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The Regionalisation of Boko Haram

The regionalisation of Boko Haram's insurgency is a major security concern for West Africa, but it represents a reactionary strategy to internal and external pressures rather than a reflection of the group's territorial ambitions, writes Gabrielle Reid.
Following a spate of attacks in Cameroon and Niger, and most recently, Chad, by Boko Haram, many have asked whether this is the start of the much forewarned regionalisation of the Nigeria-based militant group’s insurgency. Boko Haram has previously announced its ambition to establish a caliphate in northern Nigeria, and has demonstrated its ability to capture and hold territory there. However, do the attacks in Cameroon and Niger represent a regionalisation of Boko Haram’s territorial ambitions?

Boko Haram first emerged in 2002 under the leadership of Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, a Nigerian-born Salafist sect leader. The group sought to establish Sharia law across Nigeria with a specific focus on suppressing the influence of Western education systems. Since July 2014, Boko Haram has become increasingly strategic in its attacks under new leader Abubakar Shekau, moving away from asymmetric attacks and instead seizing territory in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in the north. By December, Boko Haram controlled much of the land surrounding Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. However, Boko Haram’s activity has not been confined to Nigeria. Reports of recruitment by Boko Haram in neighbouring Cameroon first emerged in 2011, and in early 2013, the group was held responsible for several high-profile attacks in the country. These initial attacks included high-profile kidnappings of foreign nationals, which reportedly solicited high ransom payments. Meanwhile, since 2012, Boko Haram has maintained safe havens in Niger, from which it has launched several cross-border attacks into Nigeria. However, in February 2015, Boko Haram shifted tactics and attacked targets within Niger itself. 

While some assert that these recent attacks reflect regional ambitions of the group, it is unlikely that they are indicative of a desire to lay claim to Cameroonian or Nigerien territory. Rather, Boko Haram’s operations outside Nigeria are reflective of a wider regional war complex developing in West Africa that involves internal and external motivating factors for expansion.

From Boko Haram’s perspective, northern Cameroon shares significant similarities with its counterpart in northern Nigeria; including a marginalised Muslim community, which offers Boko Haram a fertile recruiting ground. Furthermore, porous and poorly secured borders between Nigeria, Cameroon, as well as Niger, have enabled Boko Haram to establish safe havens, launch cross-border operations and elude regional counterinsurgency operations. These dynamics are not new, nor do they stem from Boko Haram’s caliphate ambitions.
Boko Haram
Boko Haram’s operations outside Nigeria are reflective of a wider regional war complex developing in West Africa

The regionalisation of Boko Haram’s operations should rather be seen as a reaction to domestic developments within Nigeria, including recent counterinsurgency operations, instead of a desire by the group to expand territorially. Although the group remains focused on its domestic objectives, Boko Haram’s exploitation of the region’s porous borders nonetheless poses an increased security risk to Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

The governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin recently met in 2014 to determine a joint strategy against Boko Haram, facilitated by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). These countries have already committed troops to counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram in the region. The joint response elicited increasingly aggressive rhetoric from Boko Haram, which vowed to conduct reprisal attacks against participating states. The MNJTF operation, aimed at securing the respective countries’ own territory, is a direct threat to Boko Haram’s wider network within Niger and Cameroon, needed by the group to facilitate its operations in Nigeria and to achieve its domestic objectives. Boko Haram has reacted to this threat by expanding its terror campaign to other parts of the continent. Boko Haram’s attack earlier this February against the Chadian village of Ngoubou, located approximately 20km from the Nigerian border, on Lake Chad, is a clear example of the group’s capability and intent to carry out retaliatory action against MNJTF member states. The attack came several days after Chad troops to regional efforts to combat Boko Haram. The recent attacks in Cameroon, Niger and Chad after the formation of the MNJTF highlight the external, motivating factor for Boko Haram’s expansion, which involves retaliation by the militant group. These attacks also highlight the risks of a regional response to Boko Haram and emphasise the importance of a Nigerian-led solution to the crisis.

However, since Boko Haram’s inception, the Nigerian government has struggled to contain the group. While this has primarily derived from a lack of political will, corrupt party dynamics and a dependence on an under-resourced and poorly trained military, Boko Haram’s safe havens outside Nigeria have always provided a respite from domestic counterterrorism operations. The truth of the matter is that the current regional response is likely too little, too late. With Boko Haram having already established an operational presence in Cameroon and Niger, any subsequent military response on the part of these states will be met with high-impact retaliatory attacks. The Boko Haram insurgency now cannot be seen as anything other than a regional problem. However, it is largely one of the states’ making and not one of Boko Haram’s regional ambitions. Combating Boko Haram now comes with a greater risk of regional terrorism.

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