The Abu Sayyaf Group and Islamic State

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is one of the most well-known militant Islamist organisations in the Philippines. In September 2014, the ASG released a video featuring the group’s leader, Isnilon Hapilon, one of the world’s most wanted terrorists, declaring allegiance to Islamic State (IS). Hapilon made his statement in Arabic in the depths of the southern Philippines jungle, with the IS black flag behind him. The video prompted concerns that the ASG would ramp up its kidnappings and terror activities in Southeast Asia. However, despite these fears, it appears that the ASG’s motivation for aligning with IS is largely strategic; given the group’s relative decline in the past decade, the ASG seems to be seeking relevance amongst the Philippines’ plethora of rebel and terrorist organisations. Drawing on the IS brand serves as a marketing tool to recruit potential members and expand the ASG’s organisational capacity in the face of an ongoing military offensive. While future kidnappings are likely, the recent pledge is unlikely to significantly alter the ASG’s current modus operandi.

The ASG aims to establish a caliphate across Mindanao, the second largest and southernmost island in the Philippines. In its formative years, the ASG was associated with Al Qaeda and is known to maintain strong links with Jemaah Islamiyah, an Indonesia-based terrorist organisation. Since 1990, the ASG has staged bombings, kidnappings, and executions that mainly targeted Filipino Christians on the island of Basilan and on the west coast of Mindanao. The group gained international notoriety in the early 2000s for its ability to stage large, well-orchestrated kidnappings mainly targeting foreigners with the purpose of extracting ransom payments. The ASG demonstrated its ability to carry out complex kidnappings when, in April 2000, it kidnapped 21 foreigners from a tourist resort in the Malaysian state of Sabah, and again, in May 2001, when it attacked a holiday resort in Palawan and kidnapped 18 people. Largely in response to these kidnappings, the Philippine government intensified its operations against the ASG with assistance from US Special Forces in 2002.

Despite the crackdown, the ASG has continued to carry out kidnappings for ransom - albeit on a smaller scale - targeting wealthy foreign nationals, local politicians, business people, and civilians in the Philippines’ Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao and along eastern Malaysia.

The ASG’s kidnapping operations are well-planned, utilising a network of militants stationed on islands off the western coast of Mindanao tasked with abducting individuals and tourists. Victims are then transported to villages where they are kept whilst ASG members negotiate a ransom for their release. Unlike the ASG’s kidnappings during the 1990s, which were largely fuelled by political and ideological motivations, due to declining funds the group is now predominantly focused on kidnappings for financial purposes. By focussing on kidnappings for ransom, the ASG has been able to maintain its operations in the face of an on-going military offensive that has, over the years, severely weakened it. Ultimately, the ASG of today pales in comparison to the expectations set out by the group in the early 2000s.

Against this backdrop, the ASG’s 2014 pledge of allegiance to IS has raised fears that the group may adopt IS’s violent kidnapping tactics. Yet, the ASG itself already developed a reputation for targeting foreigners and western nationals and for beheading its victims, although not as publicly as IS, throughout the 2000s. Regionally-based representatives of a special risk consulting group indicated that support for IS is, therefore, more likely to encourage new recruits to join the group, allowing the ASG to increase its operational capacity and therefore by extension, potentially carry out more kidnappings. In addition, ASG’s affiliation with IS may force the group to place a greater emphasis on ideological rhetoric and a greater reliance on social media. Future kidnappings conducted by the ASG could involve the release of videos featuring hostages declaring political and ideological narratives. However, due to limited operational capabilities, the primary motive for attacks will remain ransom payments, meaning the ASG is unlikely to follow IS’s tendency to execute the vast majority of its kidnap victims. Moreover, the ASG is unlikely to stage large-scale kidnappings as witnessed in the early 2000s, and attacks are instead likely to be limited to the southern Philippines and eastern Malaysia, given the on-going military offensive.

The ASG’s pledge of allegiance to IS is, therefore, unlikely to fundamentally alter its kidnapping operations. For the most part, aligning with IS, and appropriating the organisation’s symbols and ideology, serves as a tactic for ASG to boost its relevance amongst the Philippines’ numerous rebel and terrorist groups. Supporting IS helps the ASG appear part of a bigger jihad, thus increasing its attraction to IS sympathisers. Potential South-east Asian IS followers may find it easier to join the ASG in the southern Philippines instead of travelling to the Middle East, for example. Jumping on the IS bandwagon serves as a springboard for the ASG to reassert its status as a feared organisation amongst the Philippines and regional collection of Islamist militant groups.