Solving Gang Violence in Central America's Northern Triangle

In 2015, more than 16,500 people were killed and 109,000 displaced in Central America’s ‘Northern Triangle’ – comprising Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras – largely as a result of gang violence. Strategies that have involved truces and the so-called ‘Mano Dura’ (‘Iron Fist’) approach to curb this threat have been ineffective to date, and many gangs, particularly the infamous Maras, have only grown stronger. Recognising that gang violence is a regional problem, the three Northern Triangle governments recently shifted strategy. In August 2016, the creation of a tri-national anti-crime task force was announced to address this threat. However, the new initiative is ultimately a piecemeal approach and is unlikely to be effective in the long term. 

The new tri-national security unit – known as the ‘Fuerza Trinacional Antipandillas’ (FTA) – forms part of a USD 750 million US-backed security and economic development plan for the region. In addition to the current funding, Northern Triangle authorities are also seeking extra funding from Washington, as well as further intelligence, and anti-narcotics and combat training for local security forces. The FTA’s focus is to dismantle the region’s Mara gangs – Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (MS-18) – which operate trans-nationally and together boast almost 70,000 members. However, joint operations will only focus on border regions to cut off illicit income streams like money laundering, and drug, weapons and human-trafficking. Cooperation among the three governments will also include intelligence sharing, as well as the creation of a database of gang members and their transnational networks. 

This is not the first attempt to create a multilateral anti-crime task force in the Northern Triangle. Joint-border security initiatives have been touted as the solution to combating transnational organised crime in the region since at least 2002. Northern Triangle governments have experimented with a number of border security agreements, but each has been undermined by a lack of trust, border disputes, and confusion over legal authorisations and jurisdictions. With the FTA, the Northern Triangle governments have called for a standardisation of legislation in the region, including extradition laws, in an effort to prevent these issues from resurfacing. However, homogenising legal frameworks on a national level will be a protracted process. Moreover, strategically, doubts remain over the FTA’s overall effectiveness. With security forces clamping down on illicit cross-border activities, gangs like MS-13 and MS-18 are anticipated to increasingly rely on other revenue streams like extortion and kidnapping, particularly in urban areas. There is already evidence in Honduras that the Mara gangs are expanding their extortion activities and increasingly targeting larger companies. Moreover, in El Salvador, gang extortion is estimated to cost three percent of the country’s GDP per year. 

Critics of the FTA have also pointed out that without development and economic opportunities, impoverished youths will continue to join these gangs. US development aid is expected to partially fill this gap, but government corruption – recently highlighted in a series of high-level scandals in Guatemala and Honduras – raises serious doubts about whether this will be put to effective use. Without more jobs, better education, and greater government accountability, the Northern Triangle’s gang problem is here to stay.