ailing monarch who is considered a stabilising and unifying force in Thai politics and has the respect of the majority of Thai people. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn does not enjoy the same prestige as his father due to allegations of adultery and ties to organised crime. Rumours persist that Yingluck’s administration would leverage the king’s death to secure Thaksin’s return from exile and installation as president. A possible remedy would be designate Princess Sirindhorn, Vajiralongkorn’s more respected sister, as heiress so as not to damage the prestige of the monarchy. However, even in this instance, the removal of such a unifying national figurehead as Bhumibol would have a highly destabilizing impact on Thai politics and prompt further fragmentation at the national level.